a. Initial Reports
During an interview for this investigation, the 11th Marines operations officer recalled another possible chemical warfare agent exposure incident on the evening of February 25. Battery H, 3/14, (a reserve unit attached to the 1/11) fired its cannons directly at two of Iraq’s multiple rocket launcher vehicles, destroying one and putting the other out of action. According to the operations officer, someone from the unit reportedly went back to the site and determined two or three chemical warfare rounds were among the conventional rounds in at least one launcher.[125] A review of documentation confirmed that Battery H successfully attacked the launchers (at 12:16 PM).[126] Relevant approximate locations are shown in Figure 22.
Figure 22. Incident H approximate locations
b. Additional Evidence
The Battery H commander did not recall hearing that a multiple rocket launcher contained chemical rounds but did report hearing the 1st Marine Division commanding general visited the site. He said that after the war the assistant division commander presented the battery commander with a souvenir from a launcher.[127] We found no logs or chronologies noting chemical rocket rounds in connection with this engagement or any subsequent visit to the site.
Figure 23[128] shows one of the Soviet-manufactured BM-21 122mm launchers in this incident. After the war UNSCOM investigators identified this caliber rocket launcher as capable of firing nerve agent rockets. They also found Iraq’s 122mm chemical warfare rockets had no identifying markings to distinguish them from conventional rockets.[129]
Figure 23. Dug-in enemy rocket launcher
The 11th Marines NBC officer did not recall hearing about chemical rounds in the launcher’s tubes although he remembered the incident and described his involvement as follows. Taking along a couple of Marines, he quickly reconnoitered the scene within less than half an hour after the engagement. They hurried to return to their unit so they would not be left behind or mistaken for the enemy. He paid particular attention to the rocket launchers, which were deployed with tanks, an unusual tactical formation, he thought. He used his CAM but observed no positive chemical warfare agent (CWA) indications. The Marines with him performed an M256 test and got a positive result, but the NBC officer determined they had taken shortcuts in the test. When they repeated the test properly, they got negative results. The NBC officer noted the site contained no special chemical protective equipment as he would have expected if the enemy unit possessed an offensive chemical capability. He said he took a few samples, which he said he turned over to the regimental intelligence officer. The NBC officer did not believe CWA was present at this site.[130]
We could not identify the Marine who reportedly found chemical rockets on a launcher, nor could we locate analysis of the samples the 11th Marines NBC officer reported collecting. We contacted the former 11th Marines intelligence officer (S-2) regarding the samples. He said that during this incident, he was with the 11th Marines jump command post and not with the main command post where the regimental NBC officer remained. He did not recall receiving NBC samples during the war and believed the distance between the main and jump command posts precluded his being given samples as claimed by the NBC officer. The regimental S-2 suggested possibly the NBC officer passed the samples to a Marine NCO serving in intelligence with the main command post.[131] We could not contact this NCO, now separated from the Marine Corps.
c. Analysis
First, if chemical rockets had no special markings, a Marine without special knowledge would find it difficult to casually determine their nature. Also, none of those who inspected the launchers during or after the war reported any symptoms. The 11th Marines NBC officer’s site inspection and tests did not indicate chemical agent presence. If some of the rockets were chemical munitions, it is possible none leaked and, therefore, M256 kits would not have detected CWA. However, Marines destroyed one of the two launchers. This likely would have released chemical warfare agent had it been present on that launcher. Despite much abandoned or destroyed enemy equipment in Kuwait after the war, we know of no confirmed or corroborated reports that those who inspected, recovered, disarmed, or destroyed that equipment identified chemical weapons in that country. The initial positive M256 test, disproved by a second test done correctly and not corroborated by simultaneous CAM testing, might have led to the second-hand report of CWA rounds.
d. Assessment
We believe it unlikely the multiple rocket launcher contained chemical rockets. We considered particularly significant the information of the NBC officer who led a team that investigated the site shortly after the engagement and believed they found no CWA. Also, Iraq’s practice of not specially marking CWA rounds would have made identification of them in place very difficult. Our assessment cannot be more unequivocal as we could not identify and interview the Marine who allegedly discovered chemical rockets at the site and therefore could not directly investigate the second-hand report.
a. Initial Reports
On the ground war’s second day (February 25, 1991) several unit logs contained entries about incoming artillery fire assumed to be chemical weapons. The 11th Marines Summary of Action stated, at 5:38 PM, "Various units report incoming artillery gas attack; Units go to MOPP level 4. After detection efforts prove negative, all clear is sounded at 1755 [5:55 PM]."[132]
The units recording this event included:
According to the sources cited above, most units called an all clear within half an hour after detection equipment found no CWA present. See Figure 24 for approximate unit locations.
