6. Incident E

a. Initial Reports

An NBC NCO assigned to the 1/12 jump command post (CP) told us in an interview that on or about the night of February 25 (an incorrect date—see the analysis below indicating it was January 23), his unit conducted an illumination mission towards an airfield. A jump CP moves forward of the main CP to set up and take control while the main CP in turn moves forward. In an illumination mission the unit fires shells that release flares to light the battlefield. According to this witness, the unit’s XM21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) alarmed during the mission. (Tab A describes the RSCAAL, which can detect nerve and blister agent clouds at distances up to three miles.) The witness conducted tests with an M256 chemical agent detection kit and a chemical agent monitor (CAM) after the first positive RSCAAL reading; he said both tests were negative. He reported he reset the RSCAAL, and a few minutes later it went off again. He conducted another M256 test; again the results were negative. The RSCAAL continued to sound alarms over the next hour, but he said the M256 kits and CAM never produced a positive test. He noted he finally shut off the RSCAAL, believing it was alarming to an interferent such as exhaust, dust, or artillery smoke. In his first interview for this investigation, he stated the unit did not increase its protective posture in response to the RSCAAL alarms. He said he advised the chain of command about the situation, but nothing came of it. In a subsequent interview, he said he believed the unit did increase its protective posture. In retrospect, he thought it was a false alarm. According to this witness, the CP stayed in that position for six to seven hours and then headed back to join the rest of the battalion.^[68]

A 1/12 operations officer reviewed our information on this incident and recalled the unit fired an illumination mission in support of forces near Kuwait International Airport.^[69] In a follow-on interview, the original 1/12 NBC NCO witness believed the location was near Al Jaber Air Base. Historical accounts indicate his unit was near Al Jaber at the approximate time he ascribed to the incident.^[70] We found no logs or chronologies reporting these RSCAAL alarms or any change in the unit’s protective posture during the reported time of this incident.

In an interview, the 11th Marines NBC officer stated his regiment had only one RSCAAL and he deployed it with the 5/11 throughout the ground campaign in Kuwait. Therefore, the 1/12 could not have had a RSCAAL alarm during that period. However, he did recall he sent his only RSCAAL with artillery raid forces twice before the ground war and after the reported CS (riot control agent) exposure during the artillery raid described in Incident D above. Eventually he said he decided the RSCAAL’s set-up and tear-down times exposed participating artillery units for too long and also exposed this unique piece of equipment to loss from counter-battery fire. Thereafter, he reported he ceased sending the equipment on artillery raids. He did not recall hearing about any positive RSCAAL alarms on either of these two raids.^[71]

After the 1/12’s first artillery raid (Incident D), the 1/12 participated in one additional artillery raid near Khafji on January 23-24, 1991. They executed their fire missions shortly before midnight. Based on the testimony of the 11th Marines NBC officer noted above, this would have been the first of the two raids on which a RSCAAL would have accompanied a raid force (we believe the 5/11 carried out the other such raid on January 26). The battalion’s summary of the raid did not note detection of CWA or a change in MOPP level.^[72]

In an effort to clarify the timing and location of his reported RSCAAL detection, we again contacted the NBC NCO assigned to the 1/12. We told him of the additional information the 11th Marines NBC officer had provided regarding the RSCAAL and the record of 1/12 artillery raid involvement. The NBC NCO indicated he might have confused an incident on an artillery raid with activity during the ground campaign, although he thought his initial testimony about the timing was correct. He recalled participating in the January 23-24 artillery raid. Whatever the date, he was sure the RSCAAL alarm incident occurred at night and it was too dark to determine visually what the RSCAAL observed. He could not recall for what type of CWA the RSCAAL alarmed (it could detect both nerve and blister agents). He noted he initially attached the RSCAAL to an external alarm used with the M8A1 system. After this alarm went off, he disconnected it and used the device only with the built-in alarm, which repeatedly sounded. He was unable to recall when and from whom he initially received the RSCAAL, or when and to whom he later relinquished it so he could not confirm when he operated the RSCAAL.^[73]

The 11th Marines NBC officer knew how many RSCAALs his regiment had (one) and with whom he deployed it and when. The 1/12 had a RSCAAL for one artillery raid but not for the ground offensive.

