[1] An acronym listing/glossary is at Tab A.
[2] Memorandum from 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, CMAT No. 1998195-0000037, p. 3.
[3] Memorandum for Commander, US Army Technical Escort Unit, Subject: "Operational Trip Report, Number 20", March 16, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000041.
[4] Memorandum from 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, CMAT No. 1998195-0000037, p. 3.
[5] Memorandum from 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, CMAT No. 1998195-0000037, p. 2; Memorandum from 2d MARDIV NBC officer, Subject: "Reports of Chemical Agent Detection During Operation Desert Storm," May 25, 1994, CMAT No. 1999082-0000038, p. 2; Testimony of MEF NBC Officer before the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, May 7, 1997; Capt. Thomas Manley, Marine Corps NBC Defense in Southwest Asian, Marine Corps Research Center Research Paper #92-0009 (called The Manley Report), p. 18.
[6] Iraqi Chemical Warfare: Analysis of Information Available to DoD (U), "Chapter 11, Possible Chemical Warfare Agent Release", Department of Defense Intelligence Oversight Committee Report, p. 20-22.
[7] Eddington, Patrick, Gassed in the Gulf, Washington, D.C.: Insignia Publishing, 1997 p. 155-156 and p. 181-183.
[8] The three Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) officers assigned as the I MEF NBC officers do not remember specifically tasking the 2d MARDIV to investigate the cement factory. See Lead Sheet #14343, Interview of I MEF NBC officer, February 3, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #7312, Interview of I MEF NBC officer (Rear), December 18, 1998, p.2; Lead Sheet #15664, Interview of I MEF NBC officer, March 31, 1998, p. 8-9. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) NBC officer does not recall the specifics of this incident. See Lead Sheet #15114, Interview of CENTCOM NBC officer, February 16, 1998, p. 1. It is possible that the tasking went through intelligence or operations channels rather than through NBC channels. However, none of the six Marine intelligence or operations officers interviewed recall the tasking. See Lead Sheet #14146, Interview of 2d MARDIV intelligence officer, January 14, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #14341, Interview of 2d MARDIV assistant intelligence officer, February 3, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #15115, Interview of 2d MARDIV assistant intelligence officer, February 16, 1998, p.1; Lead Sheet #15501, Interview of 2d MARDIV operations officer, March 18, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #15184, Interview of 2d MARDIV assistant operations officer, February 25, 1998, p.1; Lead Sheet #15143, Interview of 2d MARDIV weapons employment officer, February 18, 1998, p.1.
[9] Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), March 20, 1991, CMAT No. 1997181-0000-079 p. 10.
[10] Memorandum from 2d MARDIV NBC officer, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, CMAT No. 1998195-0000037, p. 2; "Personal Award Recommendation from 2d MARDIV NBC officer", September 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1999005-0000027, p. 2.
[11] Many of those interviewed believe that the mission took place in the first week of March. However, most conclude that events were happening so quickly that recalling an exact date is not possible. After reading a draft of this narrative, the Group Leader concluded that March 12 was the probable date of the mission. Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), April 22, 1998, p. 2.
[12] Mroczkowski, LtCol Dennis, US Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993, p. II-22.
[13] "CENTCOM NBC Desk Log," March 12, 1991.
[14] Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000038, Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000039. The Materiel Courier Receipt is the chain-of-custody document for the soil samples.
[15] Fox 1 tape, March 14, 1991, CMAT No. 1998134-0000019.
[16] Lead Sheet #5431, Interview of FOX subject matter expert, June 12, 1998, p. 2. The MM-1 operator is certain that this is the tape from the cement factory. This was the only time they went to the cement factory and the only time his Fox MM-1 had an alert. Lead Sheet #16618, Interview of Fox 1 MM-1 operator, May 15, 1998. p. 1.
[17] "CENTCOM NBC Desk Log", March 12, 1991., Personal Award Commendation from 2d MARDIV NBC officer, September 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1999005-0000027, p.2. Each site could be correct as these two locations might be within the cement factory complex.
[18] One possible explanation for this discrepancy is an error in writing a "3" as a "0". Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000038, Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991 CMAT No. 1998195-0000039. This is the correct Materiel Courier Receipt for this mission as this was the only time Marines took samples during the Gulf War. Lead Sheet #15664, Interview of I MEF NBC officer, March 31, 1998, p. 10.