Figure 24. Incident I approximate locations
b. Additional Evidence
The 11th Marines operations officer recalled listening to events unfold over the radio. He heard incoming fire had hit between the 3/11’s and 5/11’s locations and that the incoming rounds dispensed canisters (submunitions).[138]
After hearing the operations officer’s account of canisters, we asked several other veterans from various 1st Marine Division units if they knew first-hand or indirectly about canisters or sub-munitions from incoming artillery fire anytime during the war. No witnesses recalled seeing or hearing about such weapons. However, the 11th Marines NBC officer recalled several instances of airbursts and low-order detonations. He said he discounted the possibility they were chemical rounds because no one reported any casualties. He recalled intelligence reports indicating Iraq dispensed CWA in canister rounds and claimed he knew which of Iraq’s units had them. He said that Coalition air forces struck one such unit near Al Jaber Air Base before the ground campaign began, and the enemy unit subsequently was observed from the air performing what he described as decontamination operations.[139] We found no reference to this activity in operational or intelligence reporting. At least through February 14 (10 days before the ground campaign began), the Defense Intelligence Agency indicated, "Decontamination efforts have not been observed at sites that have suffered bomb damage, indicating that Iraq is confident that no chemical or biological contamination has resulted."[140]
The CO of the 3/12, the unit that got the positive CAM indication for nerve agent, recalled he sent his NBC officer to check. The tests, of unknown type, were negative. The CO noted he unmasked himself, rather than find someone else to perform selective unmasking procedures. He recalled thinking that matters were getting out of control. He instructed his batteries to, in the future, continue the mission and go to MOPP Level 4 only if he so directed. He told the unit’s NBC officer to advise him of any positive CAM indications and then do confirming tests. With no confirming tests forthcoming, the CO said he left his battalion in MOPP Level 2.[141]
Although reporting noted elsewhere in this narrative suggests otherwise, the 3/11’s commanding officer did not recall any CWA detections within his unit during the war.[142] The battalion operations officer, who also served as the NBC officer, did not think his unit sustained a chemical attack and had reservations about the chemical detection equipment’s capabilities, stating he thought the equipment was inadequate.[143]
Since publishing the interim report in November 1998, we received additional accounts about this event. A US Navy hospital corpsman, assigned to the 3/11’s headquarters battery, reported that during the ground war his unit occupied an enemy artillery position near the Al Burqan oilfield and Al Jaber Air Base. While there, Iraq attacked the unit with mortars. He recalled at least one mortar round struck with a thud, followed by a popping sound, but did not explode. Later, as evening fell, he inspected this round at a distance of 16 to 20 feet (5 to 6 meters); he did not wear a protective mask or gloves. He described the object as similar in size and shape to a large coffee can that had broken partially open with a gel-like substance oozing out. Asked why he thought the object was a mortar round, the witness said he could differentiate incoming artillery and mortar rounds based on sound. According to the corpsman, a Marine sergeant conducted M256 tests that indicated mustard agent presence. Only then did the corpsman go to MOPP Level 4. He did not recall noting any unusual smells while unmasked. He said the Marine sergeant then radioed a report to an unidentified location. The corpsman knew of no one having symptoms of CWA exposure. He said he knew mustard came in a jelly form and Iraq loaded this jelly into 55-gallon drums that could be dropped on troops from airplanes.[144] Intelligence reports confirmed Iraq used helicopters to drop drums of agent, probably mustard, during its war with Iran.[145]
Based on this account, we interviewed several more 3/11 members. The Marine sergeant the corpsman identified recalled that while positioned near Al Burqan and Al Jaber, a few rounds of incoming enemy fire hit the unit in the afternoon or early evening of February 25. He said Marines went to MOPP Level 4 and took cover in foxholes. At first he thought the rounds were duds because they did not explode. He did not see anything oozing from a round that hit approximately 150 yards from his position, but when the round began to emit smoke he became concerned. Thinking the smoke was CWA, he reported gas to the battalion’s fire direction control center. However, the sergeant said he did not conduct M256 tests. He recalled chemical warfare-trained Marines left a foxhole close to his and went to investigate. According to the sergeant, he and other Marines later were told CWA was present, so the unit remained at MOPP Level 4 until the all-clear came, hours later.[146] Another corpsman assigned to the 3/11 headquarters battery also remembered being told mustard agent was present but did not treat any CWA casualties incurred in this incident or at any other time.[147]
