DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS

File: 123096_sep96_decls1_0099.txt
Page: 0099
Total Pages: 109

Subject: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS       

Unit: OTSG        

Parent Organization: HSC         

Box  ID: BX003203

Folder Title: DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS                                       

Document Number:          1

Folder Seq  #:         21













                                                     NATO UNCLASSIFIED


                                                         CHAPTER 9


                                                    MEDICAL MANAGEMENT

                    901.   The treatment required for casualties from biological operations will
                    not differ in basic principle frorh-that required for patients suffering from
                    the same disease incurred by natural means.      There will certainly be
                    significant differences in the methods of providing basic medical care to such
                    a large number of cases occurring during a comparatively short span of time.

                    902.    Basically different from such a scenario would be a covert biological
                    attack direcced towards a key administrative center, institution or
                    installation, whether military or civilian. In such a situation only a
                    restricted number of casualties might be expected.       A successful mass attack
                    wi II, however, produce a suf f ici enLI y large number of casualties such that no
                    consideration can oe given to treatment in hospitals, perhaps not even in
                    improvised treacment centres.

                    903.  An exception to this could be index cases to b6 hospitalized in special
                    centers for the purpose of diagnosis.     The problems of initial clinical
                    diagnosis in a mass attack would be great, particularly since the mode of
                    entry and dose of the infectious agent (especially in the case of the aerosol
                    route) might be principally different from a natural epidemic situation. Thus
                    the symptomacology must be expected to differ considerably or entirely from
                    that described in textbooks. A further problem adding to the diagnostic
 possibility that the agent or the disease would often be
                    unfamiliar to the medical profession in the particular geographic area. These
                    considerations hold true also in relation to an attack with biological
                    toxin(s) as demonstrated clearly with the alleged use of mycotoxins in
                    Southeast and Central Asia.

                    904. If physical facilities have been destroyed by other means of warfare
                    Most civilian casualties will be cared for in the home; military casualties
                    will be treated by unit medical personnel rather than being moved to a
                    hospital. This will be a mass casualty situation with all of its
                    difficulties, but there will not be nearly the number of problems thar. would
                    be encountered in caring for the same number of casualties requiring
                    surgery. For the vast majority of patients no special equipment, such as X-
                    ray facilities, oxygen tents or surgical equipment, will be needed.

                    905. An important exception is a situation resulting from the use of
                    biological toxins where dramatic acute symptoms such as respiratory paralysis
                    would indicate the need for various types of advanced equipment.
                                   Al
                    906. If the disseminated organism produces an illnes that results in
                    relatively few deaths (Venezuelan equine encephalowyelitis or dengue), home or
                    group medical care will be quite effective.      If the disease is one for which
                    specific therapy such as antibiotics is indicated (Q fever or tularemia),
                    instructions for obtaining and administering the drug could be disseminated.
                    If a disease like yellow fever, with a high lethality rate and for which there
 therapy is encountered, instruction for general supportive care
                    that might be provided by nonmedical personnel, could be disseminated. This


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Document 109 f:/Week-36/BX003203/DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS/detection of medical defense against biological :1217960927452
Control Fields 17
File Room = sep96_declassified
File Cabinet = Week-36
Box ID = BX003203
Unit = OTSG
Parent Organization = HSC
Folder Title = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS
Folder Seq # = 21
Subject = DETECTION OF MEDICAL DEFENSE AGAINST BIOLOGICAL
Document Seq # = 1
Document Date =
Scan Date =
Queued for Declassification = 01-JAN-1980
Short Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Long Term Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Permanent Referral = 01-JAN-1980
Non-Health Related Document = 01-JAN-1980
Declassified = 17-DEC-1996