J. Environmental Factors and Other Related Topics
Beginning early in the deployment phase of Operation Desert Shield and continuing through the post-Gulf War period, military leaders expressed concern over the possibility of Coalition forces exposure to possibly hazardous environmental and industrial conditions within Al Jubayl. In the short-term, these conditions could have affected the immediate health and war fighting ability of Coalition forces, given that Al Jubayl was a major theater staging area that played a crucial role during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the longer-term, exposure to some of these dangerous environmental and industrial hazards in Al Jubayl could produce detrimental health effects to those individuals exposed.
This section will review the environmental conditions and industrial activities occurring during the period Coalition forces were in Al Jubayl; the potential sources of airborne contaminants; the regulatory history of the Al Jubayl industrial area; the results of other investigations into potential environmental and industrial conditions in Al Jubayl; the limitations and uncertainties in making an assessment of this sort; and the conclusions as to whether Coalition forces could have been exposed to hazardous environmental and industrial conditions within Al Jubayl. The purpose of this review is to determine, based on available data, if a gradual or sudden accidental release of toxic chemicals occurred; and second, could such a release have resulted in adverse health effects or caused the incidents observed at Camp 13.
Constructed on undeveloped property and consisting of operations and facilities related to Saudi Arabias petroleum resources, the industrial area of Al Jubayl (Figure 22) encompasses about 30 square miles a little over a mile west of the Persian Gulf. The strip of land between the industrial area and the Gulf contains temporary housing and other non-industrial facilities. Permanent housing is located a mile and a half north of the industrial area.[184]
Camp 13 (shown in the upper left quadrant of Figure 22) covers less than a half square mile in the north central portion of the industrial area of Al Jubayl. The motor pool area used by members of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24 is located west of Camp 13 across a two-lane road. The motor pool area is open ground and extends a number of miles to the south and the west.[185]
Figure 22. Al Jubayl industrial area
3. Industrial Activities of Selected Industries Surrounding Camp 13
A number of industrial activities were close to Camp 13 (Table 5). We reviewed their potential to contribute sudden and catastrophic, as well as non-sudden and gradual releases of chemicals that could have adversely affected those who were exposed.[186] Processes and operations associated with these industries involved the use of a number of toxic chemicals during the Gulf War deployment period. Most continued their normal operations and production schedules, but in earlier investigations, company officials stated that their companies made efforts to minimize their on-hand chemical inventory. In general, chemicals at these industries were stored in stainless steel tanks with a thickness of one and a half inches. The exception to this was anhydrous ammonia, located at the Al Jubayl Fertilizer Company east of Camp 13, which was stored in double-walled tanks to provide more adequate insulation for the chemical.[187]
After considering all the potential airborne contaminant releases due to industrial activity around Camp 13, the Center for Naval Analysis concluded that the chemical threat was threefold: the threat from fires due to the burning of petroleum products; the threat from toxic gases such as anhydrous ammonia, a colorless toxic gas with a pungent odor, and chlorine, a green-yellow toxic gas with a pungent, suffocating odor; and the threat from hydrogen sulfide, a colorless flammable gas, produced from fires at oil wellheads and pipelines.[188]
Table 5. Industries Surrounding Camp 13[189]
Saudi Iron and Steel (HADEED) (#1) | |
Finished products |
Steel billets, sponge iron, reinforcing rods, and wire coils |
Daily production | 12,000 metric tons |
Production per year | 1,100,000 metric tons |
Operating procedures during OSD/DS | The company continued its normal operations and production during DS/DS, but made efforts to minimize on-hand inventory. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | A number of flammable natural gases. |
Environmental Controls | Controls emissions of metal fumes and dust through in-line scrubbers and bag houses. |
Arabian Petrochemical Company (PETROKEMYA) (#3) | |
Finished products | Ethylene, polystyrene, butane-1 |
Daily production | 2,190 metric tons (estimated) |
Production per year | 800,000 metric tons |
Operating procedures during OSD/DS | The company continued its normal operations and production during DS/DS, but made efforts to minimize on-hand inventory. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | Caustic solution, a corrosive; diethylamine, a highly flammable liquid; propane, a flammable gas; wash oil, a flammable liquid. |
Environmental Controls | Emissions routinely examined by environmental monitoring. |
Petromin Shell (#4) | |
Finished products | Fuel oil, naphtha, kerosene, gas, oil, diesel, benzene. |
Daily production | 685 barrels per stream day |
Production per year | 250,000 barrels per stream day |
Operating procedures during OSD/DS | Disaster plan in place and possessed capabilities to deal with explosions and leaks. Also, monitored emissions regularly. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | Benzene, a highly
flammable liquid; caustic solution, a corrosive liquid; di-isopropanolamine, a flammable