[19] Numbered locations on Figure 2 correspond to sites listed in the CENTCOM message. The closest site listed in the message was approximately 18 kilometers away to the east, near the Kuwait International Airport. Message from CENTCOM, Subject: "RII-2622: Suspected Chemical and/or Biological Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War.," 28180IZ Feb 91. In 1997, during testimony to the Presidential Advisory Commission, a spokesman for the CIA stated that the closest site was a residential area of Kuwait City "and we have no information on munitions storage in this area." Statement for the Record by Robert D. Walpole: "16 Suspect CW/BW Storage Sites Identified in 28 February 1991 MARCENT Message, Central Intelligence Agency," September 4, 1997, p.1. The results of any of the reconnaissance missions performed in response to the CENTCOM will be investigated separately.
[20] Message from CENTCOM, Subject: "RII-2622: Suspected Chemical and/or Biological Weapons Storage Sites in the KTO Prior to the Ground War.," 28180 IZ Feb 91; "CENTCOM NBC Desk Log", March 12, 1991., Personal Award Commendation from 2d MARDIV NBC officer, September 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1999005-0000027, p.2.
[21] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997,
[22] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox Detections in an ASP/Orchard" (Case Narrative), September 25, 1997.
[23] "Personal Award Recommendation from 2d MARDIV NBC officer", September 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1999005-0000027, p. 2.
[24] Walters, Kenneth R., Sr., Major Kathleen M. Traxler, Michael T. Gilford, Capt Richard D Arnold, TSgt Richard C. Bonam, TSgt Kenneth R. Gibson, Gulf War Weather, USAF Environmental Technical Applications Center, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, March 1992, p. 4 -17.
[25] Lead Sheet #14996, Interview of Marine EOD technician, February 11, 1998, p. 3.
[26] Map representation drawn by 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, December 12, 1997.
[27] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p.1.
[28] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) and Chemical Protection" Information Paper
[29] According to the group leader, these overlays showed possible planning for offensive employment of chemical artillery munitions. Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p.1.
[30] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p.1.
[31] Lead Sheet #14996, Interview of Marine EOD technician, February 11, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1 & 2.
[32] Lead Sheet #14996, Interview of Marine EOD technician, February 11, 1998, p. 1.
[33] Photograph from MineFacts, v. 1.2, Charlottesville, Va: Department of Defense, 1997 (no pagination, CD database).
[34] MineFacts, v. 1.2, Charlottesville, Va: Department of Defense, 1997 (no pagination, CD database). A bounding fragmentation mine detonates after initially lifting off the ground two to three feet. This increases the probability of casualty to the upper torso.
[35] Lead Sheet #14996, Interview of Marine EOD technician, February 11, 1998, p. 1.
[36] Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2.
[37] Lead Sheet #15160, Interview of Marine EOD officer, February 24, 1998, p. 1.
[38] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.
[39] Photograph courtesy of Fox 2 wheelman.
[40] Lead Sheet #7310, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, December 12, 1997 p. 1.
[41] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p.1.
[42] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), April 22, 1998, p. 2.
[43] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997. Additional Fox information is also contained in the glossary found in Tab A.
[44] Photograph courtesy of Fox 2 wheelman.
[45] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997, p. 4.
[46] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997, p. 5-7.
[47] Lead Sheet #7310, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, December 12, 1997 p. 1.
[48] Lead Sheet #14132, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, January 13, 1998, p. 1.
[49] Fox 1 tape, March 14, 1991, CMAT No. 1998134-0000019.
[50] Lead Sheet #7330, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, December 16, 1997, p. 1.
[51] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.
[52] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1.
[53] Lead Sheet #15788, Interview of Fox 2 wheelman, April 2, 1998, p. 1.
[54] Lead Sheet #15788, Interview of Fox 2 wheelman, April 2, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #18148, Interview of Fox 2 MM-1 operator, July 20, 1998, p. 1.
[55] Lead Sheet #7350, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, December 16, 1997, p. 1.
[56] Lewisite is a persistent blister agent and its primary casualty causing mechanism is through contact. The symptoms manifest within minutes. The liquid would leave a wet spot on the ground for days to weeks, dependent upon weather conditions.
[57] Sarin is a non-persistent, G-series nerve agent. It is normally an airborne vapor hazard that attacks the nervous system of the victim in seconds to minutes. It is less persistent than tabun and cyclosarin.
[58] Lead Sheet #17781, Interview of Fox 2 commander, July 2, 1998, p. 1.
