UNITED STATES NAVY IN DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

in sustaining that presence. Our maritime MARITIME INThRCEP~ON. The
forces clearly benefited from years of experi- role of our naval forces, working with our
ence m the harsh operating environment of coalition partners to implement the U.N. sanc-
Southwest Asia. Over 40 years of continuous tions through a comprehensive maritime in-
naval presence in the Persian Gulf - largely terception campaign, is a major DESERT
independent of political access - demon- SHIELD/STORM success story. Through April
strated U.S. interest and resolve. Over those 1991, over 9200 merchant ships were chal-
years, our coalition partners in the region came len ged, over 1200 were boarded for inspection,
to recognize and respect the depth of our com- and at least 67 were diverted for carrying
mitment and gradually afforded additional prohibited cargo. Iraq's GNP was reduced by
access, paving the way for the massive deploy- approximately one-half. The impact of the
ments required by DESERT SHIELD. embargo was clearly felt by Iraqi soldiers in
the trenches - with corresponding impact on
* Forward presence made possible the morale and will to fight.
rapid positioning of naval forces in
response to the invasion of Kuwait. * Sanctions against seaborne commerce
are enforceable. How effective they
* Deploying forces augmented ships will be in achieving their ultimate
already on station in the Persian Gulf. objectives depends on other factors
Naval forces were prepared to launch such as agricultural development,
strikes had Iraqi forces continued support by neighbors and other allies,
southward into Saudi Arabia. Their and geography.
sustainable combat capability and
control of the sea provided protection * Aircraft, especially those with inverse
- for the introduction of ground and air synthetic aperture radar (ISAR), made
forces into the theater and enabled a vital contribution to our ability to
immediate enforcement of U.N. conduct round-the clock maritime
sanctions. surveillance.

SEA CONTROL. DESERT SHIELD * The training and advice of U.S. Coast
underscored that sea control is a fundamental Guard Law Enforcement Detach-
prerequisite for power projection operations. ments (LEDets) proved invaluable.
As demonstrated during the "tanker war with
Iran, Iraq's mines, missile-firing patrol boats - "The success of MIF ops was due in no small mea-
and aircraft were capable of damaging and sinutre to experience and training provided by LEDets. Drug
disrupting seaborne commerce. Sealift carried to erdiction operations in the Caribbean haveallowed LEDets
become familiar with many Navy procedures, capabilities,
90% of the cargo required for DESERT and support assets for conducting boardings from Navy
SHIELD/STORM. Without control of the sea, platforms. LEDets provided Navy personnel with training in
that cargo would have been at risk, slowing the boarding procedures and authority, and indoctrinated per-
deployment, threatening our ability to charter sonnel in policy for use of force, as well as team duties."

foreign merchant ships and significantly in-
forces were - Vice Admiral S.R. Arthur, USN, Corn-
creasing costs. Because our naval mander U.S. Naval Forces Central Corn-
on station and ready, we were never seriously mand, Quick Look - First Impressions
challenged, and sea control was assured from Report, 22 March1991
the outset.

-57-