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File: 070296_cia_70086_70086_01.txt
Page: 01
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Subject: IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST. DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR, 1990-91 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR, 1990-91 IN ADDITION TO LAUNCHING SCUD MISSILES, IRAQ TRIED TO PROVOKE COALITION GROUND OPERATIONS BY SETTING KUWAITI OIL WELLS ON FIRE AND BY CREATING A LARGE OIL SLICK IN THE PERSIAN GULF THAT THREATENED SAUDI WATER DESALINATION FACILI- TIES. IRAQ'S POLITICAL STRATEGY. TO EXPLOIT THE PERCEIVED INTERNAL WEAKNESSES AND DIVISIONS IN THE COALITION, BAGHDAD CONCENTRATED ITS DIPLOMATIC AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS ON SEVERAL THEMES. IRAQ DECRIED THE COALITION EFFORT AS AN ISRAELI-INSPIRED PLOT TO DESTROY THE LARGEST AND MOST POWERFUL ARAB ARMED FORCES AND THREATENED TO STRIKE ISRAEL. BELIEVING ARAB MEMBERS OF THE COALITION WOULD FIND HOSTILITIES WITH BAGHDAD UNPAL- ATABLE WHILE IRAQ WAS FIGHTING ISRAEL. BAGHDAD ALSO HIGHLIGHTED THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE OIL-RICH GULF STATES THAT HAD JOINED THE COALITION AND THE POOR ARAB STATES THAT SUPPORTED SADDAM, PORTRAYING THE CONFLICT AS A STRUGGLE BETWEEN "GREEDY " OIL SHAYKHS AND IMPOVERISHED ARAB MASSES. IRAQ THREATENED TO ATTACK THE SAUDI OILFIELDS, TO EMPLOY CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION FORCES AND ISRAEL, TO CONDUCT SABO- TAGE AND TERRORIST ATTACKS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, AND TO DESTROY KUWAIT AND ITS OIL INDUSTRY IN THE "MOTHER OF ALL BATTLES" TO DRIVE HOME IRAQI DETERMINATION TO HOLD KUWAIT AND TO TERRIFY WESTERN AND ARAB PUBLICS. FINALLY, SADDAM USED THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT TO BUY TIME AND DIVIDE THE COALITION, HOPING THAT, AS LONG AS HE HELD OUT THE PROSPECT OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE COALITION WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE TO FORCIBLY EVICT IRAQ FROM KUWAIT. THE "SADDAM LINE" IRAQI FORCES BUILT FORTIFI- CATIONS ALONG THE SAUDI BORDER CALLED THE "SADDAM LINE" BY US TROOPS, THESE DEFENSES, CONSISTED OF OBSTACLES FLAME TRENCHES. THE FLAME TRENCHES WERE LONG DITCHES FILLED WITH OIL THAT THE IRAQIS INTENDED TO IGNITE TO HINDER A COALITION ASSAULT, READYING THE STRATEGIC FORCES AT LEAST INITIALLY, BAGHDAD PROBABLY BELIEVED ITS UN- CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY COULD HAVE A SIMILARLY STRONG IMPACT IN A WAR WITH THE COALITION FOR KUWAIT AS IT HAD IN THE WAR WITH IRAN. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN IRAQ'S OFFENSIVES IN 1988. IRAQI ATTACKS ON IRANIAN CITIES WITH MISSILES -TERRIFIED IRANIAN CITIZENS ALREADY WEARY OF THE LONG, COSTLY WAR. IRAQ PROBABLY ASSESSED THAT BOTH WEAPONS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO TEH- RAN'S DECISION TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE. AS A RESULT, BAGHDAD CAME TO LOOK ON ITS UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES AS IMPORTANT INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY AND ROUTINE COMPO- NENTS OF ITS MILITARY OPERATIONS IRAQ'S UNCONVENTIONAL ARSENAL BEFORE THE GULF WAR, IRAQ POSSESSED AN IMPRESSIVE ARRAY OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND EXTENSIVE COM- BAT EXPERIENCE IN THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND BALLISTIC MISSILES. CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IN 1990, IRAQ HAD THE LARGEST CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD AND COULD PRODUCE THE BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENTS SARIN AND