Because the Styx missile attack would have come from offshore, the logs of US Navy warships and surveillance aircraft were important sources of information. We asked the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to assist in this investigation because it is the repository for many of the Navy’s operational records from the US warships and surveillance aircraft deployed to the Gulf.

We asked the CNA to determine if the Navy’s documents contained any reference to an attack not recorded elsewhere and to determine if a non-Coalition vessel could operate off the coasts of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia without detection by naval surveillance aircraft and ships.

CNA analysts studied message traffic, watch logs, the reports of CNA analysts aboard US warships in the Gulf, imagery from every major Navy and Marine Corps command involved in the Gulf War, operational logs from the Anti-Surface Warfare Command for the Arabian Gulf battle force, the logs from the local Anti-Surface Warfare Command unit for the northern Arabian Gulf, the airborne surveillance plan, and the reports from surveillance missions. The CNA study concludes:

P-3C and Nimrod aircraft maintained 24 hour per day coverage in the NAG [Northern Arabian Gulf] with ISAR [Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar] and IRDS [Infrared Detection System]. Based on the radar detection range and the search characteristics we estimate that at maximum speed an Osa [fast attack patrol boat] would be within ISAR detection for sufficient time to allow detection and tracking by the P-3C. At slower transit speeds, the exposure time increases sharply. Since the MPA [Maritime Patrol Aircraft] surveillance was successful detecting much smaller vessels and vessels operating along the coast we believe it is quite unlikely an Osa could transit the NAG surveillance box without detection and further investigation by the MPA. Therefore, a Styx missile attack on Al Jubayl at the time of the loud noise incident launched by an Osa is highly unlikely.^[101]

The second scenario presented to us during the September 5, 1997, meeting alleged that Iraq’s aircraft penetrated Saudi Arabian airspace, flew to Al Jubayl, and sprayed a dusty mustard agent over the city. In this scenario, Iraq’s fighter aircraft providing aircover for the spraying aircraft caused the loud noise. Information offered to support this second theory included:

In the discussion of the Styx missile attack scenario, we stated that Iraq had the capability to produce dusty chemical warfare agents, had the equipment to deliver the agents, had the will to use chemical warfare agents, but was very unlikely to have had dusty mustard in its inventory during the Gulf War.

To support their aircraft attack theory, the two individuals suggested two possible explanations: Iraq’s aircraft simply avoided radar detection, or Iraq used the same Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) codes and equipment as the Coalition’s aircraft. While it is conceivable that one of Iraq’s pilots avoided ground radar detection, he would still have had to fly through a gauntlet of Coalition fighter aircraft as well as avoid detection by the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).^[103] During the war, the AWACS (Figure 11) provided continuous 24-hour surveillance of the approaches to Coalition airspace (Figure 12).^[104] Because each AWACS flight records surveillance activity for future analyses and training, we focused on these data to determine whether any of Iraq’s aircraft penetrated Coalition airspace, specifically Saudi Arabian airspace.

We asked the 552d Air Control Wing to help determine whether any penetration of Coalition airspace occurred on January 19, 1991.^[106] Specifically, we asked the 552d team to answer the following questions:

In response to our request, the 552d formed an analysis team composed of two computer specialists, an air surveillance officer, and two air surveillance technicians. The 552d’s analysts identified approximately 150 aircraft tracks for each hour of replay. Of these, analysts found only four tracks of interest to us. The 552d answered each question in our letter of December 15, 1997.^[107]

To the first question about whether any of Iraq’s aircraft penetrated Saudi airspace during the war (and particularly on January 19, 1991), the 552d answered:

Research of local lessons learned from the Gulf War were reviewed to determine if a record of this incident existed in the wing’s tactics library or intelligence library. No records were discovered.

In the six hours of replay, coalition aircraft were the only aircraft to cross the Iraq/Saudi Arabia airspaces.

