free rein. Operation EARNEST WILL          forces clearly contributed t6 a responsive char-
         (during the Iran-Iraq war) and             ter market. Early, accurate identification of lift
         DESERT STORM both highlighted the          requirements was difficult and changed often.
         need for a robust, deployable U.S.         DESERT SHIELD/STORM identified a need
         Navy MCM capability.                       for more roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships to
                                                    meet unit equipment surge requirements.
         INTELLIGENCE. Intelligence support
   reflected application of proven principles             MARITIME PREPOSITIONING. The
   coupled with outstanding innovation. A joint     afloat prepositioning concept was validated.
   intelligence doctrine and architecture are       No other alternative could have achieved the
   needed to support both joint and component       early force closure dates witnessed during
   commanders. More interoperable intelligence      DESERT SHIELD. Beginning 15 August, two
   systems are also required.                       squadrons of Maritime Prepositioning Ships
                                                    (MPS) delivered unit equipment and 30 days
         COMMUNICATIONS. Almost every               supplies for two Marine Expeditionary Bri-
   aspect of naval command and control commu-       gades (MEBs) totaling nearly 45,000 men - the
   nications capability was stressed to the limit   first heavy ground combat capability in the-
   during DESSRT SHIELD/STORM. Problems             ater.
   were solved through aggressive management,
   work-arounds, innovation, close cooperation            MEDICAL SUPPORT. Navy ships and
   and coordination, equipment upgrades and         fleet hospitals provided well over two-thirds
   new installations. The Navy is focusing atten-   of in-theater medical capability during the first
   tion on improving our ability to communicate     four months of the operation. In accordance
   with other services and nations, strengthening   with plans, the hospital ships MERCY and
   jam-resistant communications, and using high     COMFORT were activated and deployed on
   speed computer networks to increase capac-       five days notice. Together with the Fleet Hos-
   ity.                                             pitals, they provided the most comprehensive
                                                    medical care facilities in theater and the capa-
         LOGISTICS. Naval forces arrived in         bility to deal with a major influx of combat
   theater with full sea-based, self-sustained lo-  casualties.
   gistic support capability. Naval forces required
   minimum airlift and sealift for deployment             TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT. DESERT
   and support.  Aircraft readiness averaged        SHIELD/STORM validated significant aspects
   nearly 90%. The readiness of our ships was       of the Navy's Total Force concept.
   equally impressive and reflects a high degree
   of unit self-sufficiency. The combat logistics         FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE         To
   force (CLF) performed superbly, meeting all      defend America's interests around the world,
   requirements. There were ample supplies of       future force structure must enable us to con-
   fuel and ammunition.                             tinue to employ the winning strategy of con-
                                                    centrating superior force anywhere rapidly
         STRATEGIC SEALIFT. The contribu-           enough to deter aggression or achieve quick
   tiori of strategic sealift was a major success.  success in combat.
   World-wide sea control afforded by our naval

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