The 3/11’s NBC NCO could not remember specific incidents (although he recalled enemy incoming fire throughout the ground war). He recollected seeing enemy rounds emit smoke after incidents involving incoming fire. He also remembered chemical detection equipment produced positive indications for CWA. However, he expressed strong reservations about the capabilities of the chemical detection devices the Marine Corps fielded. In his opinion, every piece of chemical detection equipment the Marines had then was ineffective and unreliable. He asserted any petroleum product could set off detector alarms and falsely indicate CWA presence.[148]
c. Analysis
The recollections of the regiment’s operations officer about canister or cluster munitions, the initial positive CAM test for nerve agent, and reported mustard detection in the 3/11 tend to support the possibility of CWA presence. Most G nerve agents are non-persistent (see Nerve Agents in glossary at Tab A), which could explain early positive readings and negative readings thereafter.
However, other facts point away from CWA. Some logs and chronologies clearly indicated commanders assumed a chemical attack, presumably as a precaution. While one Marine remembered hearing about canisters or submunitions, operational logs contained no record of unusual characteristics for the incoming fire, and we could find no one who observed canisters or submunitions firsthand during this flurry of activity, unless the munition the Navy corpsman observed and described as a mortar round was such a device.
After the single positive CAM test in the 3/12, tests for CWA in that and most other units were negative, so those units swiftly unmasked. The 3/11 remained in MOPP Level 4 for hours after the mustard agent report. No one reported chemical warfare casualties, including two corpsmen, one of whom wore no mask or gloves while viewing an oozing munition at close range. If an M256 chemical detection kit identified mustard (blister agent) in the area of the 3/11, it may have registered a false positive indication. For example, burning rubbish can cause an M256 positive reading for blister agent. It is at least possible the oil well fires from the Al Burqan oil field might have done the same. Some kinds of smoke munitions also will give false positive indications for blister agent.[149]
Oozing rounds do not generally indicate chemical warfare munitions. If such rounds operate as designed, fuse activation causes a burster charge to detonate, explosively dispersing the agent, usually as an aerosol. Such rounds normally do not ooze or smoke.[150] According to explosive ordnance disposal experts, conventional munitions can ooze or smoke under certain conditions. High-explosive ammunition filler subjected to heat (as low as 149� F) can exude filler through breaches in the munition case. As noted in Incident F, munitions filled with white phosphorus, will burn, produce white smoke, fizz, and sputter if the filler comes into contact with air; and can leave a brownish crust behind that might appear to have oozed out.[151] Therefore, striking conventional rounds that do not explode (duds) may ooze, deposit material outside the munition case, or emit smoke. Figure 25 shows one of Iraq’s conventional artillery rounds (not the one the corpsman observed) that has exuded part of its explosive filler, which then turned dark brown on extended exposure.[152]
Figure 25. Iraqi artillery round that exuded explosive filler
d. Assessment
After analyzing all available evidence, we believe it is unlikely chemical warfare agent (CWA) was present in this incident. We found no one who saw sub-munitions in Iraq’s attacks and must consider one officer’s memory of hearing about them on the radio as unconfirmed by observation. Although one Marine described an oozing mortar round, based on technical experts’ opinions we do not believe he saw a CWA munition. While supporting the assessment, the lack of casualties is less important because that does not necessarily prove absence of agent.
Positive readings, such as the CAM indication of nerve agent and a reported M256 positive reading for blister agent, could suggest agent presence. However, other detection equipment could not confirm the 3/12 CAM positive indication, and follow-up tests proved negative. Furthermore, we could not substantiate a second-hand report of an M256 detection. The unit commander and NBC officer, who would know about such detections, stated no one in their unit detected CWA at any time during the war. Single indications of possible agent presence do not suffice as proof; due to the possibility of false alarms, other means must corroborate them. In both cases we found no supporting evidence.
