IRAQ: POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON USE.

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SERIAL: DIM 37-91

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SUBJECT: IRAQ: POTENTIAL FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON USE.

DOI: 25 JAN 91
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KEY JUDGMENTS
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1. COALITION ATTACKS ARE STEADILY ELIMINATING IRAQ'S CHEMICAL
WEAPON PRODUCTION AND FILLING CAPABILITIES.
[b.1. sec 1.5(c)]

2. IRAQ IS LIKELY TO RETAIN A SIGNIFICANT CHEMICAL WEAPON
STOCKPILE FOR SOME TIME, ALTHOUGH 1TS NERVE AGENT STOCKS ARE BEING
REDUCED BY SPOILAGE AND PROBABLY WILL BE MILITARILY INEFFECTIVE
AFTER 31 MARCH. IRAQ'S BINARY STOCKS AND BLISTER AGENTS WILL REMAIN
TOXIC FOR A LONGER TIME.
3. THE PRINCIPAL THREAT OF CHEMICAL ATTACK IS FROM ARTILLERY
AND MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER FIRE AGAINST COALITION GROUNDFORCES.
THE LIKELIHOOD THAT CHEMICAL MUNITIONS WOULD BE AIR DELIVERED HAS
BEEN REDUCED BY ALLIED AIR SUPERIORITY. IRAQ HAS TOO FEW SCUD
CHEMICAL WARHEADS TO SUSTAIN THEIR USE.
4. ATTACKS ON IRAQ'S CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION AND WEAPONS
FILLING CAPABILITIES SHOULD BE CONTINUED. ELIMINATING FIRE SUPPORT
ASSETS AND CHEMICAL STORAGE AREAS AT GROUND FORCE DEPOTS IS THEMOST
EFFICIENT MEANS TO PREVENT TACTICAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
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BACKGROUND
))
5. IRAQ HAS A SIGNIFICANT PRODUCTION CAPABILITY FOR BOTH NERVE
AND BLISTER AGENT WEAPONS. THE IRAQI CHEM1CAL WEAPON PRODUCTION� THE LOSS [b.1. sec 1.5(c)]
WILL GREATLY REDUCE IRAQ'S POTENTIAL TO REPLENISH
ITS CHEMICAL MUNITIQN STORES. FURTHER STRIKES AGAINST SAMARRA WILL
BE REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE THIS CAPABILITY.
6. IRAQ IS NOT ABLE TO MAKE GOOD-QUALITY CHEMICAL AGENTS.
TECHNICAL FAILURES HAVE REDUCED THEIR PURITY AND CAUSED PROBLEMSIN
STORAGE AND HANDLING. THIS IS A PARTICULAR PROBLEM FOR THE SARIN-
TYPE NERVE AGENTS (GB AND GF). THESE BOTH CONTAIN HYDROFLUORICACID
(HF), AN IMPURITY THAT ATTACKS METAL SURFACES AND CATALYZES NERVE
AGENT DECOMPOSITION. THIS LEADS TO METAL FAILURE AND LEAKS IN THE
AMMUNITION, INCREASING HANDLING HAZARDS. MUSTARD IS ALSO JUDGEDTO
BE OF POOR QUALITY, BUT IT HAS LESS CORROSIVE IMPURITIES. LOWER
PURITY SIGNIFICANTLY LIMITS SHELF LIFE AND REDUCES TOXIC EFFECTS
WHEN THE MUNITION IS EMPLOYED.
7. IN WEAPONS WITH RELATIVELY SMALL FILL WEIGHTS, THE REDUCED
PURITY AND LOSS OF TOXICITY THROUGH DILUTION PROBABLY WOULD NOTHAVE
MUCH EFFECT ON THE WEAPON'S AREA OF COVERAGE. IN MUNITIONS WITH
LARGER FILL WEIGHTS (AERIAL BOMBS AND MISSILE WARHEADS), THE
WEAPON'S LOSS OF POTENCY COULD REDUCE CONTAMINATED AREAS
CONSIDERABLY. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS INCLUDING WEATHER ANDTERRAIN
ALSO INFLUENCE THE EXTENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTAMINATION.
8. [b.1. sec 1.5(c)]

