The information developed in this investigation fell into two general areas: an analysis of the significance of the information in the ARCENT message, and troop unit movements in and around each site.

A.  Analysis of the ARCENT Message

The following analysis is based on the interview with the US Army intelligence officer who drafted the USCENTCOM message to ARCENT, and our own investigation:

• The intelligence officer used all available sources to make an assessment of the sites as possible chemical or biological weapons storage sites before the ground war began.^[19]
• USCENTCOM did not transmit this message until four days after the ground war began, after US forces had already passed by or through nearly all of these sites.
• This message was not written or transmitted as a warning to US forces that these sites could possibly contain chemical weapons, but simply as a "request for information," with responses due by noon of March 4, 1991.
• There was no indication that XVIII Airborne Corps, a major subordinate command of ARCENT, or any of its subordinate units received the ARCENT 17-site message.
• There was no indication of any reply to the request for information by the March 4th deadline. In fact, there is no indication of any response to this message for another 23 days, until March 27, 1991.
• There was no indication, until March 27, 1991, that the information in this message ever came to the attention of any commander or key staff who were responsible for the security of their forces.^[20]
• The message was transmitted via special communications links between National Military Intelligence Support Teams (NMIST) within the Kuwait theater of operations. As the name implies, these teams were specially-created intelligence units that typically focused on items of national and strategic interest. They were collocated with USCENTCOM units but actually reported to the Joint Staff. The intelligence officer stated he did not specify the priority of the message nor that NMIST channels be used to transmit the request. Those decisions were made by others in his chain of command.^[21]

B.  Troop Movements

Analysis of unit location data (Tab C) showed that every one of the sites had at least one US unit within five kilometers of it. Some sites had numerous units nearby throughout the ground war and during the post-cease-fire period. For example, two sites that were within a few kilometers of each other had elements of two US armored divisions, two engineer battalions, and one EOD detachment in their immediate vicinity. Another large ammunition storage area, the Rumaylah Ammunition Storage Area, Southwest, had elements of three US Army divisions, two armored cavalry regiments, two engineer battalions, and four EOD detachments either passing through it, conducting inventory, doing demolition work, or bivouacked. We used troop movement information to identify key individuals to be interviewed. Those interviewed stated that during their operations at these sites there were no symptoms, illnesses, or injuries that could be attributed to chemical warfare agent exposure.^[22]

The purpose of this investigation was to determine if chemical warfare agents were present at any of the 17 sites listed on the February 28, 1991, USCENTCOM message to ARCENT, and to determine if there was a release of a chemical warfare agent, resulting from the air or ground campaigns or from demolition operations after the cease-fire.

There are no validated reports of US soldiers with chemical warfare agent injuries or who suffered symptoms consistent with exposure to a chemical warfare agent (with the exception of the reported mustard agent exposure as noted earlier.)^[23] Records of the Army and Navy revealed no injuries caused by a chemical warfare agent. We found no record of medical evacuation to Navy ships for chemical warfare agent exposure.  The investigation was terminated before we investigated Air Force medical evacuation records.

The Central Intelligence Agency assessed in 1997 that chemical warfare agents were only stored at two locations in the Kuwait theater of operations—An Nasiriyah and Khamisiyah (also known as Tall al Lahm).^[24] Both of these locations are among the 17 sites listed in the message to ARCENT.  Although there were many reports by veterans that they saw chemical weapons, our research provided no conclusive evidence of chemical warfare agents at any of the 17 sites (excluding Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah). The fact that US troops were erroneously identifying particular markings on munitions as chemical weapons contributed heavily to anecdotal reports of chemical weapons at sites other than Khamisiyah and An Nasiriyah. Iraq did not consistently mark its chemical weapons. Without distinguishing or unique markings, chemical warfare agent weapons could not be recognized easily and would have required special training and hands-on inspection, such as that given the EOD teams.

Explosive ordnance disposal and engineer specialists who were interviewed – those principally responsible for the destruction of major ammunition supply points – confirmed the absence of symptoms or casualties associated with chemical warfare agent exposure during their demolition operations.

The Presidential Special Oversight Board requested that we provide a summary of this investigation, which we did at a public hearing on September 16, 1999. Based on that summary, the Board concluded that the information obtained to date, the emerging results, and the anticipated outcomes from continued investigation are not likely to improve our understanding of any unexplained illnesses. Consequently, the Presidential Special Oversight Board recommended terminating further investigation; therefore, this investigation is discontinued.

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