During this investigation we examined eight events we initially thought might involve CWA threats to the 11th Marines but later set aside as beyond the scope of this case. Five of these eight events we discovered did not affect the 11th Marines but might have affected other units. We are assessing these incidents for possible future investigation. Three of the eight events did affect the 11th Marines but were not potential NBC incidents. These three events included precautionary increases in protective posture as the 11th Marines approached the obstacle belts in southern Kuwait; a false alarm; and an incorrect interpretation of a log entry. Because we reported the eight incidents to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses in 1997 as under investigation, we briefly discuss them here for completeness and to document our rationale for setting them aside.

A 3:00 AM log entry on January 18, 1991, originally thought to be from an 11th Marines element, contained the entry, "NBC team on 100% alert." At 4:00 AM, another entry said "NBC Team going to 50% alert."^[296]

After the Gulf War, this log was archived with documents identified as belonging to the 1/12. However, on closer inspection, we determined 3d Marines (Task Force Taro) operations officers kept the log. We did not find this event recorded or recalled by the 11th Marines.

This incident was not an 11th Marines incident.

An 11:10 PM log entry on January 29, 1991, noted a gas alert was transmitted, whether by outgoing or incoming message was unclear. The log recorded an all clear 30 minutes later. About 35 minutes after the alert, the log indicated an NBC-1 report came in from the 3/3 (in Task Force Taro).^[297]

As with incident S, this alert was initially misidentified as associated with the 11th Marines when it was actually associated with Task Force Taro.

This incident was not an 11th Marines incident.

At 10:20 AM, on the morning the Coalition attacked through the obstacle belts in Kuwait (February 24), the 1st Marine Division instructed 11th Marine elements to go to MOPP Level 2.^[298] During the same time frame, intelligence reports indicated Iraq’s preparation for and conduct of NBC attacks.^[299] It was not initially clear whether adopting MOPP Level 2 increased or decreased protective posture.

Analysis determined the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions did this initial precautionary upgrade from MOPP Level 0 to Level 2 as the they approached the first obstacle belt (for the 11th Marines, about 13 miles north of the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border).^[300]

This precautionary MOPP upgrade was not the result of chemical warfare agent (CWA) detection, incoming fire, or other alert; CWA was definitely not present. No reports of Iraq’s actual delivery of chemical weapons were associated with the intelligence reports.

Just before noon on the first day of the ground campaign (February 24), Marine Air Group 26 (MAG-26) reported nerve agent about 11 miles southwest of Al Jaber Air Base. A few minutes later, a log entry noted an NBC-1 (initial incident report).^[301] Another official chronology echoed these events verbatim.^[302]

Available reporting did not explain further about the detection process, who increased protective posture as a result, or if an all clear was sounded. At the time, the nearest 11th Marines element was a forward-deployed component of the 3/11 battalion located about nine miles to the southeast of the reported CW threat.^[303] No documentation or testimony indicated this alert affected any part of the 11th Marines or that they even received it.

This was not an 11th Marines incident.

A log from the 5/11 forward Command Post included this outgoing message entry at 6:18 PM on February 24: "GAS NBC 1 REPORT FALSE ALARM."^[304]

About this time, the Task Force Ripper NBC officer recalls receiving an NBC-1 report. When neither the 11th Marines nor 1st Marine Division confirmed it, he discarded the report and did not retransmit or act on the alert. No one interviewed from the 5/11 recalled the log entry, why it was initiated, or why it was declared a false alarm. The 11th Marines NBC officer said he believed if an NBC incident had been associated with this log entry, word of it would have spread on the artillery networks (and presumably be recorded by several other units) even if the 5/11 had canceled the NBC-1 report before transmission.^[305] We could locate no other documentation about this incident.

Whoever originally entered this incident considered it a false alarm. No other documentary evidence or testimony—no test results, no casualties, no witnesses, no recollections—support a real NBC incident. In our interim report on the 11th Marines, we addressed this log entry as a potential incident and reflected the scant evidence presented here. In this final report, we have set this incident aside as a false alarm and moved discussion of it to this Tab.

At 1:00 PM on February 26, a 1st Combat Engineer Battalion command chronology noted a report of Flash! Gas! and that Task Force Papa Bear went to MOPP Level 4. The all clear came an hour later.^[306]

We uncovered no evidence the 11th Marines recorded or reacted to this alert, although the 1/11 directly supported Task Force Papa Bear at the time. No 11th Marines witness recalled an alert at this time.

We found no evidence this incident affected 11th Marine units.

Shortly after midnight on February 27, the 11th Marines and Task Force Papa Bear sent "pos" reports to the 1/11. The 1/11 log did not indicate any change in protective posture.^[307]

We found no witnesses or other journal or log entries addressing this entry. We could find no cause for an alert, and no one reported any casualties or changes in MOPP status.

We assessed this event as definitely not indicating CWA presence. We considered the likelihood "pos" in the hand-written log meant positive indications of CWA and investigated whether other evidence substantiated that interpretation. We concluded the "pos" referred to position reports and not to an NBC incident. The Presidential Special Oversight Board recommended deleting this event from the body of the narrative, consequently we moved discussion of it to this tab.

A 1st Combat Engineer Battalion command chronology reflected an alert at 9:30 AM on February 27, with the annotation "Flash! Gas!" As a result, Task Force Ripper went to MOPP Level 4.^[308]

Although 11th Marines were in Task Force Ripper’s general vicinity, none of the artillery regiment’s chronologies or logs recorded this incident.

This does not appear to be an 11th Marines incident.

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