The RSCAAL can detect and alarm for chemical warfare agent (CWA) presence up to three miles from the detector. Therefore, a positive RSCAAL alarm could occur when sensitive point detectors near the device gave no positive indications. If the wind was right, a CWA cloud could trigger a RSCAAL alarm from a distance but never drift over the unit operating the RSCAAL. However, at a minimum we know that M256 test kits, capable of detecting both blister and nerve agent vapors, detected none; the M256 kit is a highly sensitive detector for airborne chemical warfare agent vapors. For example, the M256 can detect G-series nerve agent vapor at a minimum concentration of 0.005 milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m³). The comparable detection thresholds are 0.1 to 0.2 mg/m³ for the M8A1 system, about 0.1 mg/m³ for the Chemical Agent Monitor, and 62 mg/m³ for the Fox’s mass spectrometer.^[74]

The 11th Marines NBC officer noted the RSCAAL had power supply problems. He explained that sometimes they were hooked up to vehicle power supplies. If the vehicle was not running, the detector would rapidly draw down the vehicle battery and then alarm for low power. In this incident, the NBC NCO remembered the RSCAAL was hooked up to a vehicle (a HMMWV) for power (he did not mention whether the engine was running).^[75] Because it was a new piece of equipment, Marines may not have received training on power supply problems, according to the 11th Marines NBC officer.^[76]

Figure 18 shows this incident’s approximate location, assuming, as we do, it occurred late on January 23, 1991, during an artillery raid conducted near Khafji.

Figure 18.  Incident E approximate location

We assess it unlikely CWA was present in the unit’s immediate area. Important to our assessment is the fact that the M256 kit (a reliable, sensitive detector for airborne chemical warfare agents) detected no agents. There were no reports of chemical casualties, but this could be explained if a chemical warfare agent cloud passed to the side of the unit or the unit had increased its protective posture. The RSCAAL may have given false alarms because of contaminants or power supply problems. However, we cannot rule out a valid long-range detection, outside the unit’s immediate area.

Intelligence reported Iraq’s preparation for and possible use of chemical weapons on the evening of January 30.^[77] Subsequently, maneuver units including the 11th Marines received chemical warfare alert warnings. The I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) initiated Condition Yellow (attack probable, do not don protective gear yet). At 8:35 PM, Task Forces Shepherd and Taro received orders to go to MOPP Level 2 (wearing overgarments and overboots but no masks or gloves).^[78] Logs indicate shortly after 9:00 PM, I MEF went to MOPP Level 3 (mask and hood on but not gloves) for all forces north of 28 degrees, 5 minutes north.^[79] Unit location data from the time indicated the only 11th Marines unit north of this line was the 5/11 (Figure 19).^[80]

Figure 19.  Incident F approximate location

During the previous day (January 29), Iraq’s tanks had penetrated the border into Saudi Arabia not far from 5/11’s location, and 5/11 elements went to 100 percent alert. However, early in the morning of January 30, the enemy tanks retreated back into Kuwait, and the 5/11 reduced its alert to 25 percent. The exact meaning of the alert percentages is unclear. Neither during the January 29 incursion nor at the time of this incident on January 30 did the 5/11 record incoming fire in its operational chronology.^[81]

In our interim 11th Marine case narrative, we uncovered little 11th Marines information on this potential incident. After publication of the interim narrative, the 5/11 executive officer (XO) discussed with us an experience that led us to further investigate this incident and collect additional interviews. Analysis of this information convinced us the XO’s experience was associated with this documented incident (rather than a separate event), even though the XO was unsure of the date and he noted incoming fire not recorded in the battalion’s logs or chronologies for the period. We lay out our reasoning for this association in the Analysis section below.

