The cement factory is located in an area between the Kuwait International Airport and an area of Kuwait known to the Marines as the Ice Cube Tray, so named because of the configuration of the area’s road system. The cement factory’s location is identified in two different sources as QT751349 and QT746343.[17] A third position identified by the Material Courier Receipt, QT751049,[18] to the east of Al Jaber Airbase, is not in this general area and is probably an incorrect coordinate. On February 28, 1991, CENTCOM sent a message to the Marine Central command (MARCENT) concerning suspected chemical and biological weapons storage sites in their area of responsibility and required them to perform inspections of each of these sites.[19] However, the cement factory was not one of these sites and none of these sites (Figure 2[20] ) were near the cement factory.
Selection of the Reconnaissance Group
The 2d MARDIV NBC officer decided to send a substantial group to perform reconnaissance and look for evidence of Iraqi chemical weapons at the cement factory. The 2d MARDIV NBC officer selected his second-in-command NBC officer (henceforth called the group leader) to lead the reconnaissance. Several senior NBC non-commissioned officers (NCOs) supported him. The group leader assembled a small security force, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts to identify potential munitions hazards, additional NBC NCOs, and two Fox vehicles referred to as Fox 1 and Fox 2.[21] Throughout the Gulf War period, the Marines employed Fox reconnaissance vehicles to investigate suspected chemical weapon sites, e.g., the Fox vehicle searched Ammunition Supply Points.[22] In addition, two Kuwaiti officers accompanied the group.[23]
On March 12, the 2d MARDIV reconnaissance group drove to the position of the cement factory’s main buildings. The day was clear with temperature between 16 and 27 degrees Celsius and southeasterly winds of 5-15 knots.[24] The area around the compound was mined and ingress/egress avenues were limited. In addition, Coalition bombs, cluster bomb units, and artillery shells had been used against the facility. Some remained unexploded and this ordnance, identified by the EOD experts, presented hazards to the group.[25] The cement factory facility had multiple small buildings dispersed over an area of four square kilometers (Figure 3[26] ). Fox 1 conducted a thorough reconnaissance around the buildings and did not detect any chemical warfare agents. The group leader established a command post at an assembly area and briefed the reconnaissance group before they performed their inspections.[27] The group then donned the maximum level of chemical protective equipment, Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) 4,[28] and conducted a thorough search of each of the buildings. Anything suspicious was checked with an M256A1 Chemical Agent Detection Kit, M8 and M9 Detector Paper, or a chemical agent monitor (CAM). One of the buildings contained documents, possible offensive map overlays, and chemical defense protective equipment.[29] According to the group leader, a Kuwaiti interpreter determined that the documents and map overlays indicated that the facility had been used as an Iraqi chemical brigade headquarters. Using all available detectors, the team was unable to detect the presence of any chemical warfare agents in the buildings.[30] However, it did identify several items of concern:
Figure 3. Cement Factory Schematic
Landmines and landmine packing crates were found within and throughout the cement factory compound. One of the EOD specialists remembered seeing empty mines while others remember seeing only the mine packing containers.[31] One source estimated that there were more than 100 mines present.[32] One of the EOD technicians riding with a Fox vehicle identified them as Italian-made, Valmara-59 mines (Figure 4[33] ). The Valmara-59 is a conventional explosive, bounding fragmentation, anti-personnel mine that contains 0.576 kilograms of high-energy explosive and is not filled with chemical warfare agents.[34] The EOD technician recalls cautioning the Fox vehicle commander that it was his understanding this type of landmine could be filled with either conventional munitions or chemical warfare agents.[35] The current assessment of a US government mine expert is that the Valmara-59 is a conventional mine and cannot be used with a chemical warfare agent.[36] The senior EOD expert on the scene noted that the mines lacked explosive charges and assumed they were used for training purposes.[37] For more information about chemical mines, see Tab E.
