UNITED STATES NAVY IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

* STRIKE WARFARE. The Joint Force range, all weather stealthy strike
Air Component Commander (JFACC) aircraft (AX) as a replacement for
used the air tasking order (ATO) as a the A~. In addition, the excellent
centralized planning and execution performance of the F/A-18 con-
tool. It was effective in managing the firmed the validity of the multi-
high volume of sorties generated to mission strike/fighter concept.
concentrate coalition air power
against Iraq, espedally during the - TOMAHAWK CRUISE MIS-
preplanned, structured stages of the SILE. Tomahawk was a tremen
campaign. There were some prob- dous success, and its first use in
lems with production of the ATO and combat fully confirmed the results
its delivery to naval forces. The of previous extensive operational
flexibility of the ATO must be im- testing. The value of distributed
proved to account for changes, shift- firepower was demonstrated by
ing priorities and real time target TOMAHAWK launches from
requirements as the campaign surface combatants and subma-
progresses. rines. DESERT STORM high-
lighted the importance of rigorous
"The ...... was ~ective in managing the volume training on this complex weapon
ofsorties generated to concentrate coalition air power against system, not only for shooters, but
Iraq, especiallyduring the preplanned structured stages of the for all levels of command, indud-
campaign... After the first two days, late completion of the
ATO impacted operations. As hostilities progressed and key ing joint staffs involved in strike
targets had been struck (with delayed BDA) the ATO proved planning. Knowledge grew
increasingly unresponsive to rapidly moving events... The rapidly throughout the build-up
"kill box" concept was an improvement, as it allowed decen- period. Planned improvements in
tralized target selection and coordination with airborne assets the Tomahawk missile and mis-
for real time target priorities..." sion planning systems will further

- Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn- enhance the capabilities and
mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn- potential contributions of this
mand, Quick Look - First Impressions formidable weapon.
Report, 22 March1991
"...The oblective is not always to reduce a target to
- STRIKE AIRCRAFT. The A-6 rubble, but to significantly disrupt operations. TLAM [the
aircraft was a workhorse for long Tomahawk land attack missilel proved to be an excellent
range strike. It performed ex- weapon to accomplish this, especially TLAM-D."
tremely well in an environment of - Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn-
established air superiority, but its mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn-
survivability would be reduced mand, Quick Look - First Impressions
against future high-tech air de Report, 22 March1991-
fenses. It was clear the A-6 re-
quires upgrade and eventual "The use of TLAM has validated the ~ectiveness of
replacement. The performance of these weapons for a number of contingencies..."
the F-I 17 demonstrated the value - Admiral J. T. Howe, USN, Commander-
of stealth and validated the re in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe, Quick
quirement for a follow-on, long Look First Impressions Report, 20 March
1991

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