Finally, we believe the most units involved increased protective posture as a precaution against the possibility of chemical weapons. Operational reports indicate most units had no reason other than assumptions to believe they were under chemical attack.
a. Initial Reports
Shortly after 6:00 PM on February 25, 1991, less than half an hour after the previous incident, Incident I, Battery A, 1/12, reported it was under gas attack about six miles southeast of Al Jaber Air Base.[153] Ten minutes earlier, the 3d Tank Battalion logistics column had reported it was gassed but did not identify its location. Various 1st Marine Division elements, including Task Force Ripper, went to MOPP Level 4. The all clear sounded beginning at 6:30 PM. Battery A, 1/12, completed standing down from MOPP Level 4 at 6:48 PM.[154] Figure 26 shows approximate unit locations at the time.
Figure 26. Incident J approximate locations
b. Additional Evidence
Earlier in the day of this incident, Battery A, 1/12, had been split off from the rest of the battalion and dispatched to a location 10 km (6.2 miles) southeast of Al Jaber Air Base to support Task Force Grizzly.[155] One of this battery’s platoon commanders, who also served as the battery NBC officer, told us that as a precaution his platoon had remained in MOPP Level 4 continuously since approaching the first obstacle belt. When his platoon reached their intended location near Al Jaber Air Base, an M8A1 alarm sounded. They had noted no incoming fire or other means of CWA delivery before the alarm. The platoon commander himself conducted six-to-twelve M256 kit tests in various areas of their position over about 30 minutes. Initially, several of the kits tested positive for what he recalled was nerve agent, and he remembers thinking "man, I’m glad I’m suited." After eventually getting repeated negative test results, he initiated selective unmasking, one howitzer crew at a time, until all his Marines had unmasked and assumed MOPP Level 2. He said no one had symptoms of CWA exposure. He remembered that at the time, the sky was black from oil well smoke, which can cause some detectors to give false positive readings - see Section III.C.1. Reflecting on his unit’s CWA detection capability, this witness noted that the M8A1 frequently gave false alarms, and his platoon shut down their M8A1 before the end of the ground campaign. He stated their M256 kits also sometimes gave false nerve agent indications (showed no color change) possibly because they were old. For this reason, he said he always ran at least six M256 tests for any alert.[156]
The other platoon commander in Battery A, 1/12, also recalled this incident. This Marine related that it was about dusk on February 25 and his platoon at the rear of the Battery A column was still en route to their firing positions southeast of Al Jaber Air Base. His platoon passed some Marine infantry unit’s amphibious vehicles stopped nearby. Noting the infantry unit’s Marines had gone to MOPP Level 4, his platoon also upgraded from MOPP Level 2 to MOPP Level 4. This second platoon commander was in a truck without radios so he did not receive any alert. His platoon did not have M8A1 alarms activated while underway. His unit arrived at their new position, and while his platoon sergeant positioned the howitzers, the platoon commander himself performed several M256 tests around his unit’s position over 30-40 minutes, getting only negative readings. Because his platoon brought up the rear of the Battery A column, he considered it possible the battery’s other platoon might have been stationary and already setting up its firing line and M8A1 alarms while his own platoon was still on the move.[157]
Interviews of 13 other witnesses from the 1/12 revealed no further information about this incident. We also asked the 11th Marines CO and Task Force Ripper’s NBC officer about this incident; neither of them recalled it.[158] The Battery A, 1/12, commander did not remember ever identifying a chemical attack. However, he noted he spent time away from his unit and his company’s platoons were dispersed, so he might not have known about a possible chemical warfare attack. He was not available for re-interview concerning what his platoon commanders subsequently told us.[159]
c. Analysis
This incident happened during a flurry of chemical warfare incident reporting. Consequently, some witnesses had difficulty recalling individual incidents. It appears an M8A1 alarm event in Battery A, 1/12, triggered the incident. The M8A1 system was designed only to detect nerve agents (see the glossary in Tab A). The incident did not coincide with incoming fire or other potential CWA delivery means; it was not associated with an enemy attack. As we note in Section III.C.1.e below, numerous M8A1 false alarm events led some 11th Marines units to sideline their detectors before hostilities ended. One of the two Battery A platoon commanders got positive M256 results for nerve agent, but that Marine noted he had experienced other M256 false positive readings before the ground campaign, possibly because of kit age. For this incident, eventually several M256 kit tests he performed proved negative. The second platoon commander tested and got only negative results. No one in either platoon reported CWA symptoms or casualties. This is less significant for the continually masked platoon than for the platoon initially unmasked at MOPP Level 2.