The group encountered several other items that they tested for chemical warfare agent. These included munitions that resembled five-gallon drums, raising concerns that they might have contained some type of chemical warfare agent. One of the EOD specialists, who had previously seen similar munitions in other places, declared them to be "smoke pots" used to generate obscurant smoke during combat operations. A number of 55-gallon drums filled with unidentified liquids were found in the facility. The group leader thought these could contain precursor chemicals that could be mixed to make chemical warfare agents.[38] The Marines also discovered two or three large liquid containers (water trailers). They have been described as slightly larger than the 500-gallon "water buffaloes" that the US military uses to deliver water to personnel in the field. A picture of a smaller water buffalo at the cement factory is shown in Figure 5.[39] An NBC staff member thought they resembled one-ton bulk chemical containers.[40] Testing with M8 or M9 Chemical Agent Detection Paper was performed on the contents of all of these containers. Results of the testing were negative for chemical warfare agent.[41]
Figure 5. Liquid Sampling at the Cement Factory
When none of the suspicious items in and around the buildings tested positive for chemical warfare agents, the group leader decided that the facility was not a chemical weapons filling station. As the group leader prepared to depart, Fox 1 alerted for possible chemical warfare agents.[42]
This section provides an overview of the Fox vehicle.[43] The primary liquid chemical agent detector on the Fox vehicle (Figure 6[44] ) is the MM-1 mass spectrometer. The MM-1 detects a chemical warfare agent by analyzing the fragmentation pattern of a sample collected through a retractable probe. In the initial alert the MM-1 is looking to identify key ions of 10 chemical warfare agents. The probe can collect samples by "sniffing" the surrounding air or by taking them from a silicone wheel that is lifted from the ground to the probe. The sample is vaporized by heating at 180 degrees Celsius so it can be analyzed by the MM-1. [45]
Figure 6. Fox Vehicles of the 2d MARDIV
When the MM-1 alerts to a possible chemical warfare agent, an audible alarm sounds. A full spectrum analysis must then be performed to identify with high confidence the presence of chemical warfare agent. The preferred method for performing a full spectrum requires taking another sample at lower temperature, 120 degrees Celsius. The 120-degree temperature permits greater sample separation before analysis by the MM-1. A spectrum can also be produced with the other methods, but this is the most accurate. Without the full spectrum and an analysis of the fragmentation pattern generated in the spectrum, the presence of a chemical warfare agent cannot be identified with confidence. A tape which provides details of the spectrum can be printed by the operator.[46]
Considerable effort was made to locate the Fox tapes of the cement factory samples. Since the Fox was an experimental new item, employment doctrine was evolving and there was no requirement for Fox crews to maintain any of the Fox tape printouts. Many of these tapes were either routinely destroyed or misplaced. The Fox 1 MM-1 operator preserved the Fox 1 tapes for his own records even after he left the Marine Corps, and he provided copies of these tapes to this investigation. Unfortunately, the Fox 2 tapes have not been found and, for this reason, it is unclear to what substances Fox 2 alerted.
