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File: 950925_68240008_94.txt
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IIR 6 284 0008 94/DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS Filename:68240008.94 CDSN = LGX120 MCN = 93287/21893 TOR = 932871327 PTTCZYUW RUEKJCS7625 2871325- --RUEALGX. ZNY P 141325Z OCT 93 FM DIA WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC RHFPAAA/UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN-CMO// RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2/N22// [ (b)(2) ] RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN// RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2// RULKQAN/MARCORINTACT DET QUANTICO VA [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] RUEALGX/SAFE P 140950Z OCT 93 FM [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEOAYB/FSTC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE VA//AIFICA// RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:SEE// RUEKJCS/JOINTSTAFF WASHDC//J-5/PMA// [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//EEY/EUR-PM// RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE BT SERIAL: (U) IIR 6 824 0008 94 /*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/ COUNTRY: (U) CZECH REPUBLIC (EZ). SUBJ: IIR 6 284 0008 94/DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS BY CZECHOSLOVAK UNIT DURING DESERT STORM, PART III (U) WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. [ (b)(2) ] /------------------------------------------------------ -- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE /------------------------------------------------------ -- DOI: (U) 910101-910830 REQS: (U) [ (b)(2) ] SOURCE: A- [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] B- [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] C- [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] SUMMARY: (U) PROVIDES ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CHEMICAL AGENTS DETECTED DURING DESERT STORM IN THE JOINT FORCES COMMAND -- NORTHERN AREA OF OPERATIONS TEXT: 1. THIS REPORT PROVIDES ADDITIONAL AND CLARIFYING INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DETECTION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS BY THE CZECHOSLOVAKS DURING DESERT STORM. THIS INCLUDES THE OPERATIONS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK NBC DETACHMENTS, DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS IN THE AREA AROUND KING KAHLID MILITARY CITY (KKMC), AND REPORTING OF THIS DATA THROUGH CHANNELS. 2. OPERATIONS OF CZECH DETACHMENTS. THE CZECHOSLOVAK FORCES DEPLOYED TO SAUDI ARABIA WERE TASK ORGANIZED INTO THREE DETACHMENTS, TWO OF WHICH WERE SUPPOSED TO SUPPORT ROYAL SAUDI FORCES, AND THE THIRD WHICH WAS TO BE HELD IN RESERVE AND SUPPORT CZECHOSLOVAK FORCES. DURING ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT, ALL THREE DETACHMENTS WERE IN FACT SUBORDINATED TO THE JOINT FORCES COMMAND NORTH COMMANDED BY SAUDI GENERAL ((SULIMAN)). EACH DETACHMENT [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AND WAS FULLY EQUIPPED TO INDEPENDENTLY IDENTIFY AND DECONTAMINATE CHEMICAL AGENTS. THEY UTILIZED [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] 3. THESE THREE NBC DETACHMENTS WERE TO SUBORDINATED TO THE 20TH SAUDI BRIGADE AND ITS BASE CAMP LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 10 KM NORTH EAST OF HAFAR AL BATIN (2827 N 04558E), THE 4TH SAUDI ARMORED BRIGADE, AND TO THE HEADQUARTERS KKMC. 4. ON 19 JANUARY 1991, ALL THREE CZECHOSLOVAK DETACHMENTS INDEPENDENTLY DETECTED A G SERIES NERVE AGENT WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES OF EACH OTHER. AT THAT TIME, THE UNITS WERE BETWEEN 20 TO 50 KM DISTANT FROM EACH OTHER. AT LEAST ONE OF THESE UNITS, AT THE TIME OF DETECTION, WAS CONVOYING TO A NEW LOCATION, IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THEIR ASSIGNED MAJOR COMMAND. 