d. Assessment
We assess CWA presence as unlikely in this incident. Key factors in our assessment included the absence of a means of CWA delivery and, to a lesser extent, eventual consistently-negative M256 tests and absence of casualties in unmasked Marines. Given available evidence, we believe it far more likely that the detectors generated false positives from heavy oil well fire pollution or for other reasons such as M256 kit age. However, coincidence of M8A1 and M256 positive indications preclude entirely ruling out presence of nerve agent.
a. Initial Reports
Our case narrative, Al Jaber Air Base, indicated the Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle assigned to Task Force Ripper reported the possible presence of mustard agent at 7:08 PM on February 25. The Fox vehicle crew radioed word of this alarm to the Task Force Ripper NBC officer, who relayed it to the 11th Marines and possibly other units, misquoting it as a positive lewisite alarm. The 3/11, directly supporting Task Force Ripper, echoed this report. During contamination checks for CWA, Task Force Ripper went to MOPP Level 4.[160]
Entries in contemporary logs indicate several positive alarms and substantiation by a Fox reconnaissance vehicle. In the separate Al Jaber investigation, we determined a Fox reconnaissance vehicle using the Air/Hi method got the only positive alarm. As noted previously, the Fox system is an insensitive detector using this method. After subsequent battery-level tests using M256 kits failed to confirm CWA presence, the units selectively unmasked and returned to MOPP Level 2.[161] Figure 27 shows approximate unit locations.
Figure 27. Incident K approximate locations
b. Additional Evidence
Both the Task Force Ripper commanding officer and NBC officer believed this was the only incident in which CWA was present in Ripper’s area of operations.[162]
c. Analysis
The Al Jaber Air Base case narrative contains the detailed rationale for assessing this incident. In preparing the 11th Marines narrative, we did not attempt to recreate or duplicate the Al Jaber Air Base investigation but only summarized it here for completeness. The Fox crew did not get a mass spectrometer spectral analysis, M256 kits had negative readings, selective unmasking was successful, and there were no reported CWA casualties.
d. Assessment
Despite the convictions of Task Force Ripper’s commanding and NBC officers, the separate Al Jaber Air Base case analysis assessed the presence of CWA in the affected units’ area as unlikely. Since publication of the Al Jaber case narrative, we have not received or discovered new information suggesting a need to change its assessment.
NOTE: This section discusses three sequential incidents within a few hours involving a single unit. Since they are linked and most research material addressed them together, we do also.
a. Initial Reports
The incidents include:[163]
Incident L: At 2:13 AM on February 26, the third day of the ground campaign, Battery A, 1/11, received a chemical warning message. Battery A ran tests with two M256 kits, which registered positively for blister agent. The unit reported the positive indication and went to MOPP Level 4. An all clear sounded at 2:45 AM.
Incident M: Again at 3:27 AM, Battery A reported a positive M256 indication for blister agent. Most of the 11th Marines assumed MOPP Level 4.
Incident N: Subsequent tests by Battery A at 4:10 AM were positive for blister agent. Tests at 4:21 AM had negative results, and an all clear sounded. One of the two documents cited listed alternate times of 4:00 AM for the detection report and 4:15 AM for sounding the all clear.