[59] The wheelmen from both Fox 1 and Fox 2 remember taking five samples each. The Fox 1 commander recalls his wheelman taking three soil samples and a liquid sample. Lead Sheet #16153, Interview of Fox 1 commander, March 19, 1998, p. 1. The Fox 1 MM-1 operator also recalls three soil samples and three liquid samples being taken. Lead Sheet #16618, Interview of Fox 1 MM-1 operator, May 15, 1998, p. 1. Additionally, an NBC gunnery sergeant attached to Fox 2 says he took two samples while he was outside the vehicle in MOPP 4. Lead Sheet #7330, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, December 16, 1997, p. 1. The wheelman from Fox 2 remembers the gunnery sergeant being outside the vehicle, but remembers taking the five samples from inside the vehicle. Lead Sheet #15788, Interview of Fox 2 wheelman, April 2, 1998, p. 1. The records show that crewmen forwarded a combined total of seven samples. In addition to sending two soil samples for further analysis, the Fox 1 commander, wheelman, and MM-1 operator remember taking a liquid sample from one of the large liquid containers. They believe that a liquid sample, along with the other samples, was sent to the Army CRDEC in the United States. The Fox 1 wheelman and the MM-1 operator recall that liquid samples were carried back to the division headquarters, where the operator and the crew of yet another Fox vehicle could not get the sample to register on the MM-1. The liquid samples were then buried. Lead Sheet #16153, Interview of Fox 1 commander, March 19, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #16618, Interview of Fox 1 MM-1 operator, May 15, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #15148, Interview of Fox 1 wheelman, February 19, 1998, p. 1.
[60] The Materiel Courier Receipt, a standard military form, is used to establish the chain of custody for possible chemical or biological warfare agent samples. It is not a sample analysis document. Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000038, Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991 CMAT No. 1998195-0000039.
[61] Tabun is a semi-persistent G-series nerve agent, much like Sarin.
[62] Memorandum for Commander, US Army Technical Escort Unit, Subject: "Operational Trip Report, Number 20", March 16, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000041, p.2. , CENTCOM NBC Desk Log.
[63] Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), March 20, 1991, p. 12.
[64] "CENTCOM NBC Desk Logs", March 12, 1991.
[65] Fox 1 Tape, March 14, 1991, CMAT No. 1998134-0000019. Cyclosarin is a semi-persistant G-series nerve agent.
[66] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997,
[67] Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), March 20, 1991, p. 15.
[68] Memorandum from 2d MARDIV NBC officer, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, CMAT No. 1998195-0000037, p. 3.
[69] "CENTCOM NBC Desk Log," March 12, 1998.
[70] Lead Sheet #15107, Interview of JCMEC commander, February 3, 1998, p. 4-5
[71] Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000038; Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991 CMAT No. 1998195-0000039.
[72] Lead Sheet #7330, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, December 16, 1997, p. 1; Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000038; Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991 CMAT No. 1998195-0000039.
[73] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 3.
[74] Lead Sheet #7330, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, December 16, 1997, p. 1; Lead Sheet #7174, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC officer, p. 5; Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader),December 12, 1997, p. 1.
[75] Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000038; Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991 CMAT No. 1998195-0000039.
[76] The TEU is a US Army unit based in Edgewood, Maryland, and is responsible for transporting all suspected chemical or biological samples to the United States. For a discussion of sample handling see: Information Paper: Analysis of Soil Samples Obtained in Southwest Asia, ARCENT, March 18, 1990.
[77] Memorandum for Commander, US Army Technical Escort Unit, Subject: "Operational Trip Report, Number 20", March 16, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000041. Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000038; Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991 CMAT No. 1998195-0000039.
[78] The CRDEC was renamed the US Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM) in 1998.
[79] Lead Sheet #15107, Interview of JCMEC commander, February 3, 1998, p. 4-5.
[80] Memorandum for Commander, US Army Technical Escort Unit, Subject: "Operational Trip Report, Number 20", March 16, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000041, p. 4.
[81] The sample analysis included: vapor analysis by gas chromatography/ mass spectrometry (GC/MS); thermal desorbtion into a mass selective detector; chloroform extracts of the samples analyzed by GC/MS; and high performance liquid chromatography/ion chromatography to identify any degradation products. See Memorandum for Record from team leader of Analytical Chemistry, ERDEC, Subject: "Analysis/Evaluation of Soil Samples," March 26 1996, CMAT No. 1998040-0000010, p. 1. Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center (ERDEC) was an element of CBDCOM.
[82] Lead Sheet #14092, Interviews of CRDEC chemical warfare agent experts, December 19, 1997, p. 1, 2 &4.
