facilities and overflight rights.                   support nor anti-air warfare were
                                                          fully tested by this conflict.
    * An opponent who receives support
      from allies with significant capabili-              INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENVI-
      ties such as the USSR or China.               RONMENT: Our regional allies provided a
                                                    well-developed infrastructure in what could
    * Non-availability of overseas bases            have been a difficult operating environment.
      from which to conduct offensive or            ThemodernportsandairfieldsofSaudiArabia
      support operations.                           accommodated the rapid build-up of coalition
                                                    forces with relative ease. There was an ample
    * U.S. action without strong regional or        supply of fuel close at hand. The flat,. feature-
      international support.                        less terrain of the region, and the demanding
                                                    environmental conditions proved both a help
    * Force and mobility requirements of a          and a handicap during )~p~~~~~~5 The terrain
      second major simultaneous crisis in           is well-suited for air warfare, but navigation
      another region.                               and concealment were more challenging for
                                                    ground forces. Sand, heat and unusual radio
      OPPOSITION STRATECY: Because                  wave propagation conditions hindered opera-
Iraq did not press their attack into Saudi Arabia   tions. The normally clear air-mass of the re-
in the days following annexation of Kuwait, or      gion is well-suited for flight operations al-
attack coalition ground and air forces in Saudi     though unusually poor weather encountered
Arabia early in the build-up, we were able to       during the air campaign hampered battle dam-
fine tune our forces and plans. Once conflict       age assessment, forced modification of plans
began, Iraq's burrowing, defensive, survival-       and precluded delivery of some precision ord-
oriented strategy, precluded a realistic test of    nance. The lack of a significant coastline and
our tactics and systems against a modern, well-     the "bottleneck" effect of the Northern Persian
led, well-trained, highly motivated adversary.      Gulf made the option of amphibious assault
Also, Iraq's strategy was shaped in part by the     more challenging than would be the case in
fact that it was not a maritime power, pos-         other regions.
sessed no submarines, and had only limited
ability to threaten forces enroute to the theater.        AREAS NOT TESTED:

      AREAS NOT TESTED:                                *  Limited host-nation support and
                                                          infrastructure.
    * Rapid transition to hostilities.
                                                          While the extreme and unique topo-
    * Requirement for forcible entry, sig-                graphical and climatological condi-
      nificant naval opposition, and                      tions of Southwest Asia posed spedal
      antisubmarine warfare.                              challenges, DESERT SHIELD/
                                                          STORM only tested our capabilities to
    * Confrontation by an integrated de-                  operate in one of many extreme
      fense and strong resistance from a                  environments.
      capable adversary with modern high-
      tech weapons. Neither close air                  *  Amphibious assault was not fully
                                                          tested.

                                                  -53-

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