According to the battalion XO, sometime after the air campaign began but before the ground war started, he observed unusual incoming fire near his position. During this period, the battalion operated out of the Al Qaraah area and conducted nighttime missions, including artillery raids, along a nearby section of the Kuwait-Saudi Arabian border that runs generally north-south (Figure 19) ^[82]

According to the 5/11 XO, the night was clear and cold and the unit had just completed a practice breaching exercise. The XO observed two incoming artillery rounds pass over him from the north and land an estimated 1.5 to 2.0 kilometers (.9 to 1.2 miles) south of his position, causing the unit to take cover. He believed the attack involved artillery rather than mortar rounds, based on the likely distance to enemy forces and the sound when passing overhead. The XO recalled he had an unobstructed view and good eyesight. He said the rounds, rather than exploding, glowed, smoldered, and fumed. He believed the wind was coming from the north and blew the fumes away from them to the south. Initially, he said at this point the battalion commanding officer (CO) upgraded NBC protective posture to MOPP Level 4. In a later discussion, he was not sure if they donned all their MOPP gear. Also, he could not be sure if the increase in protective posture resulted from a local decision or direction from higher headquarters. The XO noted at the time his unit’s Marines carried personal, lightweight British protective suits to save the US chemical protective overgarments (CPOGs) for the ground campaign, when greater durability counted. He said a five-ton truck carried the battalion’s CPOGs. In this incident, he remembered the NBC staff broke out the CPOGs, requiring distribution by size from behind the truck. Upon reflection, this witness believed only a higher echelon could direct using the CPOGs. However, the XO noted he did not routinely remain in the command post and might not know about orders received from higher headquarters. He did not recall anyone using an M256 detection kit. He thought they were in MOPP gear all night, removing it when they left the next morning. The witness knew of no one who suffered symptoms consistent with CWA exposure because of this incident.^[83]

We contacted the 5/11 CO to ask about the fuming rounds incident his former XO related. The CO did not recall unusual rounds fired against the battalion resulting in an alert and donning more NBC gear. He noted he might have been somewhere else in the unit’s area at the time. Before February 24, he remembered increasing protective posture only once, other than for training, in response to an out-of-context interpretation of a radio message by a radio operator in his combat operations center (COC), which did not involve direction from higher headquarters. According to the CO, the operator thought he had heard gas over the radio. After about an hour, the CO unmasked to confirm no agent presence. Those in the COC had noted no delivery means for CWA and wrote it off as a false alarm.^[84] The battalion operations officer (S-3), assistant logistics officer (S-4A) in the logistics train behind the firing batteries, the battalion sergeant major, and Batteries S and R commanders did not recall incoming fire or fuming rounds.^[85] The battalion sergeant major remembered the 1st Marine Division ordered the battalion to go to MOPP Level 3 around January 30 or a few days later. He did not remember incoming fire, unusual or otherwise, at the time of this incident. Neither did the operations gunnery sergeant in the COC at the time.^[86]

The battalion’s assistant operations officer (S-3A) was standing watch in the COC tent during incident F, which he recalled as in late January, possibly the 30th, a couple of days before his unit took casualties from a friendly aircraft attack on February 2. It was unusually crowded in the COC, suggesting something out of the ordinary was ongoing, but he could not recall what. Then one of the firing batteries located nearby reported gas based on sighting smoke. He said the radio chief in the COC further disseminated the alert. The S-3A recalled everyone in the COC put on protective masks but did not don the rest of their chemical gear. He said the S-3A and the 5/11 CO then tried to ascertain what had caused the alert and whether someone had observed a delivery means (aircraft, artillery fire, etc.). The S-3A did not believe they ever found out exactly what triggered the alert. He remembered hearing about smoke but not about incoming fire and was sure no artillery fire struck near the COC. He also did not recollect direction from higher headquarters to increase MOPP level, although he admitted he might not have recalled it if it occurred during the confusion of the local alert. The S-3A routinely carried a CPOG rather than the lightweight British suits issued to some other Marines and did not remember the issuing of CPOGs from a truck as the XO related. After about 30 minutes in masks, the CO decided it was a false alarm and unmasked himself to prove it. He said the unit then unmasked. Asked about the CO’s recollection of misinterpretation of a radio message in connection with this event, the S-3A said there was no misinterpreting the transmission, and the CO might have confused this incident with one later during the ground campaign where that might have occurred.^[87]

The 5/11 unit chronology for the war notes that on the evening of January 30 the battalion was warned that intelligence indicated Iraq’s 1st Mechanized Division might attack nearby border areas. In response, the battalion used artillery-delivered mines to plug breaches in the protective border berm.^[88]