PERIODIC PRODUCTION RUNS ARE NEEDED TO REPLENISH
DETERIORATED NERVE AGENT STOCKS. THE IRAQI STOCKPILE'S TOTAL SIZE
IS NOT KNOWN, BUT IT HAS BEEN ESTIMATED AT 300 TO 2,000 TONNES. THE
LARGER STOCKPILE SIZE IS BASED ON A LARGE PROPORTION OF MUSTARD IN
THE INVENTORY.
9. THE NERVE AGENT [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] SHOULD HAVE ALREADY BEGUN
TO DETERIORATE, AND DECOMPOSITION SHOULD MAKE MOST OF THE NERVE
AGENT WEAPONS UNSERVICEABLE BY THE END OF MARCH 1991. IRAQ'SBINARY
STOCKS AND BLISTER AGENTS WILL REMAIN TOXIC FOR A LONGER TIME.
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]
10. PRODUCTION FACILITIES. THE SAMARRA PRODUCTION COMPLEX,
CONTAINED IN AN AREA OF ABOUT 25 SQUARE KILOMETERS, IS THE WORLD'S
LARGEST CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION FACILITY.

ALLIED BOMBING HAS DESTROYED SEVERAL OF THE
[b.1.sec.1.5.(c)] FACILITIES.
11. SAMARRA IS CAPABLE OF PRODUCING NERVE AND BLISTER AGENTS,
BINARY COMPONENT CHEMICALS, AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS.
12. [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]

SOME OF THE HABBANIYAH PLANTS ALSO MAY BE ABLE TO PRODUCECHEMICAL AGENT OR BINARY COMPONENTS.
13. OTHER FACILITIES. OTHER CHEMICAL AGENT PRODUCTION
FACILITIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]
IT IS POSSIBLE IRAQ HAS ESTABLISHED CLANDESTINE
PRODUCTION SITES INSIDE LARGE PRODUCTION COMPLEXES [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]
OR AT REMOTE OR EVEN UNDERGROUND LOCATIONS.
THESE POSSIBILITIES ARE CONSIDERED UNLIKELY. HIDING A CHEMICAL
AGENT PLANT IN A LARGE COMPLEX RISKS ITS DISCOVERY BY VISITORS.
THERE IS ALSO A RISK OF ACCIDENTALLY EXPOSING FACTORY WORKERS TO
CHEMICAL AGENTS. CLANDESTINE LOCATIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO
ESTABLISH AND OPERATE WITHOUT DISCOVERY [b.1. sec 1.5.(c)]
ADDITIONALLY' THE IRAQIS DEPEND
ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR THEIR TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, AND IT IS
LIKELY THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE WOULD ADD TO THE RISK OF DISCLOSORE.
14. CHEMICAL STOCKPILE. DIA ESTIMATES THAT MOST OF THE IRAQI
CHEMICAL STOCKPILE IS IN MUNITIONS, WITH A MODEST AMOUNT OFCHEMICAL
AGENTS STORED IN BULK. DIA ASSESSES THAT MOST OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ARE UNITARY; THEY HAVE BEEN FILLED WITH A FINISHEDCHEMICAL
AGENT. BINARY WEAPONS ARE BEING INTRODUCED, BUT THEY ARE BELIEVED
TO BE A SMALL PART OF THE CURRENT STOCKPILE. THE STOCKPILE INCLUDES