To the second question about the likelihood of any of Iraq’s aircraft penetrating Saudi airspace, the 552d answered:

Due to the extensive coverage of AWACS, the presence of other coalition aircraft flying through the many corridors, and ground stations monitoring the skies above the area of interest and particularly on 19 January 1991, it is highly unlikely that Iraqi aircraft would have penetrated the Saudi Airspace undetected.

Three replays were completed through the hours of 0100L and 0700L. During this time period, several aircraft were flying in southern Iraq. Our interrogation of aircraft IFF/SIF [Identification Friend or Foe/Selective Identification Feature] codes and our close monitoring the flight path of aircraft lead us to believe there were no non-coalition aircraft present in southern Iraq. This was determined by tracking all data trails entering, exiting, and orbiting in that airspace.

To the questions about identification codes, the 552d answered:

In summary, the 552d ACW’s analysis of AWACS data "does not support the theory that one of Iraq’s aircraft was able to penetrate Saudi Arabian airspace and fly over the city of Al Jubayl."^[108]

During the September 5, 1997, meeting, the two individuals presented us with a table from an unidentified government document showing that Coalition aircraft shot down six of Iraq’s aircraft on January 19, 1991: two MiG-25s, two MiG-29s, and two F-1 Mirage aircraft. They theorized that the two Mirages provided air cover for the aircraft conducting the chemical attack on Al Jubayl.

While it is true that Coalition aircraft shot down two Mirages on January 19, 1991, this happened in the afternoon (at approximately 3:30 PM), 12 hours after the loud noise event at 3:30 AM. The Mirages went down in northern Iraq along the Tigris river, near the cities of Mosel (Al Mawsel) and Irbir, which are approximately 685 miles from Al Jubayl. All four MiG aircraft (two MiG-25s and two MiG-29s) went down within minutes of each other (around 1:00 PM) and within the same general area (near the city of Mudaysis in southwestern Iraq, approximately 560 miles from Al Jubayl).^[109] See Figure 13.

This paper discussed the white cloud and burning skin phenomenon in the preceding section concerning the alleged Styx missile attack. The information provided there applies to this discussion of the alleged attack by Iraq’s aircraft.

The loud noise event of January 19, 1991, consisted of several separate reports. The primary observations included explosion-like noises, a white cloud, flashes in the night sky, British forces’ positive detections of chemical warfare agents, and a burning sensation on hands and lips. Lesser-known reports included some units receiving incoming fire and a terrorist threat notification made to various Coalition command elements. In addition, two non-DoD individuals provided us additional scenarios for consideration as possible causes for the loud noise event. The first scenario involved a Styx missile attack against Al Jubayl while the second scenario involved an attack by Iraq’s aircraft against Al Jubayl. Both of the alleged attacks included the use of chemical warfare agents.

There is no doubt that a loud noise or noises occurred at approximately 3:30 AM on January 19, 1991. Both official and unofficial documents as well as veteran interviews described the loud noise(s). Some people believed the loud noise(s) involved a Scud missile—either by detonating upon impact with the ground or by the intercept of a Scud by a Patriot missile. However, we found no evidence to support this theory. Based upon our analyses of available information, we concluded that Coalition aircraft caused the loud noise heard on January 19, 1991. We based our conclusion on the following factors:

An alternate theory for the loud noise holds that Iraq’s forces (or one of Iraq’s terrorist groups) sailed down the coasts of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia without detection and, when positioned off the coast from Al Jubayl, launched a Styx missile armed with a chemical warhead into Al Jubayl. Based upon our analysis of available information, we concluded that no such attack occurred at Al Jubayl on January 19, 1991. We based our conclusion on the following:

The attack by Iraq’s aircraft theory states that F-1 Mirage aircraft caused the loud noise either by a sonic boom or by dropping ordnance. The theory stated Coalition forces shot down the F-1s while the F-1s were providing air cover for an aircraft that sprayed a chemical warfare agent over the city. Based upon our analyses of available information, we concluded that no such attack occurred at Al Jubayl on January 19, 1991. We based our conclusion on the following:

Some veterans reported seeing a bright flash (or flashes) in the night sky at the time of the loud noise. Veterans who reported seeing the bright flashes attributed them to a Scud missile or the destruction of a Scud missile by a Patriot missile. Although we cannot definitively identify a source for the bright flashes, we concluded that missiles (Scud, Patriot, or Styx) did not cause the bright flashes. We based our conclusion on the following:

A variety of environmental factors on January 19, 1991, could have produced the cloud or mist that was reported during the loud noise incident. These events ranged from weather phenomenon to steam escaping from pipes or grates. Both US and UK records contained references to a white cloud and mist, and the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (UK MOD) reported a cloud sighting by British soldiers.^[111] Otherwise, neither UK nor US investigation teams had extensive information on the reported cloud(s). For example, investigators from neither team could determine the source of the cloud(s) or whether the Seabee and the British soldier saw the same cloud or multiple clouds. Steam venting from a pipe or rising from one of the open aqueducts that crisscrossed the area could have produced the cloud. However, veterans’ descriptions of a mist throughout the area suggested weather-related factors.^[112] If the mist were man-made to conceal activity or the presence of chemical warfare agents, it would have taken a considerable effort not only to produce the mist but to sustain it as well. The equipment and personnel needed to produce the mist would not have gone unnoticed. Likewise, if the mist were the result of a catastrophic event such as an explosion, that event would not have gone unnoticed either. Logs would record such an event and those who were in the area would have some knowledge of it. Consequently, we concluded that weather conditions or industrial operations—not a chemical warfare attack or some type of catastrophe—caused the cloud and mist reported by some troops. We based our conclusion on the following:

f. Burning Skin

A number of NMCB-24 Seabees from Camp 13 reported that they experienced a burning or numbing sensation on their hands and lips during the loud noise event. The burning skin convinced some Seabees of their exposure to a chemical warfare agent. However, none of the Seabees reported that their symptoms worsened over time. Some NMCB-24 Seabees reported they felt no symptoms after the loud noise occurred although they were outside and not wearing their chemical protective clothing. Although not every NMCB-24 Seabee experienced the burning sensation, some Seabees reported that a strong odor of ammonia existed in the area at the time of the loud noise. Available information indicated a substance other than a chemical warfare agent, quite possibly ammonia, caused the burning and numbing sensations:

During the evening of January 20 between 9:40 and 9:50 PM, authorities issued a Scud^[113] alert and air raid sirens sounded throughout Al Jubayl.^[114] Consequently, units in the area went to MOPP-4. At 10:30 PM, units secured from general quarters and returned to MOPP-0. At 12:46 AM on January 21, 1991, the air raid sirens sounded again.^[115] The NMCB-24 security log noted two explosions, 15 to 20 seconds apart, southeast of Camp 13 at 12:54 AM.^[116] At 1:15 AM, units returned to normal operations.^[117] The NMCB-24 security logs also noted that Saudi sirens sounded at 1:42 AM.^[118] The NMCB-24 air detachment log noted Scud alerts occurring at 10:00 PM on January 20 and at 12:45 AM, 3:30 AM, and 9:50 PM on January 21, 1991. Approximately 20 minutes after each alert, the all clear was given.^[119]

USCENTCOM NBC logs for January 20-21, 1991, noted that at 9:47 PM on January 20, Iraq fired two Scud missiles towards Al Jubayl-Dhahran and US forces fired four Patriot missiles in response—destroying the Scuds in the air. A 10:00 PM entry in the NBC log indicated that a Patriot battery fired five Patriots at a third suspected Scud. The NBC log noted the Patriots destroyed the missile, which may have targeted Dhahran. The USCENTCOM logs contained no entries to indicate the presence of chemical warfare agents in the Al Jubayl area during January 20-21, 1991.^[120]

Based upon available information, we concluded that the loud noises were not the result of an attack upon Al Jubayl. We based our conclusion on the following:

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) completed its own investigation of incidents that comprise what we refer to as the loud noise event. Although we cooperated with the MOD’s investigators, the MOD investigation team relied almost entirely on information developed from their own sources. As we did, the UK investigators relied upon veterans’ recollections, unit logs, diaries, and other official documents that have survived the postwar years.