[83] For a discussion of proper packaging procedures for the TEU and JCMEC see CENTCOM J-2 Fact Paper, Subject: "CBW Agent Sampling Procedures", January 2, 1990.
[84] Commander, CRDEC, Message Subject: "Results of Analysis," 27193 OZ Mar 91, CMAT No. 1998159-0000018, p. 2-3.
[85] Commander, CRDEC, Message Subject: "Results of Analysis," 27193 OZ Mar 91, CMAT No. 1998159-0000018, p. 2-3.
[86] These are awaiting declassification and will be included in future versions of the narrative when declassified.
[87] Memorandum for Record from team leader of Analytical Chemistry, ERDEC, Subject: "Analysis/Evaluation of Soil Samples," March 26 1996, CMAT No. 1998040-0000010, p. 3.
[88] Lead Sheet #14092, Interviews with CRDEC chemical warfare agent experts, December 19, 1997, p. 4.
[89] Commander, CRDEC, Message Subject: "Results of Analysis," 27193 OZ Mar 91, CMAT No. 1998159-0000018, p. 2-3.
[90] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997,
[91] This is a common phrase used to restrict dissemination of classified information. However, even if JCMEC determined the group leader did have a need to know, JCMEC had not yet been notified of the analysis results and would not have been notified until March 27. Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 1. Memorandum from 2d MARDIV NBC officer, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, CMAT No. 1998195-0000037, p. 3. JCMEC notified on March 27, 1991 - Commander, CRDEC, Message Subject: "Results of Analysis," 27193OZ Mar 91, CMAT No. 1998159-0000018, p. 2-3.
[92] Memorandum from 2d MARDIV NBC officer, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, CMAT No. 1998195-0000037, p. 3.
[93] Lead Sheet #15107, Interview of JCMEC commander, February 3, 1998. p. 4-5.
[94] Lead Sheet #15664, I MEF NBC officer testimony to the PAC, May 7, 1997, p. 9.
[95] Many of the NBC specialists of the 2d Marine Division heard about this exchange from the group leader. The Army major in charge of JCMEC denies telling this to the group leader. However, he does admit that his unit redeployed during this time frame and that someone unfamiliar with this case may have taken the call. He also states that JCMEC did not normally notify a unit when samples tested negative. Only if a unit requested notification would they be informed by JCMEC of a negative result. If the sample tested positive, the unit would have been notified. According to the JCMEC commander, no soil samples or munitions samples taken during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or the post-war period tested positive for chemical warfare agents. Lead Sheet #15107, Interview of JCMEC commander, February 3, 1998, p. 4-5. Six Marine intelligence and operations officers from the 2d MARDIV were interviewed for this investigation and none remember calling JCMEC at the request of the group leader. However, several of the officers admit that it is possible that they called JCMEC, but no longer remember doing so. See Lead Sheet #14146, Interview of 2d MARDIV intelligence officer, January 14, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #14341, Interview of 2d MARDIV assistant intelligence officer, February 3, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #15115, Interview of 2d MARDIV assistant intelligence officer, February 16, 1998, p.1; Lead Sheet #15501, Interview of 2d MARDIV operations officer, March 18, 1998, p. 1; Lead Sheet #15184, Interview of 2d MARDIV assistant operations officer, February 25, 1998, p. 1; and Lead Sheet #15143, Interview of 2d MARDIV weapons employment officer, February 18, 1998, p.1.
[96] Memorandum from 2d MARDIV NBC officer, Subject: "Statement of Chemical Threat during Persian Gulf War," April 6, 1994, CMAT No. 1998195-0000037
[97] For a discussion of Fox MM-1 interferents and contaminants, see Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997.
[98] The US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) was until recently known as the US Army Chemical Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM).
[99] Xylyl Bromide is a tearing agent that was once used as a chemical warfare agent by the Germans in 1915. It is expensive to produce and its effects are easily protected against. The Fox vehicles had this substance in their 60 substance library when they were delivered from the German manufacturer. See Lead Sheet #14092, Interviews with CRDEC chemical warfare agent experts, April 1, 1998, p. 5. Xylyl Bromide is not considered a chemical warfare agent or precursor chemical. Precursor chemicals are those chemicals that when combined with other precursors, form a chemical warfare agent compound. Chemical Weapons Convention, http://www.acda.gov/treaties/cwcart.htm#II (as of January 1999).
[100] Memorandum from US Army ERDEC, "Subject: Evaluation of the Fox Mobile Mass Spectrometer (MM-1) Tapes," dated 14 March 1991, June 18, 1998, CMAT No. 998176-000006, p.1.