liquid when dissolved in water; gasoline, a highly flammable liquid; kerosene, a flammable
liquid; low volatility oil, flammable liquids; naptha, a highly flammable liquid; molten sulfur, a flammable liquid at high temperatures. |
Environmental Controls | Emissions routinely examined by environmental monitoring. |
Saudi Petrochemical Company (SADAF) (#5) | |
Finished products | Caustic soda, industrial grade ethanol, ethylene dichloride, styrene, and ethylene |
Daily production | 6,600 metric tons (estimated) |
Production per year | 2,430,000 metric tons |
Operating procedures during OSD/DS | Disaster plan in place and possessed capabilities to deal with explosions and leaks. Also, monitored emissions regularly. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | Caustic solution, a corrosive liquid; chlorine, a toxic gas; ethanol, a highly flammable liquid; ethyl benzene, a highly flammable liquid; ethylene dichloride, a highly flammable liquid; hydrochloric acid, a corrosive liquid; low volatility oils, flammable liquids; phosphoric acid, a corrosive liquid; propane, a flammable gas; styrene, a highly flammable liquid; sulfuric acid, a corrosive liquid. |
Environmental Controls | Emissions routinely examined by environmental monitoring. |
Saudi European Petrochemical Company (IBN-HAYYAN) (#8) | |
Finished Products |
Methyl tertiary butyl ether, butene-1, and butadiene |
Daily production |
1,370 metric tons (estimated) |
Production per year |
500, 000 metric tons |
Operating procedures during DS/DS |
The company continued its normal operations and production during DS/DS, but made efforts to minimize on-hand inventory. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | Caustic solution, a corrosive liquid; chlorine, a toxic liquified gas; ethylene dichloride, a highly flammable liquid; hydrochloric acid, a corrosive liquid. |
Environmental Controls |
Emissions routinely examined by environmental monitoring. |
National Industrial Gases Company (#9) | |
Finished Products |
Oxygen and nitrogen |
Daily production |
1,200 metric tons of oxygen (estimated); 400 metric tons of nitrogen (estimated) |
Production per year |
438,000 metric tons of oxygen; 146,000 metric tons of nitrogen |
Operating procedures during DS/DS |
Disaster plan in place and possessed capabilities to deal with explosions and leaks. Also, monitored emissions regularly. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | Oxygen increase a fire risk; Nitrogen is an asphyxiant. |
Environmental Controls |
Emissions routinely examined by environmental monitoring. |
Saudi Methanol Company (#10) | |
Finished Products |
Methanol |
Daily production |
1,750 metric tons (estimated) |
Production per year |
640,000 metric tons |
Operating procedures during DS/DS | Disaster plan in place and possessed capabilities to deal with explosions and leaks. Also, monitored emissions regularly. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | Methanol is a highly flammable liquid. |
Environmental Controls |
Emissions negligible; byproducts are nitrogen and carbon dioxide; copper and nickel used as catalysts in the production are sold instead of being deposited as hazardous wastes. |
National Methanol Company (IBN-SINA) (#13) | |
Finished products | Methanol |
Daily production | 2,100 metric tons (estimated) |
Production per year | 770,000 metric tons |
Operating procedures during OSD/DS | Disaster plan in place and possessed capabilities to deal with explosions and leaks. Also, monitored emissions regularly. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | Methanol is a highly flammable liquid. |
Environmental Controls | Emissions negligible; byproducts are nitrogen and carbon dioxide; copper and nickel used as catalysts in the production are sold instead of being deposited as hazardous wastes. |
Al Jubayl Fertilizer Company (SAMAD) (#16) | |
Finished products | Urea pellets coated with a polymer sold as fertilizer. |
Daily production | 1,850 metric tons |
Production per year | 600,000 metric tons |
Operating procedures during DS/DS | The company continued its normal operations and production during DS/DS, but minimized on-hand inventory significantly. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | Anhydrous ammonia is a toxic gas. |
Environmental Controls | Experienced occasional ammonia releases at levels less than 25 parts per million. Ammonia has a permissible exposure limit of 25 parts per million, but can be smelled at only five parts per million. |
National Plastic Company (A subsidiary of PETROKEMYA) (#17) | |
Finished products | Vinyl chloride monomer and polyvinyl chloride (PVC) |
Daily production | 1,370 metric tons (estimated) |
Production per year | 500,000 metric tons |
Operating procedures during DS/DS | The company continued its normal operations and production during DS/DS, but made efforts to minimize on-hand inventory. |
Potentially hazardous chemicals stored or produced | Caustic solution, a corrosive; diethylamine, a highly flammable liquid; propane, a flammable gas; wash oil, a flammable liquid. |
Environmental Controls | Emissions routinely examined by environmental monitoring. |
4. Monitoring of Airborne Contaminants
Of seven air monitoring stations throughout Al Jubayl, monitoring station number one was nearest to Camp 13, but over a mile away. Like the rest of the monitoring stations, it continuously scanned for nine atmospheric contaminants: sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, three oxides of nitrogen, ozone, non-methane organic carbon, carbon monoxide, and inhalable suspended particulates.[190] The entirely automated process compiled data hourly, daily, and monthly. Additional information on environmental monitoring at Al Jubayl is included in Tab E. Monitoring data from station number one for the period of August 1990 to June 1991 are included in Tab F.
