DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS

File: 123096_sep96_decls1_0100.txt
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Total Pages: 109

Subject: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS       

Unit: OTSG        

Parent Organization: HSC         

Box  ID: BX003203

Folder Title: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS                                       

Document Number:          1

Folder Seq  #:         21













                     would not be a very satisfactory effort, but it would be the best available
                     under the circumstances.    There simply is no satisfactory answer to the
                     problems of management of casualties in this laeter situation.

                     907.   The response of the infection co antibiotics would be the same
                     regardless of how the Patient contracted the disease. The enemy might use an
                     antibiotic resistant strain of a particular microorganism but the source or
                     route of the infection will not change the sensitivity of the organism or the
                     response Of the patient.    It is emphasized at this point that each country
                     should include in its preparedness planning for the military as well as the
                     civilian side, the provision and storage of a sufficient amount of broad
                     spectrum antibiotics. Such antibiotics may be needed in an early phase after
                     a known or suspected biological attack, before a final microbiological
                     diagnosis has been reached and an antibiotic sensitivity pattern determined
                     (ref. Chapter 8).

                     908.   There are certain unique aspects of medical defence against biological
                     attack that rosr,.b'@y would -.take the problem ema Difficult to deal with thin
                     in other mass casualty situations.     Individuals becoming ill from an attack
                     with a biological weapon would not all become casualties at the same time, as
                     they would, for example, in the case of a nuclear explosion, saturation
                     bombing, or a massive surprise attack with nerve gas.      Dosage variation and
                     host resistance cause the onset of illness to be spread over a number of hours
 as represented roughly by &
                     bell-shaped curve with relatively few casualties at the beginning, the number
                     becoming greater over successive hours or days until a peak is reached. An
                     exception to this aspect would be an attack with biological toxins(s) which
                     might create an immediate, dramatic mass onset of illness.

                     909.   Although those who had been infected by a biological agent would retain
                     their physical abilities for a period of time after the attack (incubation
                     period) and thus theoretically could return to their base without assistance
                     or elaborate evacuation systems such as needed in other mass casualty
                     situations, such a return might not be advisable for epidemiological reasons,
                     aL least not until an etiological diagnosis had been established. Thus under
                     certain conditions the situation might have to be "frozen" by the isolation of
                     groups of personnel in their location together with one or more medical
                     personnel.

                     910.   It may be necessary for one physician, with a small ntlmber of ancillary
                     toedical personnel, to care for several hundred patients. Information could be
                     disseminated as to the normal course of the disease, specific signs or
                     symptoms of adverse prognostic significance to watch for, when Lo seek
                     individual medical attention or advicet and how to obtain essential medical
                     supplies. This would allow a limited number of professional personnel to care
                     for the maximum number of patients. A particular problem would be created by
                     the appearance of cases of secondary infection. Such cases might, on the
atory based diagnoses.

                     911.   Although most activities of medical management would take place a
                     considerable period of time after the biological attack itselfv physical
                     measures such an decontamination and collective protection will still have to
                     be considered. This would be particularly important if the situation
                     necessitated a prolonged stay in a presumptively infected area*


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Document 109 f:/Week-36/BX003203/DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS/detection of medical defense against biological :1217960927452
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003203
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Folder Seq # = 21
Subject = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996