Figure 28 shows relevant approximate locations.[164]
Figure 28. Incidents L, M, and N approximate locations
The 1/11 requested a Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle from Task Force Papa Bear at 3:33 and again at 4:12 AM. Six minutes after the second request, Papa Bear reported the Fox was en route. Operational logs indicated the Fox vehicle arrived some time after 4:18 AM. Other Marine unit log entries indicated the Fox recorded positive detections (alarms) for blister agent in what they described as the passive mode, but the logs said the mass spectrometer registered negative when programmed to look specifically for lewisite, a blister agent. One report also noted CAM tests by the Fox crew gave a four-bar reading (substantial concentration) for blister agent, but the Battery A’s M256 tests, reported at 4:21 AM, were negative. The unit waited until 6:34 AM to begin selective unmasking. Action summaries attributed the positive indications to oil in the air.[165]
b. Additional Evidence
The 11th Marines’ NBC officer recalled the Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer accompanied the Fox when it was finally dispatched to Battery A, 1/11’s, position and the latter Marine reported by radio the Fox had gotten no positive alarms.[166]
The Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer believed the 3/11 originated the first alert and, because of a potential downwind hazard that might have carried chemical warfare agent toward Coalition units, higher headquarters passed it to Battery A, 1/11, and the 3/9 (part of Task Force Papa Bear). Consequently, he noted the 1/11 and 3/9 went to MOPP Level 4. The Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer further recalled the 3/9 had a CAM available, allowing that unit to test, quickly reduce its protective posture, and unmask. However, he said the 1/11 did not have a CAM and required a Fox vehicle to check for chemical warfare agent presence. The Papa Bear NBC officer said he could not get permission to go forward with the Fox vehicle until after 4:00 AM. He recalled that in the meantime, Battery A’s M256 kits repeatedly tested positive for blister agent. This witness suspected burning oil well smoke caused the positives. The Papa Bear NBC officer suggested the battery perform selective unmasking, but the continuing M256 positives kept the battery in MOPP Level 4. When he finally got to Battery A, he said the Fox crew tested using the mobile mass spectrometer and the Air/Hi method. However, he did not believe the Fox detector got an alarm for fats/oil/wax for this incident as might be expected in the presence of high concentrations of petroleum. After taking readings, the witness said the crew stepped out of the vehicle and unmasked to convince the unit it was safe. The witness did not remember if the Fox crew had first tested with the CAM after exiting the vehicle. He also said he was unaware that when testing in the Air/Hi method, the Fox’s mass spectrometer was hundreds of times less sensitive to airborne nerve agents than the M256 kit (documented in Section C.1.a. below). He pointed out the Fox was assigned to Task Force Papa Bear only a few days before the ground campaign, and he had not taken classes on the system’s capabilities.[167]
The 3/11 operations officer did not recall his battalion initiating this alert.[168] The Battery A, 1/11, commander recalled the several M256 positives. He noted the battery’s Marines tested of their own volition by rubbing M256 kits directly on liquid droplets on their vehicles’ windshields and hoods and their NBC protective suits. When they got a positive, they called it in to the 1/11. We asked him to confirm his Marines had rubbed the M256 kit with the three differently shaped test spots on vehicles and MOPP garments. He replied he did not observe this procedure himself but learned about it from others (whom he could not recall). He could not completely rule out battery members using M8 paper packed with their M256 kits to test by surface contact. At the time, the battery was about one-half mile from an oil wellhead spewing raw petroleum. The wind, he recalled, varied in direction so at times they could see fairly far by the light of burning oil wells, and moments later they were engulfed in dense smoke and raw petroleum so they could not see their hands in front of their faces. This witness also noted when the Fox vehicle eventually arrived, someone aboard told his unit only the Fox was reliable in oil smoke.[169]
The 1/11 CO also noted the battery’s NBC team was "out aggressively checking."[170] Battery A’s firing platoon leader remembered the section chief for Gun 2 ran two positive M256 tests while in a fighting hole between Guns 1 and 2.[171] We identified this Marine, now separated from the Marine Corps, but could not locate him. The platoon commander said the Fox crew failed to confirm the presence of blister agent, told the battery’s Marines that the M256 kits were giving false indications, and asserted the Fox system readings had more validity.[172]
Battery A’s executive officer remembered the battery’s M9 detection tape produced positives and their M8A1 alarm sounded. He did not know whether M256 kits were used. He stated the battery had three NBC monitor/survey teams with three or four Marines in each: one upwind of the battery, one with the battery, and the third downwind. He believed all three teams kept registering positive M256 readings.[173]
Calculating time and distance, the 11th Marines NBC officer figured the command post where he was located was about 20 minutes downwind of Battery A. Responding to each of three alerts, he dispatched Marines to run M256 tests every 15 minutes around the command post. According to him, they never got positive readings.[174]