[101] Lead Sheet #16893, Interview of Cement subject matter experts, May 28, 1998, p. 1.
[102] Lead Sheet #14092, Interviews with CRDEC chemical warfare agent experts, December 19, 1997, p. 4.
[103] Letter from research chemist, National Institute of Standards and Technology, November 3, 1998, CMAT No. 1998307-0000048, p. 1. The Fox MM-1 manufacturer was asked to provide an analysis of the tape, but has not yet responded.
[104] Lead Sheet 22275, "Interview of NIST Chemist," March 17, 1999, p.1.
[105] Phosgene is a choking agent that attacks the respiratory tract causing suffocation.
[106] Memorandum from US Army ERDEC, "Subject: Evaluation of the Fox Mobile Mass Spectrometer (MM-1) Tapes, dated 14 March 1991," June 18, 1998, CMAT No. 998176-000006, p. 3.
[107] Letter from research chemist, National Institute of Standards and Technology, November 3, 1998, CMAT No. 1998307-0000048, p. 1. M/z is a chemical term for the mass to charge ratio.
[108] Iraqi Chemical Warfare Data, Defense Intelligence Agency, undated, p. 1.
[109] The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189,
[110] The sampling wheel on the Fox vehicle was made of a silicon-based materiel that produces offgassing that could be perceived as lewisite. This possibly led to alerts for lewisite in an environment in which lewisite was not present. Performing a spectrum would show no agent present, but the initial alert could cause some questions among Fox crews. Memorandum, US Army Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, "Subject: Results of the Combat Systems Test Activity MM-1 Excursion Test, Department of the Army," Office of the Project Manager for NBC Defense Systems, July 14, 1993, CMAT No. 1997195-0000267.
[111] The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189,
[112] Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183012-1 and 2), March 12, 1991, CMAT No. 1998195-0000038; Materiel Courier Receipt (items 183013-1 through 5), March 12, 1991 CMAT No. 1998195-0000039.
[113] The question of how quickly G-series agents vaporize was considered during this investigation. The wet spot at the cement factory could have been on the ground since the end of the ground war (12 days). One subject matter expert believes that it is quite possible that some GF would remain in Kuwaiti soil after 10 days. See Lead Sheet #14092, Interviews with CRDEC chemical warfare agent experts, Email from chemical warfare agent experts, November 6, 1998, p. 15. GF and GA have similar persistency. GB evaporates at a rate twenty times faster than GF or GA. See Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9/Navy Publication No P-467/AF Manual No 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, DC, December 12, 1990, p. 19,21,23.
[114] Headquarters, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, FM 3-9/Navy Publication No P-467/AF Manual No 355-7, Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds, Washington, DC, December 12, 1990,
[115] Lead Sheet #7311, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC platoon commander (group leader), December 12, 1997, p. 3.
[116] Letter from research chemist, National Institute of Standards and Technology, November 3, 1998, CMAT No. 1998307-0000048, p. 1.
[117] Memorandum for Record from team leader of Analytical Chemistry, ERDEC, Subject: "Analysis/Evaluation of Soil Samples," March 26 1996, CMAT No. 998040-0000010, p. 3.
[118] The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 92, p. 347.
[119] UNSCOM Letter from Charles Duelfer to Congressman Glen Browder, April 5, 1994, p. 2-3. See also, CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illness, August 2, 1996.
[120] The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict 1990-1996, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189, p. 656-657. This is a listing of all the chemical munitions destroyed by UNSCOM. There are no chemical mines listed.
[121] In response to a Presidential Advisory Committee question as to whether UNSCOM had any evidence that Iraq deployed land mines containing chemical warfare agents, the UNSCOM witness replied, "We've seen nothing, absolutely nothing." Testimony of a UNSCOM Inspector to the Presidential Advisory Commission on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29,1997, p.1.
[122] Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of NGIC minewarfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2.
[123] In response to a question posed by the Presidential Advisory Committee as to whether chemical munitions had been deployed to Kuwait, the UNSCOM witness stated, "We have seen no evidence of that and Iraqis have said that no movements took place." Testimony of a UNSCOM Inspector to the Presidential Advisory Commission on Gulf War Veterans' Illnesses, July 29,1997, p.1.
[124] During the entire course of clearance operations in Kuwait, there were no reports of chemical weapons being found in the US sector, or indeed anywhere in Kuwait. According to the DIA, "During the 3-year post-Gulf War ordnance clearing operations in Kuwait, chemical warfare agents were never detected." IIR 7-717-0082-97 Defense Intelligence Agency, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait (U)," (U) - redacted copy, June 1997.
