File: 971030_77170087_001_001.txt
  Page: 001
  Total Pages: 1


SUBJECT:  POST-GULF WAR CHEMICAL WARFARE DETECTION METHODOLOGY USED IN KUWAIT 


 DOI:   940600. 

. SUMMARY:    CONTRACTORS CLEARING POST-GULF WAR KUWAIT OF ORDNANCE WERE HIGHLY SENSITIZED TO THE POTENTIAL PRESENCE OF IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. TEXT: 

 1.    POST-WAR ORDNANCE CLEARANCE.  FOLLOWING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, THE GOVERNMENT OF KUWAIT CONTRACTED ORDNANCE CLEARANCE SERVICES TO RID THE COUNTRY OF MUNITIONS DEPLOYED BY THE OCCUPYING IRAQI ARMY.  CLEARANCE OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED FROM 1992 TO 1994, BY DIFFERENT TEAMS. 

 2.   LACK OF SPECIAL TECHNICAL GEAR.  NO SPECIAL CW DETECTION EQUIPMENT WAS USED BY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL (EOD) TECHNICIANS WHO CLEARED THE "U.S. SECTOR."  THE CONTRACTING U.S. COMPANY ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED PROCURING SUCH EQUIPMENT, BUT AFTER CAREFUL STUDY DETERMINED IT WAS UNNECESSARY.  PRIOR TO THE OPERATION, AN EXTENSIVE, MONTHS-LONG SURVEY WAS MADE OF THE SECTOR.  THIS TOOK PLACE EVEN BEFORE THE U.S. COMPANY BID ON THE CONTRACT, AND BEFORE THE PRE-CLEARANCE RECONNAISSANCE PHASE IN WHICH EACH MUNITION WAS SEPARATELY INSPECTED AND CATALOGED.  THE SURVEY TEAM, WITH AN EYE TOWARD THE BID PROCESS AND FINANCIAL BOTTOM LINES, WAS ON THE ALERT FOR ANYTHING THAT WOULD COMPLICATE CLEARANCE OPERATIONS -- IN PARTICULAR, AGENT-FILLED MUNITIONS REQUIRING SPECIAL DISPOSAL PROCEDURES.  THERE WERE NO SUCH INDICATIONS.  THE SURVEY TEAM FOUND ONLY IDENTIFIABLE, CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS WITHOUT ANY SPECIAL MARKINGS OR OTHER VISIBLE IRREGULARITIES.  ADDITIONALLY, THERE WERE NO DISCOVERIES OF
 DECONTAMINATION GEAR OR CW-RELATED DOCUMENTATION LEFT BEHIND BY IRAQI FORCES, NOR WERE THERE ANY SIGNS OF SPECIAL STORAGE PROCEDURES FOR CERTAIN MUNITIONS.  BECAUSE THE SURVEY TEAM  FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF CW AGENT PRESENCE, THE COMPANY MADE THE BUSINESS DECISION TO BID, AND THEN TO OPERATE, WITHOUT SPECIAL EQUIPMENT.

 3.  HIGH LEVEL OF TRAINING.  THE PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS OF THE U.S. SECTOR EOD TECHNICIANS WERE THE PRIMARY "INSTRUMENTS" OF CW DETECTION.  THE APPROXIMATELY 150 CIVILIAN EOD TECHNICIANS EMPLOYED BY THE U.S. COMPANY WERE TOP-NOTCH PROFESSIONALS.  EVERY TECHNICIAN WAS U.S. MILITARY TRAINED, EACH EOD-QUALIFIED BY EITHER THE ARMY, NAVY, OR AIR FORCE, AND EACH A GRADUATE OF THE U.S. MILITARY EOD SCHOOL AT INDIAN HEAD, MARYLAND.  EOD FIELD EXPERIENCE FOR THE TECHNICIANS RANGED FROM EIGHT TO 20-PLUS YEARS.  IN ADDITION, AFTER SCREENING AND VERIFICATION BY THE U.S. COMPANY, THE TECHNICIANS WERE PROVIDED INTERNAL COMPANY-GENERATED REFRESHER TRAINING PROVIDING THE LATEST INFORMATION ON EOD PROCEDURES.  PART OF THE TRAINING FOCUSED ON VISIBLE IDENTIFICATION OF CW-FILLED MUNITIONS, SO AWARENESS WAS HIGH.  OF NOTE, THERE WAS EXTENSIVE EOD-SPECIFIC EXPERIENCE AMONG THE COMPANY MANAGERS THAT SCREENED THE TECHNICIANS AND ARRANGED THEIR TRAINING.  THE COMPANY'S CORE GROUP INCLUDED SEVERAL
 EX-FLAG AND FIELD GRADE OFFICERS, MANY WITH EOD-UNIT COMMAND TIME.  (COMMENT--THE TECHNICIANS WERE WELL-QUALIFIED AND WELL-TRAINED.  AS EOD PROFESSIONALS, AWARE OF THE DEADLY EFFECTS OF CW CONTAMINATION, THEY WOULD NOTE ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY, REPORT IT, AND TAKE THE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS.)