The UK’s report contributed to our investigation in several ways. First, it independently verified information contained in our original case narrative of August 13, 1997. Second, it named the military units that, until now, our case narrative identified only as British forces’ units. Third, it provided information on incidents not identified in US documents or made known through US veteran interviews. Finally, the UK report provided the UK MOD’s assessment of the likelihood that Iraq’s forces or a terrorist group employed chemical warfare agents against Coalition forces in Al Jubayl.

The UK MOD report provided information that allowed us to verify the incidents reported by our veterans. The MOD report confirmed reports of two explosions or loud noises and bright flashes in the night sky.^[121] The MOD report also contained a discussion of the British forces’ positive chemical warfare agent detections that later proved false.^[122] However, we could correlate only one of the three UK detections mentioned in the MOD report with the ones identified in the RAOC radio log. That was because the MOD report did not contain the grid coordinates for two detections and the times for the detections did not match those recorded in the RAOC log even though the RAOC log identifies these detections as the first and second FMA detections. A direct correlation was made between the third detection shown in the RAOC log and the third FMA detection discussed in the MOD report because the grid coordinates provided in the MOD report match those in the RAOC log. The MOD report also discussed the presence of a mist in the air and the sighting of a vapor cloud at the time the loud noise occurred.^[123] A log from the British Main Repair Group 11 contained evidence of the sighting of a vapor cloud southwest of the Repair Group’s position—a cement factory one kilometer north of Camp 13.^[124]

The UK’s forces occupied positions throughout Al Jubayl, from the northern industrial area of the city near Camp 13 to the less developed areas to the south near KAANB. The unit identified in the RAOC log by the acronym FMA was the Force Maintenance Area.^[125] The FMA provided combat service support to the 7^th Armoured Brigade. The FMA NBC Cell, located at the Old Port Barracks made reports to the RAOC. Figure 26 at Tab G shows the identities of the UK units and their locations in Al Jubayl.

The MOD report provided information on several incidents that we did not address in our original Al Jubayl case narrative. The first involved a possible explanation for the flashes seen over Al Jubayl.^[126] A second incident involved a propeller-driven aircraft reportedly leaking aviation fuel as it flew over the city.^[127] The third incident involved an intelligence report that the "Iraqis were loading chemical weapons somewhere in Kuwait."^[128]

The UK’s report provided another possible explanation for the bright flashes seen at the time of the loud noise. The UK’s 27 Regiment Royal Corps of Transport notified the FMA NBC Cell that it had fired what the British call a maroon during the chemical alert. A maroon was a type of warning device that, when fired, sounded three bangs to give an audible signal. During the Gulf War, British units equipped maroons with flares to provide a visual warning. The MOD’s report suggested that the flash from the maroon’s flares could have been what people saw and assumed that an attack had occurred. The report did not specify when the 27 Regiment fired the maroons, the number the regiment fired, or the location from where the regiment fired them—other than to say that the launch site was a quarry some distance away from Al Jubayl. Soon after the 27 Regiment notified the FMA NBC cell that it had fired maroons, the officer-in-charge of the FMA NBC cell issued orders to discontinue their use because using maroons as warning devices only led to further confusion during an alert.^[129]

