GULFLINK BACKGROUNDER |
OSAGWI investigating
chemical
weapon incident reports
Washington, September 9, 1997 (GulfLINK) -- The
Department of Defense ( DoD) is engaged in a comprehensive
investigation of Gulf War operations to better understand the
illnesses of Gulf War veterans. These efforts involve identifying
what happened before, during, and after the war to determine how
incidents and practices relate to various potential causes of
illnesses. The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
Illnesses (OSAGWI) is the lead in these DoD investigations.
Extensive research and analysis goes into the investigative
process. The DoD uses a methodology for investigation based upon
the United Nations protocol for chemical weapons verification.
Methods include interviews with key military personnel,
examination of thousands of pages of original source documents
for review of war operations, communication with veterans to
obtain eyewitness information that would strengthen the
investigation and analysis, as well as inter-agency information
exchange to identify new avenues of investigation.
With the passage of time since the Gulf War and the lack of
physical evidence collected at the time of an event, information
gathered from various sources may be contradictory. So, DoD has
developed an assessment scale ranging from "Definitely"
to "Definitely Not" with intermediate assessments of
"Likely", "Unlikely," and
"Indeterminate" to classify the presence of chemical
warfare agents at the time of an incident. The
investigations final product is a case
narrative designed to inform the American public of the
specific details describing each Gulf War incident.
"If we cant explain what went on in the Gulf,"
noted Dr. Rostker, special assistant for Gulf War illnesses when
commenting on the process, "then we will have a very poor
ability to put in place those military doctrine and medical
policies and procedures that would allow us to avoid these kinds
of problems in the future."
Each narrative is considered an interim report, and is
intended to open up a dialogue with Gulf War veterans in order to
gain additional information that will help DoD more accurately
understand key events. The Khamisiyah
narrative, released on February 25, 1997 outlined the story
of the demolition of the Khamisiyah ammunition storage facility
in southern Iraq in March of 1991. It specifically discusses the
demolition of munitions by U.S. forces and the subsequent United
Nations Special Commission inspections and later public inquiry
into the events. Since its publication, the investigation team
has learned much more about the Khamisiyah event.
On May 22, 1997, the DoD released the Camp Monterey
case narrative. This narrative focuses on the reported detection
of a chemical agent at a base camp in Kuwait on September 16,
1991. A few soldiers experienced eye irritation after being
exposed to a chemical powder spill. Two Fox NBC ( nuclear,
biological, chemical ) reconnaissance vehicles initially
identified the powder as sarin nerve agent, when they performed
the first tentative analysis. When each vehicle performed
complete spectrum analyses, both vehicles definitely identified
the powder as CS, a riot control agent. Additionally, analysis by
three expert laboratories provided further review and confirmed
the presence of CS, not sarin.
On July 24, the modeling
results of the plume caused by the Khamisiyah demolitions
were published. DoD and CIA officials announced that nearly
99,000 service members were possibly exposed to a very low level
of nerve agent vaporized during the weapons destruction. The
analysis indicates that no U.S. units were close enough to the
demolitions to experience any noticeable health effects at the
time of the incident. While little is known about delayed effects
from this type of low-level exposure, current medical evidence
indicates that long term health problems are unlikely.
When the findings were released, Rostker stressed that the
investigation of Khamisiyah did not end with this latest
announcement. "We have several investigations ongoing and
welcome any information people have which will contribute to our
efforts," he said. "Much of what we know about
incidents like Khamisiyah is directly related to information
weve received from Gulf veterans." An update of the
narrative is scheduled later this year.
The Department of Defense released the U.S. Marine Corps
Minefield Breaching narrative on July 29, 1997. This
report describes two incidents of possible chemical detection
during the 1st and 2nd Marine
Divisions breaching operations through two minefields in
southern Kuwait on the morning of February 24, 1991. The first
reported chemical agent incident occurred in the 1st
Marine Division when a Fox reconnaissance vehicle made what was
identified as a "trace" detection. No troops reported
any chemical effects, despite traveling through the minefield
breaches with faces and hands exposed.
Based on the facts available, the assessment for this incident
is that the presence of a chemical warfare agent is unlikely. The
presence of a chemical warfare agent in the 2nd Marine
Divisions area of the minefield was also judged to be
unlikely. Analyses of the Fox vehicles tape by three
independent labs confirmed it as a false alarm. The investigation
of the 2nd Marine Divisions breaching operations
is ongoing.
The DoD released two more case narratives on August 13, 1997.
One report is a case history of four significant events reported
from various sources that occurred in and around the port city of
Al Jubayl,
Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. On the morning of January 19,
1991 a loud noise was heard throughout the entire Al Jabayl area.
Data indicates that the loud noise was caused by sonic boom from
two coalition aircraft exceeding the speed of sound as they flew
over the city of Al Jubayl at approximately the same time the
"loud noise" was heard and reported.
A second incident of loud explosions was reported on January
20-21, 1991. Investigation findings indicate that the explosions
were probably caused by a SCUD missile fired towards Dhahran and
intercepted by a Patriot air defense missile. While there is no
record of reported impact site, the event is confirmed by
numerous command log entries and the SCUD launch database. No
injuries were reported on January 19-21 that would be consistent
with chemical agent exposure. Based on available information, the
presence of a chemical or biological warfare agent in the Al
Jubayl area during the January 19-21 time period is judged to be
"unlikely."