[125] IIR 7-717-0082-97, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Iraqi Ordnance Clean-up Operations in Kuwait," redacted copy, June 1997.
[126] US Army, FM 3-4 and US Marine Corps, FMFM11-9, "NBC Protection," Washington, DC, May 29, 1992, and CBDCOM Fact sheet for the Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) p. 1-13 & 1-14
[127] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle" (Information Paper), July 31, 1997.
[128] US Army FM 3-101-2, "NBC Reconnaissance Squad/Platoon (Fox) Operations," August 10, 1994.
[129] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, p. 430.
[130] Brletich, Nancy R., Mary Jo Waters, Gregory W. Bowen, Mary Frances Tracy, Worldwide Chemical Detection Equipment Handbook, Chemical and Biological Defense Information Analysis Center, October, 1995, p. 430.
[131] US Army, TM 43-0001-26-1 Equipment Data Sheets: Chemical Defense Equipment p. 1-15.
[132] US Army, TM 43-0001-26-1 Equipment Data Sheets: Chemical Defense Equipment p. 1-17.
[133] US Army FM 3-4, "NBC Protection," Washington DC, October 1985.
[134] Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, "Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) And Chemical Protection" (Information Paper), October 30, 1997.
[135] US Army, FM 3-9; US Navy, Publication No P-467; and US Air Force, Manual No. 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, DC, December 1990.
[136] US Army, FM 3-9; US Navy, Publication No. P-467; and US Air Force, Manual No. 355-7, "Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds," Washington, D.C., December 1990, p. 17-18.
[137] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 29, 1997. This Chemical Weapons Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France, on January 13, 1993. It has been signed by 165 States and ratified or acceded by 106 States (as of February 1998). It was signed by the US on Jan 13, 1993 and ratified on April 25, 1997. Part XI of the Convention, "Investigations in Cases of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," details some of the procedures. Other protocols and guidelines were found in Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, Finland, 1985; Verification Methods, Handling, and Assessment Of Unusual Events In Relation To Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents, Consultant University of Saskatchewan in conjunction with the Verification Research Unit of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, March 1990; and Handbook for the Investigation Of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons, Department of External Affairs, Department of National Defence, Health and Welfare Canada, and Agriculture Canada, November 1985. US Army FM 3-4/USMC FMFM 11-9, NBC Protection, May 1992; Army FM 8-285/NAVY NAVMED P-5041/AFJMAN 44-149/MARINE CORPS FMFM 11-11 (adopted as NATO FM 8-285), Treatment Of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, US Army FM 19-20, Law Enforcement Investigations, Headquarters , Department of The Army, November 25, 1985, and other DoD investigational procedures contributed ideas for the development of this DoD methodology.
[138] IIR 2 340 0458 9, Defense Intelligence Agency, Subject: "Chemical Mines (U)"
[139] Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of NGIC mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 1.
[140] Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of NGIC mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 1.
[141] The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, United Nations, New York, 1996, Document 189, p.656-657. This table shows all of the munitions destroyed by UNSCOM. There are no mines listed.
[142] Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of NGIC mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 1.
[143] In the Iraqi Armed Forces Manual for the Tactical Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Official Special Manual No. 469, there is a discussion of chemical mines and employment: "Description of a chemical mine (theory): The description of a chemical mine is a theory only for the purpose of study and discussion. However, it is the description of a real mine."
[144] Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of NGIC mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2.
[145] Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of NGIC mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2.
[146] Lead Sheet #14252, Interview of NGIC mine warfare expert, January 15, 1998, p. 2.
[147] Chemical Officers Advance Course Guide. US Army Chemical School, SG 3-122, May 1984, p. C-2-3.
[148] "Anniston, Tooele, Pine Bluff, and Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Stockpiles," US Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization. As of January 4, 1999, the source information could be found at http://www-pmcd.apgea.army.mil/graphical/CSDP/SL/index.html.
[149] The History of Captured Enemy Toxic Munitions in the American Zone European Theater, May 1945 to June 1947, Office of the Chemical Corps, US European Command, p. 11-14.
[150] Information of the Presentation at the Shikhany Military Facility of Standard Chemical Munitions and of Technology for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons at a Mobile Unit, Conference on Disarmament CD/789, December 16, 1987.
[151] Lead Sheet #7350, Interview of 2d MARDIV NBC NCO, December 16, 1997, p. 2.
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