OLD LESSONS REVALIDATED. DESERT                       mines.  No known or projected technology
SlIlELD/STORM reaffirmed the importance               c9uld have quickly neutralized over lOQO en-
of dear-cut military objectives, political cohe-      emy mines once they were in place. Neverthe-
sion and civic support. Established pnncipl~s         less, we must clearly focus our high.tech re-
of war such as concentration of force, unity of       sources on developing the best mine counter-
command, (:`.~ective leadership, the will to fight,   measures capability available.
and detailed planning were also reaffirmed.
                                                      THE LESSONS OF DESERT SHIELDI
     DESERT SHIELD/STORM demon-                       STORM. The following summary highlights
strated in `r~mistakable fashion the value and        the preliminary U.S. Navy lessons learned.
effectiveness of joint and combined military
operations. The unique capabilities of each of              QUALITY PEOPLE AND REALISTIC
the U.S. military services - and those of each        TRAINING.     The excellent quality of our
of our allies - were exploited~during various         people and their high state of training were
phases of both operations. The combined force         fundamental to success. The all-volunteer force
provided a synergistic combat capability which        worked and worked well. Our men and women
bn~ught the greatest possible military power          knew their jobs, knew their equipment, and
of the coalition force to bear against the oppo-      knew how to fight. Naval forces arrived in
nent. Likewise, our experience also reaffirmed        theater trained, ready and sustainable.   The
the importance of joint and combined training,        Navy-Marine Corps team quickly assembled a
the value of forward presence and the validity        composite force from literally all con~ers of the
of joint force sequencing for power-projection.       globe, then executed a complex series of mari-
                                                      time intercept, strike, naval gunfire support
     DESERT SHIELD/STORM under-                       and amphibious operations, under the most
scored the principle that control of the sea is       demanding circumstances.  Teamwork was
essential for successful power-projection.            evident at all levels.
Maritime superiority afforded theUnited States
a position of leadership in implementing and             *  We will continue to emphasize joint
enforcing the U.N. sanctions. The traditional               operations in our training. Some
role of sealift in moving heavy equipment and               minor training shortfalls were ob-
supplies inlto the theater was clearly high-                served with respect to new systems
lighted.                                                    and joint procedures not widely
                                                            practiced prior to DESERT SHIELD.
     The strategic advantage of high tech-                  We made good use of the nearly six
nology was re-confirmed. We must continue                   month build-up prior to commence-
to emphasize research and development to                    ment of combat operations to over-
retain that edge. At the same time, we were                 come such problems.
also forcefully reminded that possession of
high-tech weapons alone is not a sure defense               "Routine training must include joint terminology
against simple, low-tech weapons like mines.          and procedures. Joint flight training detachments (Red Flag,
        and neutralizing mines is always chal-        Solid Shield, Fallon) should actively seek to combine opera-
Finding                                               tions on available ranges. The Navy should work to incorpo-
lenging. We cannot always afford to provide           rnteKCandAWACSassets routinely. When deployed, joint
the minelayer unimpeded opportunity to lay            and multinational operations/exercises should focus on


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