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
NERVE AND BLISTER AGENT WEAPONS. BLOOD AGENTS CANNOT BE RULEDOUT.
15. MISSILE WARHEADS. IRAQ IS ASSESSED TO HAVE A LIMITED
NUMBER OF CHEMICAL WARHEADS FOR ITS SCUD-B MISSILES AND POSSIBLYFOR
THE AL HUSAYN AND THE AL ABBAS MISSILES. A CHEMICAL WARHEADWOULD
IMPROVE THE VALUE OF THESE INACCURATE MISSILES BY GIVING THEM THE
POTENTIAL TO CONTAMINATE LARGE AREAS. THE CHEMICAL FILL WEIGHTFOR
THE MISSILES HAS BEEN ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 550 KG FOR THE SCUD-B, 80
TO 1U0 KG FOR THE AL HUSAYN, AND 200 TO 3U0 KG FOR THE AL ABBAS.
THE EXTENDED-RANGE SCUD MISSILES GAINED RANGE IN PART BY REDUCING
THE MISSILE PAYLOAD. SIGNIFICANT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN GUIDANCE,
FUSING, AND AGENT STABILITY WILL CONTINUE TO LIMIT THEIR�CIVILIANS.
16. THE MOST EFFECTIVE CHEMICAL AGENT FILL FOR A MISSILE
WARHEAD IS A PERSISTENT AGENT. THE VX NERVE AGENT OR A THICKENED
AGENT OF ANY TYPE COULD BE USED TO ATTACK HIGH-VALUE DEEP TARGETS.
IRAQ'S BEST AGENTS FOR MISSILE WARHEADS ARE THE PERSISTENT BLISTER
AGENT MUSTARD AND THE SEMIPERSISTENT NERVE AGENT GF. VX IS A
POSSIBLE AGENT IN THE IRAQI INVENTORY.
17. AERIAL WEAPONS. AIRCRAFT ARE IRAQ'S ONLY MEANS TO DELIVER
CHEMICAL AGENTS ACCURATELY AT DISTANCES IN EXCESS OF ARTILLERY
RANGE. DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, ALL TYPES OF AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING
HELICOPTERS, WERE USED TO DELIVER CHEMICALS.
18. IRAQ HAS DEVELOPED 90MM ROCKETS FOR ITS HELICOPTERS.
THESE PROBABLY ARE FILLED WITH MUSTARD, BUT THEY COULD CONTAINANY AGENT.
19. AERIAL BOMBS ARE ESTIMATED TO BE THE MAJOR PART OF THE
IRAQI STOCKPILE. ABOUT 65 TO 75 PERCENT OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL AGENT
STOCK IS ASSESSED TO BE IN BOMBS BECAUSE BOMBS CONTAIN LARGER
AMOUNTS OF AGENT THAN DO ARTILLERY SHELLS. IRAQI AERIAL BOMBS ARE
ESTIMATED TO HAVE 100 KG OF NERVE AGENT OR 120 KG OF MUSTARD IN THE
500-KG BOMBS AND 50 KG OF NERVE AGENT OR 60 KG OF MUSTARD IN THE
250-KG BOMBS. ARTILLERY SHELLS CONTAIN AN ESTIMATED 1.5 TO 3.4 KG
OF AGENT.
20. GROUND DELIVERY SYSTEMS. IRAQ HAS DELIVERED CHEMICALS
USING ITS 130MM, 152MM, AND 155MM TUBE ARTILLERY AND 122MM MULTIPLE
ROCKET LAUNCHERS. OTHER FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEMS COULD BE USED TO
DELIVER CHEMICALS. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS OF CHEMICAL
EMPLOYMENT BY ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES AND MINES.
21. OTHER AGENTS AND WEAPONS. IRAQ PROBABLY HAS FILLED
MUNITIONS WITH PARTICULATE CARRIERS IMPREGNATED WITH MUSTARD,ALSO
CALLED "DUSTY MUSTARD." [b.1. sec. 1.5.(a), (g)]