The 1/11 operations officer said he called for selective unmasking across the battalion. He noted battery leaders selected two Marines from each of three batteries, including Battery A, 1/11, to perform the procedure, which resulted in an all clear.[175] The 11th Marines NBC officer pointed out that Battery A, 1/11, was downwind from the lead division echelons at the time of the alerts. He noted artillery had engaged and destroyed an enemy multiple rocket launcher (see Incident I above, which occurred more than 14 hours earlier and for which we assessed agent presence as unlikely). Since the rocket launcher’s location was about a mile from Battery A’s location at the time of the incidents, he suggested this might have caused the positive readings.[176]
The Fox vehicle commander involved in this incident recalled that despite repeated requests to have a Fox check Battery A’s location their crew did not depart in response until after daylight, accompanied by two armed scout vehicles for security. The Fox commander said when they arrived at Battery A’s location they sampled for chemical warfare agent (CWA) using the Air/Hi method and detected nothing. As this witness related, when the Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer (riding with the Fox crew) could not convince the battery to unmask, he opened his hatch and stood up or possibly stepped out to assure the unit it was safe. According to the Fox commander, none of the regular Fox crew left the vehicle. He noted the Fox vehicle occupants did not wear full NBC protective gear because the vehicle was pressurized. The Fox commander said he realized after the testing that the accompanying open scout vehicles’ crews were not wearing masks. No one had any symptoms. The Fox commander said he could not make sense of the reports the Fox got detections in the passive mode but not when programmed to look for lewisite. He noted the Fox’s mass spectrometer would look for multiple patterns of ion peaks in its library and was not usually programmed to detect a single agent. He recalled on two occasions during the ground war the spectrometer so briefly gave an indication for a possible CWA that the indication was too fleeting to analyze in more detail, but he did not believe this occurred during this incident.[177] Figure 29 summarizes the chronology of events.
Figure 29. Incidents L, M, and N timeline
c. Analysis
During these three incidents, Battery A, 1/11, was on the 1st Marine Division’s east flank, positioned west of the Al Burqan oilfield, which surrounded them on three sides from roughly the northwest clockwise to the southwest.
Battery A, 1/11, got repeated positive M256 test results for blister agent, so we considered the field behavior of these agents in analyzing these three incidents. Blister agents (e.g., mustard and lewisite) are more dense than nerve agent and designed to be absorbed through the skin; consequently they are dispensed as relatively large drops that rapidly settle out of the atmosphere to become both a contact and vapor hazard. Therefore, such agents travel a shorter distance downwind than nerve agents under similar weather and release conditions. While airborne, these substances emit vapors that can cause inhalation casualties in the unprotected. Once deposited, they continue to emit vapors but generally in smaller concentrations than nerve agents, which evaporate more easily and therefore are dispersed as small droplets to maximize evaporation and inhalation. Compared to nerve agents, blister agents’ fairly rapid deposition and slower subsequent evaporation tend to limit their downwind vapor threat. Except under unusually favorable meteorological conditions, the downwind hazard from, for example, distilled mustard deposition is not significant. This limits the area where sufficiently high blister agent concentrations could generate positive M256 vapor detections.[178]
If Battery A indeed detected blister agent with M256 kits monitoring ambient air, Iraq would have had to deliver agent near the unit. Such positive readings could result from either upwind contamination or vaporization of agent previously deposited in the immediate area.[179] However, at the relatively low temperatures at the time (approximately 45� F), the airborne vapor concentration for blister agent would have been very low. Battery A did not report a delivery means such as artillery fire. Concentration of any agent delivered at a distance, such as the approximately nine miles that separated Battery A from the 3/11 battalion credited with initiating the alert, would be minimal and probably not detectable. Battery A’s repeated positive indications for blister agent over two hours in the absence of reported delivery means suggest the cause of the positive readings may lie elsewhere, such as with interferents.[180] Smoke can cause M256 false positives for blister agent.[181]
An Air Force weather summary indicated winds in the theater at the time generally blew from the southeast at 12 to 17 miles per hour.[182] The 11th Marines NBC officer recalled the winds at the time were from the north-northwest at 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) per hour. In a later interview, however, this same witness indicated he had calculated the 11th Marines command post at the time was southwest of Battery A, 1/11, downwind from that unit, which would mean northeast winds.[183] Battery A’s commander remembered somewhat variable winds.[184] In short, available evidence presents an imprecise, contradictory picture of wind speed and direction.
