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[non-US document] 
 
 
 
 
DIN No. 39/91 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
l.    As long as Saddam or his military regime is in power, Iraq will not surrender its Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) ambitions. Saddam needs WMD to keep his dream of regional hegemony alive. Even 
without Saddam, a military regime in Iraq would want such weapons as a deterrent against the growing 
WMD arsenals of Iraq's unfriendly neighbours. 
 
2.    In the aftermath of DESERT STORM Saddam has tried hard to preserve his WMD capabilities, making 
that a higher priority than the early restoration of the national economy. But UN inspections, backed by 
economic sanctions and military muscle, are a serious setback for him. So far, the UN has uncovered 
enough to keep Saddam's expansionist policies on hold for many years. Still, we consider that Iraq is hiding 
hundreds of ballistic missiles and perhaps a stockpile of chemical and biological agents. A small amount of 
highly enriched uranium could also be concealed, although not enough for a nuclear weapon. Iraq is 
probably hiding WMD-related equipment as well, including some uranium enrichment centrifuges. 
 
3.    Even so, Saddam will not stop there. He could reconfigure Iraq's civilian industry to be able to produce 
chemical and biological weapons at short notice - in some cases even while UN inspections continue. And 
at some stage he will try to resurrect his nuclear weapon program. 
 
4.    Saddam knows, though, that the continuation of UN inspections will severely inhibit the progress of his 
WMD programs. We expect that Iraq will continue to try to obstruct the inspection teams, but in such a way 
that Iraq considers will not provoke a military response. 
 
5.    Still, Saddam is playing a dangerous game. And two constant factors since August 1990 have been his 
miscalculations and Bush's resolve. Another option for Iraq could be to export its nuclear technology to 
other sympathetic anti-Western countries in exchange for joint nuclear weapon production. still, Iraq is 
unlikely to get its bomb this century. 
 
 
 
 
 
IRAO:UNITED NATIONS INSPECTIONS     
 
LDI: 30 Oct 91 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.     United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 687 requires Iraq not to possess, or have the 
capability to produce, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). UN inspections in Iraq, aimed at ensuring 
that Baghdad is abiding by the Resolution, have been under way since May. So far 19 inspections have been 
conducted. Some inspections have clearly shown that Iraq has grossly and deliberately violated important 
terms of the Resolution. Other inspections have only reinforced concerns that Iraq is still concealing parts of 
its WMD capabilities. 
 
2.     In response to Saddam's clear contempt toward Resolution No. 687, the UN is now implementing a 
highly intrusive verification regime to monitor Iraq's future compliance. Iraq, though is still looking for 
ways of curtailing these inspections so that it can again build up its WMD capabilities. 
 
 
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(b), (c), (d)] 
 
 
 
DECLARATIONS AND ESTIMATES 
 
Chemical Weapons 
 
12.     UN inspection has confirmed that Iraqi manufactured sarin and GF nerve-agents were very unstable 
and thus unsuitable for long-term storage. Therefore, these agents were made closer to the time of 
anticipated use, rather than on a continual production schedule. There is still too much uncertainty in the 
method of estimation to determine if the 750 tonnes or so of CW agents surrendered2 accounts for the full 
Iraqi stockpile. And, as yet, Iraq has failed to respond to UN requests for its CW production schedule. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 The uncertainty arises because we can only estimate the quantities of weaponised CW agents included in 
those surrendered.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.    Moreover, there are niggling doubts about other aspects of Iraq's CW declarations. The quantity of 
mustard gas is one example. Iraq was certainly able to make a lot more mustard gas than was surrendered. 
Also, the nerve-agent tabun was not declared. Yet Iraq produced and used tabun in significant amounts 
during the war with Iran. 
 
14.    It is difficult to believe that at least small, but nevertheless declarable, amounts of other chemical 
agents, such as soman and VX were not also made. 
 
15.    Iraq's declaration of CW warheads for ballistic missiles raises concerns as well. On UN inspection, the 
Iraqis said that its 30 Scud warheads declared were purchased abroad, had their high explosive fill removed 
and were then filled with CW agent. But we believe that Iraq's Al Hussein ballistic missile production 
program, could have made available up to 300 spare high-explosive warheads for conversion to CW ones. 
Furthermore, judging from the crude warhead design features (including the fact that the CW fill was to be 
dispersed on impact) it is likely that Iraq has declared only a Mark-l version CW warhead and could be 
hiding sophisticated air-burst versions which could have been under development by the late 1980s. 
 