OTHER POSSIBLE ITEMS IN THE IRAQI ARSENAL ARE
AEROSOL GENERATORS FOR AGENT DISSEMINATION AND SPRAY TANKS THAT
COULD SPREAD CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION FROM HELICOPTERS ORFIXED-WING
AIRCRAFT.
22. CONSEQUENCES OF BINARY INTRODUCTION. IRAQ IS CAPABLE OF
PRODUCING THE COMPONENTS AND CHEMICALS FOR BINARY CHEMICAL
MUNITIONS, BUT THE NUMBER OF BINARY WEAPONS IN INVENTORY ISBELIEVED
TO BE LIMITED. UNITARY MUNITIONS REMAIN THE PRIMARY CHEMICALWEAPON
TYPE IN THE IRAQI INVENTORY. ONE OF IRAQ'S MOTIVATIONS FOR
DEVELOPING BINARY WEAPONS WAS TO MAKE CHEMICAL AGENTS THAT ARE�STABLE IN STORAGE. BINARIES COMBINE TWO OR MORE CHEMICALS IN A
MUNITION TO PRODUCE A CHEMICAL AGENT. THE CHEMICALS USED IN THE
BINARY WEAPON ARE NOT CHEMICAL AGENTS AND HAVE LOWER TOXICITY,SO
THEY ARE EASIER TO PRODUCE WITH GOOD QUALITY THAN UNITARYCHEMICAL
AGENTS AND ARE SAFER TO HANDLE.
23. THE MOST LIKELY IRAQI CHEMICAL AGENTS TO BE USED IN BINARY
WEAPONS ARE THE NERVE AGENTS GB AND GF. BOTH ARE MADE BY THE
REACTION OF AN ALCOHOL WITH THE CHEMICALDIFLUOROMETHYLPHOSPHONATE
(DF). GB IS PRODUCED BY THE REACTION OF ISOPROPYL ALCOHOL
(ISOPROPANOL) WITH DF; GF IS PRODUCED BY THE REACTION OF CYCLOHEXYL
ALCOHOL (CYCLOHEXANOL) WITH DF. GF PRODUCTION IS MORE DIFFICULT IN
THE BINARY CONFIGURATION SINCE CYCLOHEXANOL IS LESS REACTIVE THAN
ISOPROPANOL. THE REACTION WILL TAKE LONGER AND MAY NEED TO BE
HEATED.
24. THE MOST LIKELY TYPES OF IRAQI BINARY WEAPONS ARE
ARTILLERY, MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS (MRLS), AND MISSILE WARHEADS,
ALTHOUGH ANY WEAPON CARRYING A CHEMICAL FILL CAN BE CONVERTEDTO A
BINARY. GB IS THE MOST LIKELY FILL FOR THE ARTILLERY AND MRL
AMMUNITION. GF IS MORE LIKELY TO BE USED IN LARGER MUNITIONS, SUCH
AS MISSILES OR AERIAL BOMBS.
25. BINARY WEAPONS HAVE DISADVANTAGES THAT WOULD REDUCE THEIR
VALUE TO THE IRAQIS. A LARGE PART OF THE BINARY'S INTERIOR IS
FILLED WITH NONLETHAL COMPONENTS THAT HELP MIX THE CHEMICALSWHEN
THE WEAPON IS DELIVERED. THESE COMPONENTS ALSO HELP KEEP THE
CHEMICALS SEPARATED PRIOR TO USE. BECAUSE THE REACTION MUST TAKE
PLACE WHILE THE WEAPON IS EN ROUTE TO THE TARGET, THE REACTION DOES
NOT CONVERT ALL THE DF TO A CHEMICAL AGENT WHEN THE ROUND HITS ITS
TARGET. THE ROUND CONTAINS A MIXTURE OF AGENT, UNREACTED DF,
UNREACTED ALCOHOL, HF, AND OTHER IMPURITIES WHEN IT REACHES THE
TARGET.
26. AN ADDITIONAL PROBLEM FOR THE IRAQIS MAY BE THE POOR
QUALITY OF THE DF THEY PRODUCE. THE SAME CHEMICAL ENGINEERING
PROBLEMS THAT HAVE LIMITED THE PURITY OF CURRENTLY PRODUCEDAGENTS
ALSO COULD LIMIT THEIR DF QUALITY. DF IS MADE FROM AN
ORGANOPHOSPHORUS CHEMICAL AND HF. REMOVING THE HF IS DIFFICULT: IT
IS LIKELY THAT IRAQI DF CONTAINS HF, WHICH COULD CATALYZE
DECOMPOSITION.
27. DISTRIBUTION OF THE STOCKPILE. THE CHEMICAL STOCKPILE'S
LOCATION IS NOT KNOWN WITH CONFIDENCE. LIKELY STORAGE SITES ARE� BUNKERS DISTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT IRAQ AND
BUNKERS AT SAMARRA.

[b.1. sec 1.5.(c)] CHEMICAL
WEAPONS ALSO COULD BE STORED IN [b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)] BUNKERS LOCATED
THROUGHOUT IRAQ.
[b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]

IF NECESSARY, CHEMICAL MUNITIONS SIMPLY COULD BE STORED

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 ******/
IN THE OPEN.
28. DIA ASSESSES THAT IN THE KUWAITI THEATER OF OPERATIONS,
THE STOCKPILE PROBABLY HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO THE GENERAL SUPPORT
AMMUNITION DEPOTS WITH CHEMICAL STORAGE BUNKERS AND FIELD SUPPLY
AREAS FOR THE DEPLOYED UNITS.
[b.1. sec 1.5.(c)]