The evidence suggests Battery A, 1/11, began testing in response to a chemical warfare warning that they were in a downwind hazard area. If winds blew from the northwest, they were, in fact, downwind of the 3/11, which the Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer said initiated the alert. However, the 3/11 commanding and executive officers did not recall their battalion initiating this or any other chemical warfare alert. The 3/11 logs and chronologies did not document either the alert or any incoming fire that might have triggered the alert at about the time other units logged it. The 3/11’s chronology did record incoming fire at other times, including the early evening before this incident. We could not determine definitively where the alert originated or what caused it.
The two disabled enemy rocket launchers damaged by artillery fire approximately 14 hours before Battery A first had positive blister agent tests, discussed in Incident I, sat about one-half mile northeast of Battery A’s gun line. While the 11th Marines NBC officer failed to identify chemical munitions or agents shortly after the launchers were fired upon, he implied the rocket launcher event might have caused Battery A’s positive readings. Believing the 11th Marines command post was downwind of Battery A, he ordered M256 checks, which produced no positives. However, being downwind would have required northeast winds, which conflicted with his own recollection of winds from the north-northwest. If winds were predominately from the northwest, Battery A probably never was downwind of the launchers. With a northeast wind, both Battery A and the 11th Marines command post would have been approximately downwind. Southeast winds would have blown any contamination from the rocket launchers to the north of Battery A. We note again, however, the winds were somewhat variable. Key to our assessment of the rocket launcher scenario was the evidence United Nations inspectors collected after the war indicating Iraq had some nerve agent warheads for its 122mm rockets but not blister agent-filled 122mm warheads.[185] We strongly doubt the disabled rocket launcher caused Battery A’s positive M256 blister agent readings.
If Battery A’s testers rubbed the M256 kits directly on droplets deposited on vehicle surfaces and chemical protective garments as the unit CO recalled, they used an improper procedure. The kits were designed to test for airborne (vapor) agents only. A relatively low concentration of vapors from burning material can cause an M256 false positive for blister and blood agents, or oil droplets can cause a color change (to pink) on test spots and give a false positive.[186]
When the Fox vehicle finally arrived, it tested the area using the Air/Hi method. Some contemporary unit logs suggested the Fox’s mass spectrometer initially indicated a false positive for lewisite, a blister agent, but subsequent tests failed to confirm that detection. However, neither the Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer nor the vehicle commander, both aboard the Fox, recalled such positive detections. The NBC officer left the protection of the vehicle and unmasked to show Battery A it was safe. While mustard exposure symptoms do not normally appear until more than four hours after exposure,[187] the NBC officer mentioned no delayed symptoms. The accompanying unmasked scout vehicle crews also experienced no casualties. The Fox’s mass spectrometer was designed primarily for detecting liquid chemical warfare agents.[188] The US Army added the M43A1 vapor detector to the Fox to provide a credible nerve agent vapor detection capability.[189] Detection of airborne blister agent vapors is more accurately performed by detectors such as the M256. As noted under Analysis for Incident E, the Fox mass spectrometer using the Air/Hi method is much less sensitive than properly used M256 kits (see Table 3, p. 72). The Task Force Papa Bear NBC officer’s and scout vehicle crews’ absence of symptoms points to a lack of airborne agent vapors during the period they were on the scene. Other units in the general area apparently remained in MOPP Level 2 during the hours of this event and also reported no CWA casualties.
One witness recalled both M9 chemical agent detection paper and M8A1 alarms also gave positive alarms during this series of events. However, the M8A1 alarm does not respond to blister agent, and both test devices can give false indications in the presence of petroleum products—see M8A1 and M9 entries in the glossary, Tab A.
d. Assessment
We assess blister agent presence during this series of incidents as unlikely. We base this primarily on no clear indication of delivery means, that Iraq did not have blister agent warheads for rocket launchers, and the lack of casualties among those unmasked. We also considered the high concentration of known M256 interferents present and the probable improper M256 testing procedures by some of Battery A’s Marines. We did not rely on lack of a positive Fox MM-1 detections because we would not have expected an MM-1 alarm for blister agents that produce little vapor. We believe it is much more likely oil well contamination—rather than blister agent—caused the several positive readings.
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