The MOD’s report provided a detailed explanation of the CWA detection by their forces. The report indicated the number and identity of the British units that had a positive CWA detection. The information presented in the MOD’s report also illustrated that problems associated with CWA detection and reporting were not limited to our own forces. For example, the MOD’s report informed us that there were CWA detections by seven British units but the FMA NBC cell was only informed of five detections. The report also indicated that some British forces, like our own forces,^[130] might have used out-of-date equipment, which could have led to the false positive detections. In addition, the MOD report showed that units did not adequately log some detections and did not forward reports to higher headquarters, such as the FMA NBC cell. In some cases, no surviving record existed of the report arriving at a higher headquarters. The MOD report also pointed to problems in disseminating information to command elements in Al Jubayl, e.g., a discrepancy in the number of detections reported to the FMA and the number recorded in the RAOC log.^[131]

As the excitement of January 19 waned, Coalition authorities began searching for the cause or causes of the false positive detections reported by British forces. One theory blamed the false detections on some type of fuel. This agreed with a USCENTCOM NBC log entry that identified the cause for at least one detection as diesel fuel.^[132]

Both US and UK documents mentioned a propeller-driven aircraft flying over the Al Jubayl area at about the same time as the loud noise. An entry in the USCENTCOM NBC desk log noted a report that British forces heard a propeller-driven aircraft flying in the area.^[133] An entry in a British unit’s log noted that troops from that unit heard a light aircraft before each of the explosions. The diary of the British Army’s Scientific Advisory Group also contained an entry about the sound of a light aircraft.^[134] The squadron leader in charge of the FMA NBC cell hypothesized that the light aircraft leaked fluid (e.g., fuel, oil, etc.) as it flew over Al Jubayl causing the false detections. He recalled checking with the officials at KAANB who told him that no damaged aircraft landed that morning. Later that day, the squadron leader spoke to someone at KAANB, identified only as a USMC operations officer, who told him that an aircraft (possibly an OV-10) had dumped fuel before landing earlier that morning, presumably at the time of the false positive CWA detections. Thinking he had proved his hypothesis, the squadron leader notified both the Commander British Forces Middle East and joint headquarters that, in his opinion, fuel dumped from an aircraft—not a chemical warfare attack—caused the spurious alarms in Al Jubayl.^[135] As demonstrated by the following message from the Director for Operations to the Air Staff, higher levels of command apparently supported the hypothesis.^[136]

All locations which detected an agent were under the flight path of a battle damaged OV10A which recovered to an adjacent airfield around the time of the incident. As area [sic] in classic meteorological inversion at the time, it is suspected that the AC [aircraft] was releasing fuel or some other liquid which would have fallen onto the area as a fine spray and alerted chemical detection equipment.

The next day, January 20, 1991, a message went to all units within the UK attributing the false positive detections to fuel leaking from a damaged aircraft.^[137] British authorities also used this explanation to account for the mists, vapor, and droplets of liquid reported by British troops in Al Jubayl.

Investigators from the MOD asked us to assist them in determining whether a propeller-driven aircraft flew over Al Jubayl at 3:30 AM and if fuel leaking from the aircraft could have caused the false detections, as well as the reported mist and vapor.^[138] Our analysis of the suspected aircraft is contained in Section III.G of this narrative.

The UK report also referred to an unconfirmed intelligence report about Iraq loading chemical munitions in Kuwait. UK investigators believed this intelligence report came from the Kuwaiti resistance through the Central Intelligence Agency.^[139] We found no record of such a report among US Gulf War documents.

The UK MOD assessed that UK troops were almost certainly not exposed to Iraq’s chemical warfare agents. They based their assessment on three facts:

• "First, there is no evidence to suggest that any of the delivery systems that Iraq was thought to have available for chemical weapons were used against the FMA on that occasion."^[140]
• "Secondly, there is no evidence that there were any casualties on 19 January, or on subsequent days, from units in the FMA, who showed symptoms similar to those that would result from exposure to CW agents."^[141]
• "Thirdly, the examination of equipment returned from the FMA to the Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down … did not indicate exposure to Iraqi CW agent."^[142]