Data from monitoring station number one indicate that except for non-methane organic carbon and inhalable suspended particulates, there were no unusually high levels of contaminants in the air near station number one. The US Navys Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2 attributed the elevated levels of non-methane organic carbon and inhalable suspended particulates during January through April of 1991 to the Kuwait oil well fires.[191] However, station number one, like the rest of the monitoring stations, could only monitor the air near each station and could not detect elevated levels of contaminants outside of a stations effective zone. In addition, wind could blow a contaminant away from a station and prevent it from detecting a higher level. Therefore, a spill or other event could have occurred at or near Camp 13 without detection by monitoring station number one. In addition, these monitoring stations tested for the nine specific chemicals identified in the preceding paragraph. For a leak or spill of a chemical other than one of the nine, the monitoring data would show nothing unusual.
5. Environmental Regulatory History of Al Jubayl
Al Jubayls construction and development on previously unused desert land was fortuitous because from its origin, its industries had to adhere to strict environmental control and pollution standards set by the Saudi Royal Commission of Al Jubayl and Yanbu and the Saudi Meteorological and Environmental Protection Agency, the two entities that enforced environmental regulation in Al Jubayl. Permission to build and operate plants in Al Jubayl was contingent upon detailed pollution control measures. The Commission disqualified several companies because they could not meet the rigorous environmental standards. In recognition of Al Jubayls successful environmental programs, the Royal Commission of Al Jubayl and Yanbu received the United Nations Sasakawa Award in 1988.[192]
Companies in Al Jubayl have well planned and established environmental monitoring systems, advanced laboratory equipment, and highly educated staffs. Monitoring records are maintained and contaminant capturing or filtration devices are installed at release points.[193] Monitoring station data indicate no chemical leaks or spills during the Desert Shield and Desert Storm period. Since Saudi Arabia strictly applies environmental regulations to the industries of Al Jubayl, it is unlikely environmental monitoring officials overlooked a sudden or gradual release at levels affecting the health of Coalition forces.
6. Results of Other Investigations
Two other investigations have examined the threat of hazardous environmental conditions in Al Jubayl to Coalition forces.
A November 1990 report by the Center for Naval Analyses for the I Marine Expeditionary Force entitled, "Threat from Release of Chemicals Stored or Produced in the Al Jubayl Area,"[194] examined the hazards to various military installations in the event of an accident or an attack on the industrial facilities of Al Jubayl. Under a number of different modeling scenarios, the Center prepared estimates to assess the degree of the resultant damage to military facilities and the ensuing chemical releases.
The report concluded that the industrial hazards in Al Jubayl were: a threat from fires due to the ignition of petroleum products; a threat from toxic gases such as ammonia and chlorine; and a threat of hydrogen sulfide and fire from the oil wellheads and pipelines. The threat of a toxic gas release would depend on wind direction and speed, the temperature, precipitation levels, humidity, as well as the time of day the release occurred.[195]
A second report by the Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2,[196] completed in January of 1995, examined possible environmental agents that could have caused a cloud of an unknown origin to irritate the eyes, noses, and throats of several members of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 24, as well as have caused portions of some of their T-shirts and boots to change to the color of purple. Interviewers questioned members of the Royal Commission for Jubayl and Yanbu, largely members of the health service department concerned with monitoring health and environmental quality, as well as representatives of selected industries surrounding Camp 13. On most occasions, interviewers took short tours of the facilities of industries selected based on interviews with members of NMCB-24 or representative of industries that might have released industrial pollutants around Camp 13.[197]
This EPMU-2 report came to a number of conclusions:
- Al Jubayl enforced environmental control standards equal to or exceeding standards found in the United States.
- Air monitoring during the year of DS/DS revealed concentrations of seven of nine monitored pollutants were within the US Environmental Protection Agencys standards. Non-methane organic carbon and inhalable suspended particulates were slightly elevated in January through April of 1991 due to the Kuwait oil well fires. We know of no known health risks associated with these levels.
- The land used for Camp 13 and the adjacent motor pool was never contaminated.
- Three potential emission sourcesammonia from the Al Jubayl Fertilizer Company, hydrogen sulfide from Petromin Shell, and unknown chemicals from other industrial plants east and south of Camp 13might have been responsible for symptoms experienced by some of the members of NMCB-24. However, given the distances from these sources to the motor pool and the prevailing wind direction, any such emissions would have spread out and affected a large number of people over a wide area rather than targeting individuals within the motor pool while sparing individuals inside Camp 13.