16.     But some clear evidence of non-compliance has also emerged. Three large plants near Al Fallujah 
which we know were designed to make precursors for chemical weapon manufacture were not declared. 
Moreover, there was a clear shortfall in the initially declared quantity of precursors stockpiled by Iraq. 
During inspection, Iraq admitted that the Al Fallujah facilities were originally intended to support CW 
production. And even though Iraq has stated that the plants and precursors were turned over for civil use, 
Saddam's regime must have known that they had to be declared. 
 
Biological Weapons 
 
17.     At the time of DESERT STORM it was believed that Iraq had a broad-ranging, offensive biological 
weapons (BW) research program. Most effort seemed to focus on two agents - anthrax and botulinum toxin. 
It was believed that Iraq was perhaps producing and stockpiling those agents. 
 
18.     Initially, Iraq denied the existence of any BW program. When it became obvious that the UN was 
going to inspect the Salman Pak facility, Iraq admitted to a defensive BW program. 
 
19.     The UN team also discovered fermentation equipment that would have allowed Iraq to make modest, 
but significant, quantities of BW agents. And, despite initial denials that they possessed even small amounts 
of BW agents for research, the Iraqi scientists eventually surrendered BW cultures, including anthrax. 
 
20.     Further suspicion arose on inspection of the bunkers. Iraq said that the bunkers were for storing 
conventional ordnance and were not BW related. But there were anomalies in this statement. First, access to 
the bunkers was denied for 'safety reasons'. Indeed, the inspection team observed that a brick wall had 
recently been built across an entrance to one bunker. Second, outside another bunker, the Iraqis pointed out 
conventional weapons that they said had been scattered about as a result of the Multi-national Force (MNF) 
bombings; they claimed that this was evidence that the bunkers were for storing conventional weapons. The 
inspectors noted that the weapons were in remarkably pristine condition and that, despite supposedly lying 
for several months in the open, they bore hardly a trace of dust. 
 
21.     So far the inspection of several suspect BW facilities has not found any documentation that would 
confirm Iraq's offensive BW program. Nor has any stockpile of BW agents (other than organism cultures), 
or evidence of Iraqi work on BW weaponisation, been discovered. 
 
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(b), (c), (d)] 
 
 
 
 
OUTLOOK 
 
Chemical Weapons 
 
28.     Although Iraq has declared a significant CW capability, we suspect that more is being withheld. 
Furthermore, at the time that the initial declarations were made, Saddam certainly had a strong incentive to 
maintain a CW capability in order to deter its use by his neighbouring enemies. And he would have wanted 
a CW capability, even after his anticipated acquisition of nuclear weapons, for greater flexibility. For 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tactical use, a strong incentive would be to retain mustard gas and, to a lesser extent, tabun. An effective 
tactical stockpile would be in the order of hundreds of tonnes of agents. 
 
29.    For strategic use, sarin and GF would be preferable to mustard gas or tabun because of their higher 
toxicity. A strategic stockpile would also be much smaller than a tactical one. For example, Iraq could arm 
all of its possible two hundred or so missiles with about 30 tonnes of CW agent. Such a small stockpile 
would be fairly easy to hide from UN inspectors. Moreover, the sarin/GF nerve-agent would probably be 
stockpiled in the binary (precursor chemicals mixed inside the warhead just prior to use) form which would 
make it safer and thus easier to move the agents to avoid UN detection. 
 
30.     Iraq would be hard pushed to covertly re-establish any significant CW production capacity as long as 
UN inspections continue, especially helicopter-mounted ones. As a contingency, Saddam might configure 
parts of his civilian chemical industry into a form suitable for a modest, but rapid transition to CW 
production. Pursuing such a breakout capability would be attractive to Iraq because it would probably be an 
unprovable infringement of Resolution No. 687. 
 
Bioloqical Weapons 
 
31.     Saddam's BW program may assume added priority because of the ongoing UN inspections. We 
cannot be sure that Iraq is hiding a BW stockpile, but there are particularly strong incentives to do so. The 
extreme toxicity of many BW agents would allow a potent military stockpile to be maintained from only a 
small quantity of BW agent, perhaps in the order of hundreds of kilograms. The chances of the UN finding 
such a small quantity would be low. 
 
32.  Moreover, Iraq could maintain a rapid break-out capacity within its civilian industry. But the possibility 
of ongoing covert production is a particular worry because it could be carried out in very small, perhaps 
even mobile facilities that are easy to conceal. 
 