Fox 1 alerted to a chemical substance while conducting reconnaissance. The site where Fox 1 alerted was approximately 150 meters from the buildings (Figure 3).[47] The contaminated area appeared to be several "wet spots" on the ground. One observer recalled the area was a 10-foot x 10-foot or slightly larger oily spot.[48] The Fox 1 MM-1 alerted to several substances.[49] An NBC Gunnery Sergeant with Fox 1 (but not in the vehicle) donned MOPP 4 and went to the oily spot. He took a soil sample from the contaminated area, as well as one from non-contaminated soil in the same general area.[50]
The group leader monitored the Fox 1 reconnaissance and sampling from the assembly point about a quarter- to a half-mile from the contaminated area (Figure 3). The Marines at the assembly point were in MOPP 2. No one at the assembly point reported symptoms indicative of chemical warfare agent exposure. In an attempt to verify Fox 1 findings, the group leader ordered Fox 2 to test the spot. The Fox reconnaissance vehicle was new to the Marines and the group leader wanted to ensure that all of the systems checked out.[51]
When Fox 2 arrived, the group leader assigned it a general search area. He was careful not to tell the operators where the first alert had sounded. As Fox 2 searched using the sampling wheel, the MM-1 alerted to a chemical substance.[52] One of the crewmen stated that the Fox received initial warnings that appeared to be chemical warfare agents, but they could not be sure that the area was truly contaminated. After attempting to verify the reading, the Fox 2 crew took five soil samples of suspect and uncontaminated soil.[53]
Neither the Fox 2 wheelman nor the MM-1 operator remembers the cause of the MM-1 alert, but the wheelman does not think it was a chemical warfare agent.[54] The master sergeant who was with Fox 2 recalls that the MM-1 alerted to trace elements (the type of which he could not specifically remember) and "Fat, Oil, Wax," but not chemical warfare agents.[55] The Fox 2 commander distinctly remembers that the MM-1 showed contamination in the area so he ordered that the temperature be lowered to increase accuracy. He also recalled that the MM-1 alerted for lewisite[56] and sarin.[57][58] The tapes of the Fox 2 readings have not been located. Although many 2d MARDIV NBC personnel recalled the tapes being kept in a file cabinet at 2d MARDIV headquarters in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, no tapes were ever located.
Memories differ with the reconnaissance group concerning the exact nature of the sampling.[59] Because of the difference in recollections, it is unclear how many soil or liquid samples were ultimately taken and who took them. However, it is clear from the Materiel Courier Receipt that the 2d Marine Division NBC personnel forwarded only seven soil samples for further analysis.[60]
It is also unclear as to what chemical warfare agent(s) the samples may have contained. The Materiel Courier Receipts, DD Form 1911, identify the collected samples from Fox 1 and Fox 2 as being lewisite and tabun (GA),[61][62] but the group leader in an interview conducted in April 1991, stated the samples contained lewisite and sarin (GB).[63] However, the CENTCOM NBC Desk Logs identify the samples as sarin and something illegible (possibly L or lewisite)[64] and the Fox 1 tapes show an initial response for cyclosarin (GF).[65]
Additional Tests and Indications
During the sampling, the Fox crew was protected from any possible chemical warfare agents by the overpressure system of the Fox. Those outside the Fox, in proximity to the sampling, were in MOPP 4. However, there were Marines within several hundred yards of the sampling who were in MOPP 2 -- not wearing a protective mask. None of these Marines reported any physical signs of nerve agent exposure, such as dimness of vision or running noses. The group leader stated that the Marines were specifically looking for signs of a chemical warfare agent release-such as dead animals possibly killed by a chemical release-but none were found.[66]
The group leader recalled testing the samples one last time. In March 1991, he told an interviewer:
We tested the soil samples again with the CAM [Chemical Agent Monitor] and the 256 [M256A1 Kit], M-8, and M-9 paper. They came back negative [showing no presence of chemical warfare agent].[67]
After gathering sufficient information about the site, the reconnaissance group returned to the 2d MARDIV headquarters. The group leader "determined/speculated"[68] that the cement factory was a possible chemical mine filling station and that the defensive chemical equipment found in the buildings identified the Iraqi unit that had occupied the area as a possible defensive chemical brigade headquarters. His assumptions were based on the presence of mines, the liquid storage containers, and the oily spots on the ground where the Fox vehicles alarmed. The group leader reported his findings to the 2d MARDIV NBC officer and then to the I MEF NBC officer. Additionally, he reported the situation to the operations and intelligence staff officers of the 2d MARDIV. The I MEF NBC officer reported the inspection to CENTCOM where it was recorded in the following manner:
CWO3 [Name redacted] called. MARCENT has located a suspected chem land mine filling site at QT751349. The Fox got a positive for GB and [illegible]. They found containers that look like air tanks and mine crates. EOD advised the mines can be filled with HE [high explosive] or Chem [chemical warfare agent]. The area has been roped off and secured. I advised them to call 513th MIB [Military Intelligence Brigade] and get a sampling team into the area.[69]
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