- The monitoring system would likely have detected emissions of hydrogen sulfide, sulfuric acid, or nitric acid.
- Given the narrow area where Seabees experienced symptoms and the small number of people involved, the event may have been due to a small, localized spill of an unknown chemical within the motor pool.
7. Conclusions Regarding Environmental Factors at Al Jubayl
From an examination of the limited data available on the environmental conditions of Al Jubayl, as well as previous environmental assessments of Al Jubayl and a number of interviews with Gulf War veterans, we reached the following conclusions.
- A catastrophic release of a toxic chemical probably did not occur. Monitoring data and records of emergency response incidents likely would have captured such an event. Furthermore, such a release would have affected a relatively wide geographic area with severe and immediate health effects, but there were no reports of such consequences.
- Monitoring stations might not have picked up a modest localized chemical leak or even a relatively large-scale chemical release due to a number of factors, including weather conditions, such as wind direction and speed, distance from the monitoring station, or limitations on what chemicals were sampled.
- We accepted the data regarding the manufacturing processes and chemical holdings of industries in Al Jubayl detailed in the reports by the Center for Naval Analyses (for the I Marine Expeditionary Force) and the US Navys Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2. Other than air monitoring data taken from August 1990 to July 1991, there were no independent, corroborating, environmental assessment data.
- Conducting a detailed examination of plant records, including accident, spill, and disposal reports; a thorough on-site inspection and walk through to verify information received, as well as to observe site conditions first-hand; and an inventory of the above ground and below ground holding tanks would have improved the results of the previously cited investigations.[198]
- A number of environmental events on January 19, 1991, could have produced the reports of a cloud or mist sighting by the members of NMCB-24 during the loud noise incident. These events ranged from weather phenomena to steam escaping from grates.
- Because the area immediately surrounding Camp 13 contained heavy industrial activity, a sudden and accidental or non-sudden and gradual chemical release may have occurred and caused the symptoms experienced by members of NMCB-24.
- The motor pool adjacent to Camp 13 would have contained an assortment of fuels, greases, oils, solvents, and many other chemicals. It is possible that a leak or spill of one of these items also could have caused the symptoms experienced by members of NMCB-24.
- Because of the absence of monitoring data for the Camp 13 area, it is not possible to make a definitive statement as to whether releases occurred. The issue is further confounded by the few individuals affected, and the rapid abatement of their symptoms. Ultimately, there are no data available to confirm or refute the occurrence of a release of toxic or hazardous chemicals.
Members of the NMCB-24, the subjects of several studies and reports, were among the first veterans to report unexplained illnesses following the Gulf War. In a survey of NMCB-24 Seabees conducted in 1993-1994 by the Navy Environmental and Preventive Medicine Unit Number 2, members from this unit reported a variety of symptoms but the Navy found no pattern of illness. Diagnosed diseases appeared to be normal for a group of that age.[199]
In a post-war study of Gulf War veterans, scientists at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center surveyed 249 of the 606 NMCB-24 Gulf War veterans and found that 175 of the 249 (70 percent) reported serious illnesses after returning from the war. Using factor analysis of symptoms reported by these individuals, the authors concluded that 63 of the ill veterans fell into one or more of the six syndromes, and that their symptoms appeared to be related to neurological injury.[200] Neurological and psychological testing of 23 individuals from these groups showed subtle abnormalities,[201] which the authors linked to self-reported exposures to toxic chemical combinations.[202] More recently, these researchers have reported that there may be genetic susceptibilities to illness[203] and vestibular dysfunction[204] in the symptomatic individuals, but the number of individuals studied is small and the work will need to be confirmed in larger numbers of individuals.
A second survey of 1,497 Seabees who served during the Gulf War period (527 Gulf War veterans and 970 non-deployed veterans) found that deployed Seabees reported substantially more symptoms and exposures than non-deployed Seabees and had more psychological symptoms and difficulties.[205] Ninety-six of these individuals (64 Gulf War veterans and 32 non-deployed veterans) were tested for antibody to the bacteria Mycoplasma fermentans (as a marker of the infection suggested by some to contribute to veterans illnesses), but there was no significant difference between the groups.[206] Data extracted from this ongoing national study showed that Seabees from NMCB-24 were more likely to report symptoms than Seabees from NMCB-40, an active duty unit that was collocated with NMCB-24 in Al Jubayl during the Gulf War, but substantial differences in the demographics, exposures, and news media attention make meaningful comparisons difficult.[207] The larger Seabee health study will take some years to complete, but may offer additional comparisons of importance between deployed and non-deployed Seabees, and perhaps between specific deployed units.
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