29. DOCTRINE FOR CHEMICAL USE. DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN, THE
IRAQIS LEARNED TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPDNS IN WAYS THAT MAXIMIZED
EFFECTIVENESS. FOR EXAMPLE, THEY DISSEMINATED CHEMICAL AGENTS IN
THE MORNING RATHER THAN LATER IN THE DAY, WHEN HIGH TEMPERATURES
WOULD ACCELERATE EVAPORATION. TYPICALLY, THE IRAQIS WOULD DEPOSIT
PERSISTENT MUSTARD AGENT IN AN IRANIAN FORCE'S REAR AREA AND THEN
BOMBARD THE FRONT WITH A NONPERSISTENT NERVE AGENT (SARIN). TROOPS
FLEEING THE SARIN-CONTAMINATED AREA THEN WOULD BE EXPOSED TOMUSTARD
AS WELL.
30. IRAQ MIGHT ATTEMPT TO USE AIR ASSETS TO ATTACK TARGETS
BEHIND THE LINES, SUCH AS LOGISTIC STOCKPILES, PORTS, AND AIRFIELDS.
AIRFIELDS, IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BE CRITICAL TARGETS BECAUSE OF
COALITION AIR POWER. PERSISTENT CHEMICALS WOULD BE EMPLOYED TO
SUPPRESS AIRFIELD OPERATIONS. ATTACKS AGAINST NAVAL SHIPS MIGHT BE
ATTEMPTED BUT WOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO HAVE A SIGNIFICANTMILITARY
EFFECT.
31. IRAQ USED CHEMICALS EFFECTIVELY IN THE 1988 OFFENSIVES
AGAINST IRAN. DURING THIS TIME, IRAQ EMPHASIZED SELECTIVE
SATURATION OF TARGETS WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS. BECAUSE IRAQ HADTHE
OPERATIONAL INITIATIVE, ITS FORCES COULD CHOOSE THE BEST WEATHERAND
TERRAIN CONDITIONS TO SELECT CHEMICAL TARGETS.
32. LATE IN THE WAR WITH IRAN, SADDAM HUSAYN DELEGATED THE�RESULTS. THE DISCRETION OF THE GROUND FORCE COMMANDER MADE IT
POSSIBLE TO RESPOND QUICKLY WHEN THE TACTICAL SITUATION FAVORED
CHEMICAL WEAPON USE, AND COMMANDERS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THIS
AUTHORITY.

[b.1. sec. 1.5.(c)]

IRAQI RADIO RECENTLY ANNOUNCED ALLIED CHEMICAL
ATTACKS IN THE BASRA VICINITY. IT APPEARS THAT IRAQ MAY BE LAYING
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GROUNDWORK FOR ITS USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

[b.1. sec. 1.5 (a), (c)]

42. PROSPECTS FOR CHEMICAL USE. IRAQ'S CHEMICAL CAPABILITY
REMAINS SIGNIFICANT. THIS CAPABILITY WILL DETERIORATE OVER TIME,
BUT IT WILL NOT BE ELIMINATED COMPLETELY. IRAQ RETAINS THE ABILITY
TO LAUNCH CHEMICAL STRIKES AT ANY TIME WITH ARTILLERY AND AIRPOWER,
AND IT COULD USE CHEMICALS ON SOME OF ITS REMAINING SCUD-B MISSILES.
43. IRAQ MAY BE SAVING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO LAUNCH A STRIKE
WITH ALL AVAILABLE ASSETS TO KILL AND INJURE COALITION FORCES. SUCH
AN ATTACK MIGHT ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT AN ALLIED ATTACK OR MIGHT BE
PROMPTED BY IRAQ'S CALCULATION THAT IT IS FACING IMMINENT DEFEATAND
HAS LITTLE TO LOSE. THESE OPTIONS COULD BE COUNTERED BY DIMINISHING
IRAQ'S CAPABILITY TO DELIVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS: ELIMINATING ITS
AIRFIELDS, MISSILE LAUNCHERS, AND FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS.
44. SADDAM EVIDENTLY BELIEVES THE US HAS BOTH A CHEMICAL AND A
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE THEATER, BUT DIA ASSESSES THAT THIS WOULD
NOT DETER HIM FROM EMPLOYING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST COALITION
FORCES. DIA JUDGES THAT SADDAM VALUES THE FORCE-MULTIPLICATION
CAPABILITY OF CHEM1CAL WEAPONS TOO HIGHLY TO FORGO THEIR USE INANY
IMPORTANT COMBAT SITUATION WHERE THEY WOULD PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL
TACTICAL BENEFITS. CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE INTEGRAL TO IRAQ'SMILITARY
DOCTRINE. CONSEQUENTLY, DIA ESTIMATES THAT:
--IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONSIN
ANY DEFENSIVE SITUATION IN IRAQ OR KUWAIT WHERE THEY ARE BEING�--IRAQI FORCES WOULD BE VERY LIKELY TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS AN
INTEGRAL PART OF ANY OFFENSIVE INTO TERRITORY DEFENDED BY US OR
OTHER ALLIED FORCES.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 004 ******/
--IRAQ MAY USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO DISRUPT AN IMMINENT ALLIED
ATTACK.
--ONCE IRAQI FORCES BEGIN USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST ALLIED
FORCES, DIA ANTICIPATES THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO USE THEIR ENTIRE
CHEMICAL ARSENAL, INCLUDING MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS.
--SPECIAL FORCES OR OTHER GROUPS ALSO COULD DELIVER CHEMICALWEAPONS
TO SELECTED TARGETS.
45. (U) THIS MEMORANDUM CONTAINS INFORMATION AS OF 25 JANUARY
1991.

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