The battalion NBC officer was in the COC at the time of the event. He seemed to remember a warning to the unit about an attack by an enemy division, possibly immediately preceding someone calling in gas from within the battalion. He did not recall mention of smoke. He did not think there had been a delivery means. He thought the alerting procedure was improper and noted no NBC-1 report followed the verbal alert. He believed someone panicked. He thought the CO might have tried to determine the origin of the alert but never found the cause. He was vague on whether CPOGs were distributed that night (they carried enough replacement suits for one battery in their 5-ton truck and trailer) but thought partial exchange of lightweight British suits might have occurred, which would have required higher headquarters’ approval.^[89]

The Battery R, 5/11, XO recalled the whole battalion went to MOPP Level 4 because the 5/11 XO saw something (the battery XO could not specify what). He said at that point the unit already had taken the precaution of putting on protective overgarments (MOPP Level 1). The notification to don full NBC gear came from his battery’s fire direction control officer (FDO) by field telephone, and the battery XO presumed the FDO received word through the battalion radio network. It was the only chemical warfare incident he remembered before the ground campaign. He did not see any incoming rounds or smoke and did not recall any M256 kit tests. When told what the battalion XO said he saw (glowing, fuming rounds), this witness volunteered that it sounded like white phosphorous smoke munitions.^[90]

We discussed this incident with the battalion XO’s driver. Other than the XO, the driver was the only interviewee who recalled incoming fire. He said he heard rounds passing overhead (described as a shhhhhhh sound) and said it "scared the hell out of me." He did not believe he heard or saw the rounds impact or viewed impact areas afterward; he did not see glowing, smoldering, or fuming rounds. He thought maybe he was located with Battery S or Battery T at the time but was not certain. He believed he was in the general area of the XO but not necessarily in immediate proximity. He said that shortly after the rounds passed overhead, a "gas, gas, gas" alert was received by radio and the Marines in his area donned protective masks (but not other protective items like overgarments). Asked his proximity to the battalion CP, he thought it probably was within a couple of hundred feet. The witness recalled during the alert standing around with five or six other Marines and trying to converse through the voicemitters in the masks, which was difficult. He did not specifically recall anyone performing M256 chemical warfare agent tests, but noted it was routine to do so anytime the battalion received an alert. He related that they "kept their masks on forever," which he believed was at least an hour. He remembered that eventually one of the battalion leadership, possibly the XO or sergeant major, appeared (not wearing a mask) and relayed an all clear. The driver did not know who initiated the alert or whether the XO or a higher headquarters might have directed it. The weather, he said, was cool but not cold, clear, and not notably windy. He knew of no one with suspicious symptoms following this incident. When asked about exchanging protective overgarments, he thought this happened - not the night of the incident but during daylight the next day or later. So far as this interviewee could recall, this incident was the only time before the ground campaign they increased protective posture for an alert.^[91]

Based on the recollections of the 5/11 XO and his driver of masking and witnesses’ statements that only one such event took place for this unit before the ground war, we believe the evidence presented relates to a single incident. Interviewees’ association of the incident with smoke and a 5/11 XO observation reinforces this conclusion. The XO’s driver, the only interviewee other than the XO to recall incoming rounds passing overhead, did not recall the rounds exploding. The unit’s operational chronologies did not record incoming fire or a protective posture increase on January 30. If the incoming rounds did not explode as the XO related, many other Marines in the battalion may never have been aware of them, particularly if the Marines were under cover.

Only two witnesses could recall higher headquarters’ direction to increase protective posture. One other witness remembered wearing overgarments (MOPP Level 1) before going to MOPP Level 4, and the XO thought he had gone to MOPP Level 4 for the alert. Others recalled only donning their masks with no precautionary MOPP level increase. The efforts of Marines in the COC to determine by radio what triggered the gas warning apparently failed. We could document no other incident of non-training increases in MOPP level for this battalion before the ground campaign, substantiated by several witnesses. The battalion XO eventually stated he believed the incoming fire and a chemical warfare (voice) alert within the battalion happened coincidentally and admitted he assumed they were linked. The battalion XO recalled a northerly wind blowing fumes south, but Air Force data (depicted in Figure 19) reflect general winds from the south to southeast. The battalion XO recalled staying in MOPP Level 4 all night, but his driver and those in the COC remembered unmasking after an hour or so. Clearly the evidence regarding this incident is, at best, inconsistent.

