IIR 6 884 0068 94/CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SAUDI ARABIA (U)

Filename:68840068.94d
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CDSN = LGX790   MCN = 94009/02586   TOR = 940090921
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R 090925Z JAN 94
FM [  (b)(2)  ]
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC
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RUETIAQ/MPC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
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R 090906Z JAN 94
FM [  (b)(2)  ]
TO [  (b)(2)  ]
INFO RUCQAAA/USCINCCENT INTEL CENTER MACDILL AFB FL
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RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
BT

CONTROLS
[  (b)(2)  ][  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ]

SERIAL:  (U)  IIR 6 884 0068 94.


/*********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE ************/
BODY
COUNTRY:  (U)  SAUDI ARABIA (SA).

SUBJ:  IIR 6 884 0068 94/CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN SAUDI ARABIA (U)

WARNING:  (U)  [  (b)(2)  ]
                 
                DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI:  (U)  940106.

REQS:  (U)  [  (b)(2)  ]

SOURCE:  (U)  [  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ]

SUMMARY:      CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION WAS DETECTED IN JANUARY OF 
1990, BUT THE CONTAMINANT LEVELS WERE CONSIDERED INSIGNIFICANT.  [ 
     (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] DENY SAUDI POSSESSION OF CHEMICAL 
WEAPONS.

TEXT:  1.    THE RESULTS OF THE U.S. CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY IN 
SAUDI ARABIA INTO THE CAUSE OF THE MYSTERIOUS ILLNESS CLAIMED BY 
OVER 2000 U.S. SOLDIERS SERVING IN SAUDI ARABIA DURING THE GULF 
WAR CLOSELY PARALLELED THE SAUDI RESPONSE  [  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) 
 ].  
2.[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] CONFIRMED THE DETECTION OF LOW 
LEVEL CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION ON THE 19TH AND 24TH OF JANUARY
1990.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] STATED THAT THE FRENCH MADE 
THE ORIGINAL REPORTS TO THE SAUDI OFFICIALS OF POSSIBLE CHEMICAL 
CONTAMINATION WHEN THEIR DETECTORS WERE TRIGGERED.  THE SAUDIS 
RELIED ON THE CZECH CHEMICAL DETECTION UNIT TO PROVIDE 
VERIFICATION.

3.      REGARDING THE WET SPOT REPORTED ON THE 24TH, THE FRENCH 
LED SAUDI OFFICERS TO THE SITE.  SAUDI OFFICIALS ASKED THE CZECH 
CHEMICAL DETECTION UNIT TO CONFIRM THE REPORT.  U.S. OFFICIALS 
WERE ALSO INFORMED AT THE TIME AND PARTICIPATED IN THE 
INVESTIGATION.  THE LOW LEVEL OF CONTAMINANT DETECTED WAS 
DETERMINED TO BE INSIGNIFICANT AND OF NO THREAT TO PEOPLE OR 
ANIMALS.  THERE HAD BEEN NO BOMBING IN THE AREA AT THE TIME OF THE 
REPORTS, AND
THE INCIDENTS OCCURRED PRIOR TO THE FIRST SCUD ATTACK.
ACCORDING TO [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] THE INCIDENTS WERE, 
THEREFORE, DISMISSED BY ALL CONCERNED.

4.      THE ORIGIN OF THE CONTAMINANT REMAINS A MYSTERY.
WHEN QUESTIONED ABOUT SAUDI POSSESSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, [     
 (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] STATED EMPHATICALLY THAT SAUDI ARABIA 
DOES NOT POSSESS ANY CHEMICAL WEAPONS.  CONCERNING OTHER ALLIES, [ 
  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] DOUBTED THAT EGYPT, SYRIA OR KUWAIT 
WOULD HAVE BROUGHT SUCH WEAPONS INTO THE KINGDOM, THOUGH SAUDI 
ARABIA DID NOT HAVE A PROHIBITION AGAINST ITS ALLIES BRINGING 
OFFENSIVE CHEMICAL WEAPONS INTO THE COUNTRY.  SAUDI ARABIA HAS 
WORKED CLOSELY WITH THESE COUNTRIES AND IS WELL AWARE OF THEIR 
CAPABILITIES AND EQUIPMENT.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 

5. 
[      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ]

6.      THE CODEL MET WITH, [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]   THE 
DISCUSSIONS WERE VERY PROFESSIONAL AND DEALT IN DEPTH WITH THE 
POSSIBLE MEDICAL CAUSES OF THE ILLNESS AFFECTING US VETERANS. [   
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] STATED THAT [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] 
HAD BEGUN QUESTIONING [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]  CONCERNING 
REPORTS OF ANY UNUSUAL ILLNESSES ABOUT FOUR MONTHS AGO WHEN [   
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] FIRST HEARD ABOUT THE CZECH REPORTS OF 
CHEMICAL DETECTIONS.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] STATED THAT [  
 (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
SURVEYED ALL MILITARY HOSPITALS AND CLINICS, ESPECIALLY
CONCENTRATING ON THE HAFR AL BATIN AND JUBAIL AREAS,
WHERE [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]  INQUIRIES EXTENDED TO CIVILIAN 
HOSPITALS AS WELL .  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]   THE MILITARY 
HOSPITALS ALSO SEE A NUMBER OF CIVILIAN PATIENTS AND THAT [   
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] INQUIRIES TURNED UP NO REPORTS OF UNUSUAL 
OR DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN ILLNESSES WITHIN EITHER OF THE MILITARY OR 
CIVILIAN COMMUNITIES.

