File: 961031_950925_081bda_91p.txt
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No Subject Line Found Filename:081bda.91p DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY BDA-81-91 22 March 1991 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Biological and Chemical Prior to the war, Iraq had the most extensive and sophisticated chemical and biological warfare (CBW) programs in the Middle East. The objective of the Coalition air campaign was to prevent production of additional chemical and biological weapons and to destroy as many stored weapons as possible. The bombing campaign against the CBW target set progressed in [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] three overlapping stages. The first stage targeted both biological warfare (BW) and chemical warfare (CW) research and development (R&D) and production and the CW munitions-filling capability. The second stage targeted BW and CW storage. During the second stage, most of the remaining CBW R&D and production capabilities were restruck and destroyed. The third stage targeted delivery systems in the field as well as targets not destroyed in the first two stages. These stages were not clearly delineated or distinct. For example, the BW-associated bunkers at Salman Pak were destroyed before the R&D and production buildings at that facility, and at least one significant CW production bunker at Samarra survived the entire bombing campaign. Biological. The BW program was at five facilities at Salman Pak, Taji, Abu Ghurayb (two plants), and Latifiyah. Collectively the facilities were capable of BW R&D and production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Munitions are believed to have been filled with these agents, but the precise types and numbers are unknown. Prior to the war, Iraq was assessed to have at least 1 metric ton of dried anthrax spores and 20-30 kilograms of botulinum toxin in its arsenal. The location of munitions-filling equipment is unknown. Two environmentally controlled storage bunkers at Salman Pak were the most likely candidates for BW storage, whereas 19 other similar bunkers scattered throughout Iraq were capable of storing BW as well as other heat-sensitive materials; the Coalition attacked all of these bunkers. Initially four facilities were associated with BW R&D and production - the Salman Pak Chemical and Biological Warfare Production Facility, the Abu Ghurayb Suspected BW Production Facility, the Abu Ghurayb Suspected BW Production Facility (Vaccine Plant), and the Taji BW Production Facility. A fifth facility, the Latifiyah Suspected BW Plant Storage Facility, was identified in February 1991. Thirteen buildings at these five facilities were assessed to be associated with BW R&D and production. As a result of Coalition bombing, 11 of the 13 buildings were destroyed and 2 were severely damaged. All five facilities are assessed to be unable to support BW R&D or production. Activities during the bombing campaign at suspected BW production facilities indicate that Iraq made a deliberate attempt to salvage BW related equipment after the attacks. Some equipment probably was removed before the bombing campaign. Potential BW storage facilities initially consisted of 19 12-frame refrigerated bunkers at 11 locations and the Taji Suspected BW Storage Facility. In February 1991,2 additional 12-frame refrigerated bunkers were identified, bringing the total to 21 such bunkers. Of these targets, the original 19 refrigerated bunkers and the Taji Suspected BW Storage Facility all were destroyed. The final two refrigerated bunkers were identified too late in the campaign to be attacked. DIA cannot confirm whether BW material was stored in any of the bunkers, which also were suitable for storing chemical weapons, electronics, smart weapons, or fuel-air explosives. All known BW R&D/production and storage facilities were destroyed with the exception of 2 12-frame refrigerated bunkers. Reproducing the entire BW system as it existed on 15 January 1991, including the facilities at Salman Pak, Abu Ghurayb, Taji, and Latifiyah and all the destroyed [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] bunkers, would require $100-200 million and 5-8 years. However, Iraq's complete BW system had multiple, redundant R&D and production facilities. In addition, not all the refrigerated bunkers would be required to store a militarily significant amount of BW agents. Therefore, without duplicating the prewar system, Iraq could reestablish a significant BW capability with dedicated laboratories, containment facilities, and a storage and filling ca- pacity within 3-4 years for less than $100 million. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]. A BW agent production capability technically could be established in a matter of weeks to months using equipment at pharmaceutical facilities such as Samarra Drug Industries; however, production would be at a much reduced capacity and would be less safe than production at dedicated BW plants. Chemical. Iraq's prewar CW capability included production of nerve and mustard agents deliverable by aerial bombs, spray devices, air-to-ground rockets, tube and rocket artillery, and a limited number of missile warheads. CW agents were synthesized at the only known production facility at Samarra, where munitions also were filled and stored. The Iraqis were striving aggressively for a self-sufficient CW production capability by building three CW agent precursor plants at Habbaniyah. By early 1990 one of the plants was producing the nerve agent precursor phosphorus trichloride. The only missing link in attaining self-sufficiency was a white phosphorus plant that was contracted for but never built. Overall, the Iraqi CW infrastructure consisted of 10 CW agent production plants with a combined production capacity of 2,500-3,000 metric tons per year. In addition, there were 3 [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] munitions-filling lines at Samarra, 3 precursor plants at Habbaniyah, and 30 storage bunkers scattered throughout the country. Three buildings at Samarra were dedicated to CW munitions filling; all three were destroyed. At least one of these buildings may have been empty at the time of its destruction, raising the possibility that Iraq has retained at least part of its chemical munitions filling capability. All three precursor production facilities were destroyed at Habbaniyah. To produce CW agents, Iraq now must import almost all of its precursor chemicals. [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] Iraq is believed to have stored its CW munitions in 8 cruciform bunkers at Samarra and 22 S-shaped bunkers at 14 other locations. Of the eight cruciform bunkers, one was destroyed and the remaining seven sustained apparently only superficial damage. Of the 225-shaped bunkers, 16 were destroyed and 6 suffered serious damage. Iraq does not need to reproduce the 225-shaped bunkers to reconstitute a CW storage capability because chemical weapons can be stored in virtually any secure building or bunker. The objective of preventing production of chemical agents and additional chemical weapons was not totally achieved. Nevertheless, CW [ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ] agent production has been severely degraded, with about 70 percent of Samarra's production capacity destroyed. The equipment necessary to produce 50-70 metric tons of nerve agent per month and about 5 metric tons of precursor material or mustard agent per month remain intact at Samarra - assuming electric power, precursor chemicals, and personnel are available. Iraq would need at least 3-5 years and several hundred million dollars to restore the Samarra facility to its prewar status. To rebuild the three Habbaniyah facilities would take $200-400 million and 3-5 years, assuming Iraq has access to the required materials on the international market.| First Page | Prev Page | Next Page | Back to Text |