Chemical munitions do not glow. However, dud white phosphorous ammunition could burn, produce white smoke, fizz, and sputter as exposed filler will ignite spontaneously in air.^[92]

No one recalled CWA tests in connection with the incident. Neither witnesses nor documentation reported casualties or suspicious symptoms. No other units in the Kuwait theater of operations reported a suspected chemical warfare attack after intelligence reports of enemy preparation to use such weapons on January 30.

We believe it unlikely CWA was present at 11th Marines locations at the time of this incident. This assessment rests heavily on the characteristics of the unusual incoming rounds the 5/11 XO reported and lack of evidence of other delivery means. Absence of casualties also supports this assessment, although one would not expect casualties if the wind blew CWA away from the unit. We also consider it significant that the 5/11 leadership could not identify who called gas and why, making questionable the basis for the voice alert.

At 3:00 PM on February 24, 1991, the day the ground campaign began, 11th Marines elements were providing artillery support to Task Forces Ripper and Papa Bear between the two obstacle belts that stretched across southern Kuwait. At the time, the 5/11 was reinforcing the 3/11, the artillery battalion in direct support of Task Force Ripper (Figure 20).^[93] At 3:07 PM, a Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm (RSCAAL) in a 5/11 battery alarmed for the possible presence of nerve agent. Several unit logs show that the 3/11 reported gas over the battalion radio network, and the 11th Marines went to MOPP Level 4.^[94]

A survey officer assigned to the 11th Marines called our incident reporting toll-free number and stated that within the first day or two of the ground war (February 24 or 25) two smoke rounds detonated approximately 400 meters (1,300 feet) ahead of his position and 400 meters high. He described the smoke as bright white rather than the grayish-white of standard smoke rounds and added the smoke did not dissipate like standard smoke rounds. He reported a possible chemical warfare attack, and many units went to MOPP Level 4. He recalled that immediately after his report the 5/11 NBC officer at battalion headquarters got a positive alarm for nerve agent. He remembered that soon after that alert someone higher in his chain of command declared there was no chemical warfare agent (CWA) threat and ordered them to quit sounding the alert and stand down from the chemical alert.^[95]

An 11th Marines Command Chronology entry for February 24 reads, "1507 [3:07 PM]: Rascal [RSCAAL] in 5/11 position detected nerve agent; 11th Marines went to MOPP Level 4. Further detection efforts were negative; all clear sounded at 1541 [3:41 PM]."^[96] Figure 20 shows unit locations at the time.

Figure 20.  Incident G approximate locations

Many Marines witnessed the detonating rounds and resulting smoke. A corporal assigned to Task Force Ripper recalled standing outside his vehicle when a popping sound overhead caught his attention. He said he looked up to see a whitish cloud; two more airbursts followed. He remembered the wind picked up the smoke and moved it over his head in a southerly direction. To his surprise, commanders did not call for a MOPP level increase, so he continued to direct enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) to the rear. Shortly thereafter, he recalled turning and seeing other troops putting on their protective masks. His mask was back in his vehicle, so with eyes shut, he ran to it and put on his mask. Despite this period without protection, he stated he experienced no exposure symptoms. Asked if any of the unprotected EPWs were affected, he replied, to the best of his knowledge, no EPW showed symptoms. He recalled the M9 chemical detection tape attached to his vehicle showed no signs of exposure to CWA.^[97]

Other witnesses’ recollections are contradictory. The 5/11 NBC NCO described a low-lying cloud that hovered, rather than dissipated.^[98] However, a 1st Marine Division NBC officer recounted three small puffs of smoke that dissipated quickly; they were not what he, as an NBC specialist, would expect of chemical munitions.^[99]

Despite the Task Force Ripper corporal’s recollection of northerly winds, an Air Force weather summary indicates the winds for the general area on the afternoon of February 24, 1991, were out of the southwest/west (blowing from behind the Marines).^[100] Other witness’ statements, e.g., the 5/11 operations officer and commanding officer, agree with the weather summary data. The 5/11 CO remembered four artillery rounds—notably not white phosphorous or high explosive—that exploded approximately 400 meters above ground. He recalled thinking they could be chemical rounds but they detonated too high to concern him.^[101]