 
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(b), (c), (d)] 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Iraqi Non-declarations 
 
 
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(b), (c), (d)] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    MATERIAL THAT IRAQ MAY          ASSESSMENT                      NOT HAVE 
DECLARED               OF WHETHER                                                      IRAQ HAS  
                                                    THIS  
                                                    MATERIAL 
 
Chemical weapon     10s of tonnes of CW agent       yes 
related 
                    100s of tonnes of CW agent      posible 
 
                    10s of ballistic missile CW     probable 
                    warheads 
 
                   10s - 100s tonnes precursors     yes 
 
                   production equipment for CW      probable 
                   manufacture 
 
Biological weapon  research amounts of BW agent     probable 
related    
                   kilogram amounts of BW agent     possible 
 
                   production equipment for BW      probable 
                   manufacture 
 
1.     THIS BRIEF ADDRESSES IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. 
 
2.     THE ONLY CONFIRMED BW RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION FACILITY IN IRAQ IS 
LOCATED AT SALMAN PAK WHICH IS 35 KM SOUTH OF BAGHDAD. 
 
3.     IRAQ PROBABLY CONTINUED TO ACQUIRE EQUIPMENT RELATED TO BW RESEARCH 
AND PRODUCTION UP UNTIL THE TIME IT INVADED KUWAIT. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS 
EQUIPMENT WAS TO BE USED TO FURNISH NEW BW PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THE 
LOCATION OF THESE NEW FACILITIES AND THEIR STATUS IS UNKNOWN. 
 
4.     WE BELIEVE THAT IRAQ HAS INVESTIGATED THE MILITARIZATION OF AT LEAST 12 
BIOLOGICAL AGENTS. HOWEVER, PROBABLY ONLY ONE OF THESE, ANTHRAX HAS BEEN 
DEVELOPED TO THE STAGE OF WEAPONIZATION. 
 
5.     ANTHRAX IS TECHNICALLY SIMPLE TO PRODUCE AND IS ROBUST AND EASY TO 
DISSEMINATE. IT CAN INFECT HUMANS VIA SKIN LESIONS, THROUGH INHALATION OR BY 
INGESTION. INFECTION THROUGH INHALATION IS PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS AND CAN 
CAUSE 100 PERCENT MORTALITY. TREATMENT OF ANTHRAX IS DEPENDENT ON EARLY 
DETECTION, WHICH IS DIFFICULT. THERE ARE VACCINES AVAILABLE. ANTHRAX IS A 
VERY PERSISTENT AGENT AND CAN REMAIN VIABLE IN THE GROUND FOR YEARS BUT 
DECONTAMINATION TO SAFE LEVELS IS RELATIVELY STRAIGHTFORWARD. 
 
6.     IT IS LIKELY THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE PRODUCED A NUMBER OF ANTHRAX FILLED 
BOMBS AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ANTHRAX WARHEADS MAY HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED 
FOR THEIR SCUD MISSILES. HOWEVER, THE PREFERRED DISSEMINATION METHOD FOR 
ANTHRAX IS VIA AEROSOL GENERATION. 
 
7.     GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE USE OF BW AGENTS OVER THE SEA IS NOT EFFECTIVE, 
AND IT IS THEREFORE UNLIKELY THAT AN ANTHRAX WEAPON WOULD POSE A 
SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO SHIPPING. 
 
8.     THERE ARE REPORTS THAT BOTULINUM TOXIN HAS ALSO BEEN PRODUCED BY IRAQ. 
THIS AGENT IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE THE MOST LETHAL SUBSTANCE KNOWN 
TO MANKIND AND IS ABOUT A MILLION TIMES MORE TOXIC THAN NERVE AGENTS. 
HOWEVER, WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE UTILITY OF BOTULINUM TOXIN; IT IS 
DIFFICULT TO PRODUCE, STORE AND USE EFFECTIVELY ON THE BATTLEFIELD. IT IS VERY 
DOUBTFUL THAT IRAQ WOULD BE ABLE TO OVERCOME THESE PROBLEMS FOR THIS 
AGENT TO BE A MAJOR THREAT. 
 
 
 
 
 
9.     IN CONCLUSION, IRAQ PROBABLY HAS A BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAM THAT IS CONTINUING TO INVESTIGATE A NUMBER OF POTENTIAL BW AGENTS 
BUT HAS PROBABLY ONLY PRODUCED ANTHRAX IN ANY QUANTITY. THIS AGENT HAS 
PROBABLY BEEN WEAPONIZED FOR DELIVERY BY BOMBS BUT NOT MISSILES. 


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