GF. THE IRAQIS HAD EMPLOYED THESE AGENTS AGAINST IRAN IN ARTILLERY SHELLS, ROCKETS, AERIAL BOMBS, AND OTHER MUNITIONS. IRAQ ALSO PRODUCED BINARY CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND WARHEADS FOR ITS SCUD MISSILES BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. BAGHDAD HAD ONE OF THE MOST AGGRESSIVE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN THE WORLD AND PROBABLY COULD FIELD AN OPERATIONS BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY. WE BELIEVE IRAQ HAD THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE LARGE QUANTITIES OF BOTULI- NUM TOXIN, CLOSTRIDIUM PERFRINGENS, AND ANTHRAX IRAQ PROBABLV FILLED SOME MUNITIONS WITH BIOLOGICAL AGENTS BALLISTIC MISSILES. BEFORE THE GULF WAR, IRAQ HAD A LARGE FORCE OF SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES CONSISTING MAINLY OF DOMESTICALLY MODIFIED VARIANTS OF THE SOVIET SCUD. CHEMICAL WARFARE. IRAQI PREPARATIONS TO FIGHT IN A CHEMICAL WARFARE ENVIRONMENT: ASSOCIATED WITH CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WERE TRANSPORTED -TO SOUTHERN IRAQ. ACTIVITY AT BUNKERS SUSPECTED OF STORING CHEMICAL MUNITIONS CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION SITES IN THE KUWAIT THEATER IN OUR JUDGMENT, SADDAM READIED HIS FORCES TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, ONLY TO REVERSE HIMSELF LATE IN THE FALL. IRAQI ACTIVITY BETWEEN THE INVASION OF KUWAIT AND THE BEGINNING OF OPERATION DESERT STORM AND TRACES OF CHEMICAL AGENT DISCOVERED BY COALITION MILITARY PERSONNEL AFTER THE WAR INDICATE IRAQ INITIALLY MOVED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS TO THE KUWAIT THEATER AFTER THE INVASION. REPORTING INDI- CATES THESE STOCKS PROBABLY WERE MAINTAINED IN SPECIAL AMMUNITION BUNKERS. UNDER IRAQI DOCTRINE BAGHDAD WOULD NOT HAVE ISSUED CHEMICAL MUNITIONS TO COMBAT UNITS UNTIL IMMEDIATELY BEFORE BATTLE. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS APPARENTLY WERE WITHDRAWN FROM THE THEATER LATE IN THE FALL. WE NOW BELIEVE SADDAM DECIDED TO WITHDRAW HIS CHEMICAL ORDNANCE FROM THE KUWAIT THEATER BECAUSE HE CONCLUDED THE POTENTIAL BENEFIT OF CHEMICAL WAR- FARE WAS OUTWEIGHED BY THE RISK OF RETALIATION BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS. WE BELIEVE SADDAM DECIDED THE ADVANTAGE HIS FORCES WOULD ACCRUE FROM CHEMICAL WARFARE WAS NOT WORTH THE GAMBLE OF THE UNITED STATES OR UNITED KINGDOM RETALIATING WITH ATTACKS BAGHDAD COULD NEI- THER MATCH NOR ABSORB. SIMILAR CONSIDERATE PROBA- BLY INFLUENCED SADDAM'S DECISION NOT TO USE CHEMICAL-FILLED SCUD MISSILES AGAINST ISRAEL. THE COALITION AIR CAMPAIGN PLAN ACCORDING TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE US AIR FORCE, THE PLAN FOR THE COALITION AIR CAMPAIGN ENVISIONED FOUR DISTINCT PHASES. DURING THE INITIAL PHASE, COALI- TION AIRFORCES WOULD CONCENTRATE ON GAINING AIR SUPERIORITY OVER IRAQ AND DESTROYING IRAQS STRATEGIC CAPABILITY, INCLUDING ITS MISSILE, NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WARFARE FACITILIES. PHASE TWO WOULD SHIFT THE BRUNT OF AIR OPERATIONS TO SUPPRESSING IRAQI AIR DEFENSES PROTECTING THE KUWAIT THEATER. DURING PHASE THREE, TARGETS IN IRAQ WOULD CONTINUE TO BE STRUCK AND AIR DEFENSES ATTACKED AS NEEDED, BUT THE FOCUS WOULD INCREASINGLY BE ON ATTACKING IRAQI GROUND FORCES IN THE KUWAIT THEATER TO SOFTEN THEM UP FOR THE GROUND OFFENSIVE THAT WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY INTENSIVE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND BATTLEFIELD INTERDICTION IN PHASE FOUR. THE SCUD CAMPAIGN PROVED TO BE A DISAPPOINTMENT IRAQ BECAUSE IT SUCCEEDED ONLY IN DIVERTING COALITION SORTIES FROM MORE LUCRATIVE TARGETS. OF GREATEST