Part of our mission requires working to protect future forces by recommending changes in equipment, policies, and procedures. While analyzing the evidence of possible 11th Marines chemical warfare incidents, we developed suggestions that may help the Department of Defense (DoD) generally and the Marine Corps specifically improve future NBC protection.

Many witnesses noted units did not always apply proper procedures and discipline in handling chemical alerts. In particular, they:

• Broadcast gas warnings and similar alerts over tactical radio networks without clear evidence of a chemical warfare attack (for example, when observing incoming fire at a distance); and
• Failed to note who, what, where, and when in initiating or passing chemical warfare alerts.

Consequently, some units had no choice but to adopt MOPP Level 4 as a precaution. They often did not know if the triggering threat was upwind, nearby, or actually a chemical attack. Had the Gulf War occurred in warmer weather, inappropriate protective posture increases might have had a much greater degrading impact on operational effectiveness and could have contributed to heat-related casualties.

US forces in Operation Desert Storm had established procedures to report and disseminate alerts based on confirmed chemical attacks. (The glossary, Tab A, describes NBC Reports.) However, they had no procedures to discriminate any alerts based on confirmed NBC attack from reports of precautionary increases in protective posture based on sighting incoming fire, unusual clouds, etc. Consequently, some Marines called gas to warn their unit comrades. Radio operators then passed the alert to other units, sometimes without direction from unit command or operations officers. Verbal alerts seldom were followed up with a formatted NBC 1 report including originating unit, times, locations, and other data amenable to risk assessment by recipients.

Conversely, to reduce the impact of chemical warfare warnings they could not evaluate, some commanding officers eventually required their personal approval for their unit to respond to chemical warfare alerts from anyone but higher headquarters or their own Marines. This could have reduced their units’ NBC readiness in the face of real chemical warfare threats. Other battalions generally continued to respond to external alerts by automatic increases in protective posture.

Both approaches have potential drawbacks. In the heat of battle, commanders may not always be available to promptly decide protective posture. Any delay in precautionary measures could risk CWA exposure and casualties. Conversely, indiscriminate response to alerts of unknown origin and validity may degrade units’ performance—a problem that worsens with each increase in MOPP level or air temperature. The time it takes to upgrade protective posture also can slow tactical momentum and consequently increase threats from enemy engagement.

We offer these suggestions to address these problems:

• Recommend asking the Air, Land, and Sea Application Center to develop multi-service doctrine to address perceived chemical warfare threats from ambiguous indications. They should consider whether a refinement of the NBC reporting procedures could better accommodate affected units increasing their local protective posture as a precaution, advising other units and echelons of this action, but making clear the NBC threat remains unconfirmed. Recipient unit command personnel then might better judge how to respond in the context of the mission and situation.
• Recommend that all servicemembers in a position to radio NBC alerts to other units should be instructed to disseminate NBC alerts in the prescribed NBC 1 format that includes the initiating unit, the location, the time, and other key data to permit recipients to assess downwind hazards. Posting a simple format on or near appropriate tactical radios might help achieve compliance under combat pressure. This could help assure things do not get out of hand before command, operations, and NBC expertise can be brought to bear on ambiguous NBC threats.

As previously noted, Marines sometimes used CWA detection equipment in ways for which it was not designed or optimized. In particular, both the CAM and Fox reconnaissance vehicle mainly sniffed ambient air some distance from the ground. Both these devices were designed to detect CWA at close range (and consequently higher concentrations). The CAM had the design purpose of detecting contamination on people and vehicles. The Fox had the design mission of mapping and marking terrain contaminated with liquid agent on the ground. As a Fox expert noted, if agent is in the air, a sampling wheel can pick it up on the ground and present it to the Fox sensor, probably in higher concentrations than in the air.^[277]Neither the CAM nor the Fox was optimized to provide initial warning of chemical warfare agent presence.

Because they trusted in new technology or equipment, Marines sometimes relied on devices considerably less sensitive than chemical agent detectors built specifically to sample ambient air. In the case of the Fox vehicle, the detection threshold using the Air/Hi method was higher than agent concentrations that would cause casualties. In the face of an actual chemical warfare attack, relying on the Fox as a substitute for other devices could result in missed early warnings and increased chemical warfare casualties. Marines inadequately understood the various CWA detectors’ capabilities and limitations, partly because the Marine Corps fielded some of these devices shortly before the ground campaign and partly because they operated in polluted environments the equipment designers did not anticipate.

We suggest proponents address this issue in equipment technical manuals.

This and other investigations have focused on strengths and weaknesses of NBC documentation practices in the Gulf War. We often faced inadequate or conflicting information on possible chemical warfare incidents and other issues of potential significance for veterans’ health. The Marine Corps’ requirement for regular unit chronologies—with detailed documentation as attachments—served as a solid foundation in recreating a sequence of potential chemical warfare incidents affecting the 11th Marines. However, detail was often scant, and witnesses had difficulty recalling additional information years after the fact.

Post-war interviews by then-Captain T.F. Manley, USMC, covered chemical defense issues days after the end of the Gulf War while 1st Marine Division participants’ memories were fresh. Then-Captain Manley’s report^[278] and transcripts of interviews on which he based that report gave us valuable analytical input.

Perhaps only with hindsight can we now understand the importance of contemporary documentation of NBC and other operational activity. Current and future combat deployments may raise similar questions about long-term health impacts. We understand that documenting action in the fury and fog of war is a challenge, and record-keeping must not be allowed to jeopardize operational objectives. Still, the need and difficulty of reconstructing important details of combat events suggest a requirement for reasonably enhancing documentation procedures. With this in mind, we propose:

• The Marine Corps and Army should assess whether continuous audio recording of conversation and tactical radio traffic in fixed or mobile command posts during combat operations would be justified to help document critical actions.
• The services should evaluate establishing a requirement and plans to send objective experts to the field for contemporaneous debriefing of all associated with future suspected or confirmed NBC incidents—much as Captain Manley did after the Gulf War.

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