The third event associated with Al Jubayl occurred on February
16, 1991. The 66th SCUD missile launched during the
war impacted in Al Jubayl harbor. No coalition personnel were
injured and no equipment was damaged. During the recovery of the
warhead and render safe operations, explosive ordnance disposal
personnel found no evidence of chemical or biological agents.
Based on the information available, DoD assessed that the SCUD
was "definitely not" armed with a chemical or
biological warfare agent.
On March 19, 1991, nine Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24
were exposed to unidentified airborne noxious fumes. Seven of the
nine exposed individuals sought medical attention for symptoms
such as burning throats, eyes and noses, and difficulty
breathing. In addition , some portion of the brown T-shirts and
combat boots worn by personnel turned purple. While none of those
affected saw the origin of the noxious cloud that enveloped them,
they all believed the cloud came from an industrial plant located
near Camp 13. Based on testing, findings indicate that the
T-shirt color change could have resulted from exposure to a
strong oxidizer such as nitric or sulfuric oxides, by-products of
industrial area operations. Considering the information available
to date, the narrative concludes that there was "definitely
not" chemical warfare agents present on March 19, 1991.
The narrative on the sample of the SCUD
missile, released at the same time as the Al Jabayl
report on August 13, focuses on the small Scud fragment submitted
to the Presidential Advisory Committee on Gulf War Illnesses for
analysis of potential chemical agents. The fragment was reported
to be a piece of a missile hit by a Patriot missile near King
Fahd Military City on or about January 19, 1991. The metal piece
had been kept as a souvenir by a soldier stationed there. The
fragment was reported to cause blisters when touched. The
narrative reports that, based on the metallurgical analysis, the
sample could have been a Scud. However, no evidence of chemical
warfare agent contamination was found by the chemical analysis of
the sample performed by the U.S. Army Edgewood Research and
Development Engineering Center. The assessment for this case is
"unlikely" that chemical warfare agents were present.
The Mustard
Agent Exposure case centers around a single incident of
exposure to a single soldier assigned to the 3rd
Armored Division immediately following the Gulf War. This case
narrative was published on August 28. Pfc. David A. Fisher was
exposed to a chemical agent while exploring enemy bunker
complexes on March 1, 1991. He developed blister symptoms on his
arms roughly eight hours following exposure. Medical experts
concluded that Fishers skin injuries were most likely
caused by exposure to mustard agent and he was awarded a Purple
Heart for his injury. There were no similar symptoms of exposure
to liquid mustard agent reported by other troops.
The following cases are in various stages of development and
will be released in the next few months :
The Czech-French Detections case narrative describes the seven
incidents reported by the Czech and French forces concerning the
possible detection of very low concentrations of nerve or blister
agents. The case narrative is in internal review and will be
finished, after OSAGWI staff return from a fact finding trip to
France and the Czech Republic.
The Al Jaber narrative examines the reports of suspected
chemical warfare agent by U.S. Marines during combat operations
to retake the Kuwaiti Air Base of Al Jaber near Kuwait City. A
Fox vehicle involved with Task Force Ripper reported a chemical
detection in February of 1991.
The narrative referred to as ASP-ORCHARD focuses on
incidents involving a Fox vehicle assigned to Task Force RIPPER
near Kuwait City during Operation Desert Storm . A possible
chemical agent detection was reported at the Ammunition Supply
Point (ASP) located in an orchard southwest of Kuwait
International Airport in February of 1991.
The 11th Marines investigation covers a
collection of incidents that happened over a period of time
during the ground war. Five artillery battalions that were task
organized as the 11th Marines responded to
approximately 20 chemical alerts during the four days of the
ground war. At the time the alarms occurred, further evaluation
determined they were false alarms. The investigation entails
determining if the assessments made at the time were the correct
assessment.
The Tallil Air Base narrative concerns the possible presence
of chemical warfare agents at Tallil Air Base, Iraq. Tallil was a
major tactical air base in southeastern Iraq. It was suspected by
intelligence sources to be a chemical weapon storage site,
because it had a S-shaped bunker.
The Kuwaiti Girls School case involves the reported
positive detection of mustard blister agent in a tank outside a
school in Kuwait after the war. OSAGWI is collaborating with
British scientists who analyzed chemical samples from this tank..
In addition to case narratives, a series of information papers
are being prepared for release which report on the military
procedures and equipment associated with activities during the
Gulf War. The first paper, issued on July 29,1997, outlined the
capabilities of the Fox
NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle. The paper explains how the
vehicle detects chemical agents - its capabilities and
limitations - and how it was used during Operation Desert Storm.
Other information papers include issues such as insecticides,
depleted uranium, pyridostigmine bromide, infectious diseases,
oil well fires, the M8 alarm, and MOPP protective gear.
The OSAGWI continues to solicit additional information on all
reported cases. Each narrative will continue to be posted on the
GulfLINK Internet site. Veterans with information or eyewitness
experiences that could assist in these investigations are
encouraged to call the Incident Reporting Line at 1-800-472-6719.
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