IMPOR- TANCE, THE SCUD ATTACKS FAILED TO BRING ISRAEL INTO THE CONFLICT. DESPITE THE TERROR CREATED BY THE SCUDS, THEIR LIMITED PAYLOAD AND POOR ACCURACY CAUSED ONLY SLIGHT DAMAGE. CREATING AN ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE. IRAQ'S FIRST EF- FORTS TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF THE WAR WERE TO PUT KUWAIT'S OIL PRODUCTION AND SAUDI WATER DESALINATIO AT RISK. ON 22 JANUARY, IRAQ IGNITED THE FIRST KUWAITI OIL WELLS. INITIALLY, ONLY A SMALL NUMBER WERE SET ABLAZE. IRAQ HELD BACK UNTIL IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE COALITION GROUND OFFENSIVE TO IGNITE THE REST. THREE DAYS LATER IRAQ BEGAN PUMPING KUWAITI OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF, CREATING AN OIL SLICK THAT COVERED THOUSANDS OF SQUARE MILES. IRAQ CONTIN- UED TO DUMP OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF UNTIL 27 JANUARY WHEN COALITION STRIKE AIRCRAFT INTERRUPTED THE FLOW BY DESTROYING THE MAIN MIXING MANIFOLD OF THE KUWAITI OIL SYSTEMS WE BELIEVE IRAQ'S INTENTION IN BOTH CASES WAS TO GOAD THE COALITION TO ACCELERATE THE TIMETABLE FOR THE GROUND WAR. SADDAM PROBABLY BELIEVED THESE MOVES WOULD PUT SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE COALI- TION LEADERSHIP TO TRY TO RETAKE KUWAIT IMMEDIATELY TO PREVENT FURTHER DESTRUCTION OF THE KUWAITI OILFIELDS AND TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT TO THE SAUDI DESALINATION SYSTEM. BOTH ACTIONS WERE PROBABLY IMPROVISED IN RESPONSE TO THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE WAR. DESTRUCTION OF THE KUWAITI OILFIELDS SADDAM'S PRINCIPAL MOTIVE IN DESTROYING THE KUWAITI OILFIELDS WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE COALITION RECAPTURED NOTHING OF VALUE IN KUWAIT. IN ADDITION TO THIS SCORCHED EARTH POLICY, IRAQ'S GENERALS SAW TACTICAL VALUE IN IGNITING THE OIL WELLS AS PART OF THEIR RESPONSE TO A COALITION GROUND OFFENSIVE. THEY HOPED THAT THE SMOKE WOULD INHIBIT THE OPERATION OF COALITION AIRFORCES AND THAT THE BURNING WELLS WOULD SERVE AS OBSTACLES TO THE MOVE- MENT OF COALITION GROUNDFORCES. AFTER IGNITING A SMALL NUMBER OF KUWAITI OIL WELLS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE START OF THE COALITION AIR CAMPAIGN, IRAQ REFRAINED FROM FURTHER DESTRUCTION AND WAITED FOR THE GROUND WAR IRAQ BEGAN IGNITING ADDITIONAL KUWAITI OIL WELLS IN MID-FEBRUARY. WE BELIEVE THIS MOVE WAS ANOTHER EFFORT TO TRY TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT OF THE AIR WAR. BAGHDAD PROBABLY HOPED THE SMOKE OF THE FIRES WOULD CONCEAL MUCH OF KUWAIT AND HINDER COALITION AIRSTRIKES AGAINST IRAQI FORCES THERE IRAQ EMPLOYED SIMILAR METHODS AT STRATEGIC FACILITIES IN CENTRAL IRAQ, SMOKE GENERATORS NEAR INSTALLATIONS TO PRE- VENT A PILOT FROM SEEING-AND THEREFORE TARGETING- THE SITE BAGHDAD RADIO BROADCAST THAT THE "MOTHER OF ALL BATTLES" HAD BEGUN. IN RESPONSE, IRAQI FORCES IN THE KUWAIT THEATER DILIGENTLY SET ABOUT BLOWING UP KUWAITI OILFIELDS. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OILFIELDS WAS ACCOM- PLISHED WITH ASTONISHING EFFICIENCY-OVER 85 PERCENT OF KUWAIT'S WELLS WERE DAMAGED. NEVERTHELESS, IT PROVED OF LITTLE MILITARY VALUE, COALITION AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO OPERATE THROUGHOUT THE THEATER, AND THE BURNING OIL WELLS DID NOT HAMPER THE ADVANCE OF COALITION GROUND FORCES. 9 AUGUST AN IRAQI ENVOY ANNOUNCES IRAQ WILL USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS IF ATTACKED BY THE UNITED STATES OR ISRAEL. JANUARY IRAQ BEGINS TO DESTROY OIL WELLS IN KUWAIT. JANUARY IRAQ BEGINS DUMPING KUWAITI OIL INTO THE PERSIAN GULF, 1.5(C) 70086:70086
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