 4.   HIGH VIGILANCE.  ALERTNESS FOR SPECIAL MUNITIONS PRESENCE REMAINED HIGH THROUGHOUT THE LONG AND LABORIOUS CLEARANCE OPERATION. TEAMS WERE ALWAYS ON THE LOOK-OUT FOR NEW OR DIFFERENT MUNITIONS, AND IT WAS STANDARD PROCEDURE IN THE U.S. SECTOR TO SUSPEND OPERATIONS WHENEVER PREVIOUSLY UNENCOUNTERED TYPES WERE DISCOVERED. OPERATIONS WERE RESUMED ONLY AFTER TEAMS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AND CLASSIFIED EACH NEW MUNITION, AND REVIEWED RENDER-SAFE PROCEDURES. THIS PROCEDURE SLOWED PROGRESS, BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO OVERALL SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY.  (COMMENT--IT TOOK AN ESPECIALLY LONG PERIOD TO CLEAR A HUGE IRAQI MINEFIELD THAT SPANNED ALMOST THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.  THE MINEFIELD WAS OVER 100 KILOMETERS LONG, AND CONTAINED OVER 30 DIFFERENT TYPES OF MINES.  THIS REQUIRED FREQUENT SUSPENSIONS WHILE THE EOD TEAMS STUDIED THE MUNITIONS AND REVIEWED PROCEDURES.)
 
5.    LACK OF OTHER CW INDICATORS.  THERE WERE NO REPORTS IN THE U.S. SECTOR OF OTHER POSSIBLE IRAQI CW INDICATORS THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (I.E., THE PRESENCE OF LARGE LIQUID-FILLED CONTAINERS, 122MM ROCKETS WITH WHITE PLASTIC LINERS, ROCKET-PROPELLED GRENADES WITH SKULL-AND-CROSSBONE MARKINGS).  LIKEWISE, THERE WERE NO KNOWN DETECTIONS OF RIOT CONTROL AGENTS IN THE U.S. SECTOR.  (FIELD COMMENT--WHEN ASKED ABOUT THESE INDICATORS, SOURCE STRESSES ONLY THAT HE RECEIVED NO REPORTS OF THEIR PRESENCE.  DEFINITIVELY DISPROVING THEIR PRESENCE WOULD REQUIRE CONTACTING EVERY EOD TECHNICIAN WHO EVER WORKED IN THE U.S. SECTOR.  SOURCE NOTED THIS IS A PRACTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY.) TECHNICIANS IN THE U.S. SECTOR DID NOT ENCOUNTER ANY POSSIBLE IRAQI CHEMICAL DECONTAMINATION STATIONS.

 6.   NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION AWARENESS.  EOD TECHNICIANS WERE ALSO ALERT TO ANY POTENTIAL NUCLEAR CONTAMINATION. TECHNICIANS WERE ISSUED RADIOMETERS AND PROTECTIVE SUITS, AND PROVIDED ANTI-RADIATION/DECONTAMINATION TRAINING.  THE ONLY RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED DURING U.S. SECTOR OPERATIONS WERE OCCASIONAL DETECTIONS OF DEPLETED URANIUM ROUNDS.  TEAMS DID NOT RECEIVE ANY SPECIAL BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (BW) DEFENSE TRAINING, AND THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF BW AGENT DETECTION. 

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