Although the survey officer who called us said the 5/11 NBC officer detected nerve agent, the 5/11 NBC officer told us he did not. He recalled an incident similar to that described by the survey officer, but he did not operate the RSCAAL or remember an alert. He suggested the RSCAAL was fielded with Battery S, 5/11.^[102]

The executive officer (XO) of Battery S, 5/11, saw the rounds explode and confirmed the RSCAAL was with his unit. After the alert, he said one of his Marines used an M256 kit to test the air and, when he did not detect CWA, the Marines began selective unmasking procedures. The Marines who unmasked did not show signs of CWA exposure so the remainder of the unit, at MOPP Level 4 for a little over an hour, unmasked. The XO added he saw birds, apparently unaffected, flying during the incident. Although he could not identify the type of rounds, he stated they were not chemical and the RSCAAL had alarmed falsely. Several other Marines described problems with the RSCAAL.^[103] Although we interviewed several Battery S Marines, we could not identify and interview the Marine who operated the RSCAAL.

Other units performed chemical detection tests. The 5/11 battalion NBC officer stated his Marines at the command post used M256 kits to test for the presence of CWA, detected nothing, and then proceeded with unmasking.^[104] The 5/11 NBC NCO, in a convoy moving to Battery S’ flank, noted he conducted an M256 test after the incident and detected nothing.^[105] According to the Battery T commander (within one-half mile of Battery S), Marines in his unit conducted M256 tests but detected no chemical warfare agents.^[106]

In a follow-on interview, the survey officer who first described this incident suggested a Task Force Ripper Fox vehicle got a positive alarm for sarin nerve agent.^[107] The Ripper NBC officer could not recall sending his Fox vehicle back through the minefield against the flow of advancing Marines to check out the 5/11’s position. At the time of this RSCAAL alarm, Task Force Ripper had already passed through the second minefield. However, he believed a 1st Marine Division Fox vehicle likely would have responded.^[108] We determined a 1st Marine Division Fox vehicle did respond. With a 1st Marine Division NBC officer on board, the Fox drove around the area sampling the ambient air using the Air/Hi method (described in the next paragraph), but the MM-1 mobile mass spectrometer did not indicate the presence of any CWA. According to the NBC officer aboard the Fox, there were no NBC-1 reports, CWA effects, or casualties incurred in this incident.^[109]

The Air/Hi method was developed to permit reconnaissance teams to define the edges or borders of a previously identified contaminated area. The sampling probe draws in ambient air and vapors in its immediate surrounding area. The sampling probe operates at the relatively high temperature of 180� Celsius (C) (356� Fahrenheit). Consequently, the ions of the sample move more quickly to the MM-1 mass spectrometer than in the Surface/Lo mode where a cooler temperature (120� C/248� F) allows the ions to separate at a slower rate. A slower rate permits a more accurate reading of ion masses.^[110] For more information on the Fox system, see our Information Paper. ^[111]

The 11th Marines NBC officer said after the war he learned from the 5/11 sergeant major that several Marines looking up at the unusual smoke experienced burning faces and watering eyes. According to this second-hand information, these Marines masked immediately and then reached under their masks to wipe their faces with agent neutralizing wipes. After this episode, they returned to duty. The regiment’s NBC officer assumed the burning substance was not blister agent because he received no reports of medical evacuations or treatment for CWA exposures at battalion aid stations. He stated a blister agent would have caused longer-lasting, more severe symptoms, even if those exposed were treated immediately. In his opinion, these Marines may have been exposed to something such as rocket propellant but he does not believe a CWA caused their symptoms.^[112] Also, except for lewisite not known to have been in Iraq’s inventory,^[113] a blister agent normally produces symptoms after a latent period of four or more hours after exposure (at least one hour even with ideal conditions and high exposure).^[114]

We could not identify or interview any Marine who reportedly experienced these symptoms, and the 5/11 sergeant major did not recall knowing about the symptoms or discussing them with the 11th Marines NBC officer.^[115] We re-contacted the Battery S commander and his executive officer to learn more about this second-hand report of injuries. The commander said that he was not informed anyone performed decontamination procedures as a result of this incident. He stated had this occurred the XO, who also was the logistics officer, would have known about it because the affected Marines would have had to replace their decontaminating wipes. The commander noted Marines conducted M256 tests and the unit decreased MOPP level without incident.^[116] The Battery S XO said he was unaware of any injuries as a result of the incident. The Battery S corpsmen were collocated with him, and he remembered no one called for a corpsman. He voiced skepticism about any injuries from this incident—he said it was over within a few minutes and the unit moved on.^[117]