7.    [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] HAD ASKED KUWAITI OFFICIALS IF 
THEY HAD ANY REPORTS OF A "MYSTERIOUS ILLNESS".  [   (b)(1) sec 
1.3(a)(4)   ] SAID THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY CASES.  [   (b)(1) 
sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY ASKED THE SYRIANS OR 
EGYPTIANS AND HAD NO INFORMATION ON EITHER OF THOSE COUNTRIES.  HE 
STATED THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN ANY REPORTS OF ILLNESSES IN THE
JUBAIL AREA EITHER.  [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] TWO YEARS 
BEFORE THE WAR, AN AMMONIA TANK AT THE JUBAIL INDUSTRIAL CITY HAD 
CAUGHT FIRE.  HE SAID THAT THEY HAD PREPARED FOR A MEDICAL 
EMERGENCY, BUT NO MEDICAL CASES WERE REPORTED AS A RESULT OF THE 
FIRE.

8.     CODEL MET WITH [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ],  ON 940106. [ 
  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]  THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REPORTED 
HOSPITALIZATION OF ANY PERSON DUE TO EXPOSURE TO A CHEMICAL AGENT. 
 [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] KNEW OF NO CONFIRMED REPORT OF 
ANY ACTUAL USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY THE IRAQIS DURING THE WAR.  
EACH SCUD SITE, [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ], WAS CHECKED FOR 
ANY SIGN OF CHEMICALS, AND NONE WERE EVER DETECTED.  [      (b)(1) 
sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] WAS AWARE OF THE CZECH REPORTS OF CHEMICAL 
DETECTIONS AND HAD, AT THE TIME, CHECKED WITH HIS AMERICAN 
MILITARY COUNTERPARTS.  [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] NOT AWARE 
OF THE FRENCH REPORTS--THE "WET SPOT", THE CHEMICAL DETECTION NEAR 
THE ENGINEER SCHOOL AT KKMC, NOR OF THE FRENCH REPORTED DETECTION 
SOUTH OF KKMC, ADDING THAT HIS FRENCH LIAISON OFFICER NEVER 
REPORTED ANY
CHEMICAL DETECTIONS BY FRENCH SOLDIERS TO HIM. HE SAID
THAT THEY MAY HAVE REPORTED THEM TO CENTCM.

9.    [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ] REAFFIRMED THAT SAUDI ARABIA 
DOES NOT POSSESS ANY CHEMICAL WEAPONS NOW OR DURING THE WAR.  HE
DOES NOT KNOW IF THE AMERICANS OR SYRIANS HAD CHEMICAL WEAPONS, 
BUT ADDED THAT HE HAD EXCELLENT FREEDOM OF ACCESS DURING THE WAR 
TO ALL OF THE COALITION UNITS AND NEVER WAS AWARE OF ANY UNIT 
POSSESSING ANY CHEMICAL WEAPONS.  HE SAID THAT HE VISITED A NUMBER 
OF AMERICAN
AMMUNITION STORAGE POINTS AND NEVER SAW ANY SIGN OF CHEMICAL 
MUNITIONS.

10.     CODEL ALSO MET WITH SAUDI OFFICIALS FROM THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION IN JUBAIL AND [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]
REPRESENTATIVES LIVING AND WORKING IN THE JUBAIL
INDUSTRIAL CITY ON 940106.  [   (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)   ]   THEY 
BOTH REPORTED THAT THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF UNUSUAL ILLNESSES IN 
THE JUBAIL AREA DURING OR AFTER THE WAR.  THEY BOTH STRESSED THAT
THE AREA WAS UNDER STRINGENT ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS AND THAT LOCAL 
HOSPITALS WERE PERIODICALLY CHECKED TO ENSURE THAT THE LOCAL 
POPULATION WAS NOT SUFFERING ANY UNUSUAL HEALTH PROBLEMS DUE TO 
THE INDUSTRIAL CITY.

11.     [      (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)    ] AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES 
FROM THE AREA STATED THAT THEY KNEW OF NO UNUSUAL HEALTH PROBLEMS 
THAT HAD OCCURRED EITHER DURING THE WAR OR AFTER. THEY STATED THAT 
MOST OF THE EMISSIONS FROM THE PETRO-CHEMICAL PLANT AND THE 
FERTILIZER PLANT WERE WELL WITHIN U.S. INDUSTRIAL
STANDARDS.  THEY SAID THAT ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS, THE
AMMONIA RELEASED BY THE FERTILIZER PLANT EXCEEDED THE STANDARD, 
BUT HAD NOT RESULTED IN ANY HEALTH PROBLEMS. THE REPRESENTATIVES, 
MANY WHO HAVE BEEN IN JUBAIL FOR MANY YEARS INCLUDING THE WAR 
PERIOD, SAID THAT THEIR EMPLOYEES HAVE NOT HAD ANY UNEXPLAINED 
HEALTH PROBLEMS.

COMMENTS:     ALL OF THE MEETINGS WERE CHARACTERIZED BY FRANK 
DISCUSSIONS AND AN OPEN WILLINGNESS, ON THE PART OF THE SAUDIS, TO 
ANSWER AND ASK QUESTIONS. [  (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4)  ] 

//IPSP:  (U)  PT 1620; PG 2520//.
//COMSOBJ:  (U) [    b.2.    ]
ADMIN
PROJ:  (U).
COL
L:  (U) [   (b)(2)   ]
INSTR:  (U)  U.S. NO.
PREP:  (U)  [   (b)(2)   ]
ACQ:  (U)  [   (b)(2)   ]
DISSEM:  (U)  [   (b)(2)   ]
WARNING: (U)  [  (b)(2)  ]
BT

#5071

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