5. DETECTION WAS MADE INDEPENDENTLY AT EACH OF THE THREE DETACHMENTS USING TWO SEPARATE PROCEDURES; ONE WHICH USED WET CHEMICAL ANALYSIS AND ANOTHER WHICH USED BIOCHEMICAL ASSAY. IN BOTH CASES, THE MEDIUM WAS AIR SAMPLING OF THE IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT. AFTER THE INITIAL DETECTION, NO SUBSEQUENT TESTS IN TIME DETECTED CONTINUED PRESENCE OF ANY CHEMICAL AGENT. RETAINED SAMPLES FROM AT LEAST ONE DETACHMENT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TESTED AT THE FIELD LABORATORY [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] AND WAS CONFIRMED TO CONTAIN A G-SERIES NERVE AGENT. THE RESULTS OF THIS COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS WERE FORWARDED IN A SITREP TO THE HQTRS KKMC, UNDER SAUDI GENERAL SALIMAN, AND PASSED TO SOUTHERN HQTRS (RIYADH), AND ALSO TO CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF DEFENSE THERE WERE NO FOLLOW UP ACTIONS OR INSTRUCTIONS TO OUTLINE THE CONTAMINATION. 6. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] NO MILITARY EMPLOYMENTS OR ACTIONS, TO INCLUDE SCUD MISSILE ATTACKS, ARTILLERY, SPECIAL OPERATIONS, OR BOMBING, DURING THE TIME THE DETECTIONS WERE MADE. THE [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] DETECTION WAS THE RESULT OF CHEMICAL AGENTS RELEASED BEHIND THE IRAQI LINES AS A RESULT OF COALITION BOMBING. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THE WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING THIS EVENT INCLUDED A STRONG INVERSION, AND NO PRECIPITATION. ([ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THE NEAREST BOMBING OF KNOWN OR SUSPECTED CW RELATED BUNKERS WAS OVER 100 NM FROM THIS REGION.) 7. EVEN THOUGH THE CONCENTRATION OF THE DETECTED G AGENT WAS SO LOW THAT IT WAS NOT CONSIDERED A RISK, AND WHICH WOULD NOT NORMALLY CALL FOR DONNING PROTECTIVE GEAR, PROTECTIVE GEAR WAS IN FACT DONNED DUE TO THE CONCERN ABOUT THE THREAT OF CW USE BY THE IRAQIS. 8. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] NO CHEMICAL AGENTS OR MUNITIONS HAD BEEN EMPLOYED DURING THIS TIMEFRAME. FURTHER, [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] NO IRAQI, OR OTHER NATIONAL MANUFACTURE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS FOUND IN THE NORTHERN AREA OF OPERATIONS WHERE THE CZECHOSLOVAKS HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHEMICAL DEFENSE. 9. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THE DETECTION OF ANOTHER CHEMICAL AGENT, AFTER [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] UNIT WAS ORDERED BY GEN SALIMAN TO INVESTIGATE A PUDDLE IN THE DESERT, 10-KM NORTH WEST OF KKMC, WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY IDENTIFIED AS SULFUR MUSTARD. THE RESULTS OF THIS FINDING WERE REPORTED IN A SITREP TO THE SAUDIS AND THROUGH ARAB CHANNELS TO RIYADH. THIS PUDDLE WAS FOUND WHERE IT WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE SAUDI MILITARY, AND THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT IT WAS THE RESULT OF ANY MUNITIONS, TO INCLUDE AN ERRANT SCUD MISSILE, ARTILLERY, OR OTHER WEAPON TYPE. THE WEATHER WAS CLEAR, WITH NO PRECIPITATION IN THE AREA FOR AT LEAST 48 HOURS, AND THERE WAS NO OBSERVED TANK OR VEHICLE TRACKS NEAR THE PUDDLE. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] THERE WAS NO FURTHER FOLLOW UP BY ANY HEADQUARTERS. 10. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] IN THE ABSENCE OF NBC WARFARE IN THE GULF, THE THREAT POSED BY IRAQ DURING ALL OPERATIONS--ESPECIALLY IN PROVIDING NBC DEFENSIVE SUPPORT TO KKMC, REQUIRED THAT AFTER EACH SCUD MISSILE ATTACK, A COMPLETE ANALYSIS WAS DONE. ALL THESE RESULTS WERE NEGATIVE. CZECHOSLOVAK DETACHMENTS INVESTIGATED MANY SCUD, AS WELL AS ARTILLERY IMPACT AREAS DURING THE WAR, AND FOUND NO EVIDENCE IN ANY INVESTIGATED CRATER OF RESIDUAL CHEMICAL AGENTS, OR DECOMPOSITION PRODUCTS OF CHEMICAL AGENTS. THIS INFORMATION WAS SHARED WITH THE SAUDI CHAIN OF COMMAND. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] //IPSP: (U) PG 1610//. //COMSOBJ: (U) 143; 113//. PROJ: (U). COLL: (U) AB. INSTR: (U) US NO. PREP: (U) [ (b)(2) ] ACQ: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] DISSEM: [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] WARNING: (U) [ (b)(2) ]
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