In a March 11, 1991, memorandum to the regimental commanding officer, the 11th Marines regimental surgeon wrote, "No serious injuries or mortalities were received and no medical evacuations called."^[118] In a 1998 interview, the surgeon told us he knew of no chemical casualties in the regiment from this or any other incident. The corpsman in charge of the regimental medical team stated no one assigned to the 11th Marine Regiment was treated for CWA exposure.^[119] Figure 21 summarizes the timing of this incident.

Figure 21.  Incident G timeline

The RSCAAL was designed to detect CWA clouds at a distance of up to five kilometers (just over three miles). In this instance, the RSCAAL reportedly alarmed to the possible presence of nerve agent. An alarm, however, does not prove definitively that nerve agent was present. The detector was a prototype (hence the designation XM21 RSCAAL—for experimental), and not in the regular inventory. Witnesses stated the RSCAAL often false alarmed, and at one point later in the ground campaign, the battalion leadership ordered the detector stored because they had lost faith in its capabilities.^[120] We could not identify and interview the Marine who operated the RSCAAL.

Several witnesses described the airbursts and resultant smoke as odd—unlike anything they had seen before. The survey officer originally identified them as smoke rounds. According to intelligence and UNSCOM investigations after the war, Iraq’s ground forces could deliver nerve agent only with 122mm rockets or Scud-type ballistic missiles (Table 1). We are confident these rounds were not Scuds, which carry large warheads. The Battery S XO stated he could not differentiate between types of rounds, whether artillery or rocket, in this instance,^[121] and we cannot categorically rule out 122mm rockets. No witness could identify the source and specific type of delivery system.

Most Marines in the area immediately put on protective masks when the gas call came over the radio network, yet some Marines and all enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) remained unprotected. However, no one reported symptoms consistent with CWA exposure. The second-hand report of several Marines who experienced burning faces and watering eyes after they looked up at the smoke does not suggest nerve agent exposure. Nerve agents such as sarin work by inhibiting the proper functioning of enzymes in the nervous system. Had these Marines been exposed to nerve agents sufficient to cause watering eyes so quickly, they would rapidly have displayed tell-tale symptoms such as difficulty breathing, drooling, excessive sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, twitching, headache, drowsiness, or worse.^[122] There is no evidence of exposure to chemical warfare agents, a fact corroborated by the regimental surgeon’s post-war report.

It is possible M256 tests were performed in areas too distant from the smoke to detect any chemical warfare agent. However, several Marines in various locations used M256 kits to test the air and none detected CWA. A Fox NBC reconnaissance vehicle monitored the general area using the Air/Hi method and did not detect CWA; however, used in this way, its main detector is insensitive because it draws so little air. With nerve agent vapor present, we would expect casualties among the unprotected before the spectrometer could alert.^[123]

Several witnesses and an Air Force weather report indicate the wind carried the smoke in a northerly or northeasterly direction, back toward Iraq’s lines. Fallout from the detonations might have descended on Marines forward of the RSCAAL’s position, but again we are unaware of any casualties. Two witnesses recall seeing birds flying around during the incident, a significant fact, because many birds are very sensitive to the effects of airborne toxic chemicals.^[124]

After examining all evidence, we assess it unlikely CWA was present during this event. Unit logs and witnesses’ testimony thoroughly documented this incident. Witnesses’ descriptions of the odd nature of the smoke do not suffice as proof of agent presence. The RSCAAL alarm to the possible presence of nerve agent does not confirm suspicions of agent presence. In fact, several witnesses described operational problems with the RSCAAL. The leadership of the artillery battery tasked with operating the experimental detector directed it be stored because it frequently false-alarmed.

We could find no other corroboration of the RSCAAL alarm, such as M256 or Fox MM-1 detector indications of chemical warfare agent presence or casualties, which cannot rule out detection of CWA some distance from the unit. More importantly, an NBC officer doubted the rounds in question were chemical munitions. Finally, the effects some Marines reportedly experienced and brought to our attention are inconsistent with exposure to CWA.

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