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File: aabmf_02.txt
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evacuation of large numbers of US and allied casualties resulting
from such offensive actions directed toward the liberation of
Kuwait. The TAES mission consisted of the following five

	a. Forward Area Evacuation. This entailed moving patients
from second-echelon facilities in the combat zone to facilities
farther to the rear or to strategic evacuation hubs.

	b. Redistribution of Patients. Redistribution involved
moving patients between medical facilities within the theater.
Termed "leveling," it ensured a balanced distribution of patients
among available medical facilities capable of caring for specific
types of injuries.

	c. Evacuation of Disease/Non-Battle Injuries (DNBIs1.
Commensurate with the number of US forces in the area of
responsibility (AOR) throughout Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, a
need existed to move patients other than battle casualties. This
element of the AE mission provided for the movement of such
patients to and between medical facilities within the AOR.

	d. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) support. In support of
the air war, the AECC Director was asked to provide non-doctrinal
support to the special operations forces (SOF) tasked-with
recovering downed allied aircrew members. This required the
deployment of a mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) to the
classified recovery site.

	e. Strategic Evacuation. C-14ls were used to evacuate
patients, including battle casualties, from the AOR to medical
facilities in EUCOM. The decision to evacuate patients out of the
AOR was primarily based on the theater evacuation policy.

4. Casualty Estimates. Requirements for AE forces (personnel and
equipment) were based on casualty estimates provided by the United
States Central Command (CENTCOM) Surgeon's staff. Initial
estimates were for 1,100 intratheater and an additional 1,100
intertheater casualty movements/day. The President's November
decision to bring additional forces into the AOR resulted in major
changes in AE contingency planning due to the announced potential
for offensive actions. Revised casualty estimates provided by
CENTCOM/CCSG on 15 December 1990 are outlined in Table 1.

5. Theater Evacuation Policy. The pre-hostilities policy was
established at 15 days, with the option to increase it to 30 days
on a case-by-case basis. During hostilities the evacuation policy
was set at seven days.

6. AE Manning Requirements. The AECC Director decided in late
August that AE elements required to support initial casualty
estimates would include one AECC, two aeromedical evacuation
control elements (AECEs), seven aeromedical evacuation liaison
teams (AELTs), five MASFs, 24 tactical aeromedical crews and 24


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