UNSCOM's Comprehensive Review

STATUS OF THE VERIFICATION OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAMME

1. According to the requirements of Security Council resolution 687

(l991), in the chemical weapons area Iraq shall declare and have destroyed, removed or rendered harmless under international supervision all stocks of chemical weapons (CW), all related components and all R&D, support and manufacturing facilities. The Security Council also demanded in its resolution 707 (1991) that Iraq provide full, final and complete disclosure (FFCD) of all aspects of its programme to develop CW and of all holdings of CW, their components and production facilities and locations. Over a period of seven years, Iraq provided to the Commission three formal FFCD's and about 20 sets of clarifications with a status of integral parts of the FFCD's.

2. All elements of Iraq's CW programme are covered by the above-mentioned Security Council provisions, including CW-related R&D, production and support capabilities and activities. Given the fact that dual-use materials and equipment and information obtained by Iraq from abroad were used in the creation of these capabilities, the procurement of those is also covered by the requirements of the Security Council resolutions. The military aspects are also covered by Iraq's obligation to disclose all aspects of its CW programme. A diagram of the full scope of Iraq's CW programme is given in the attachment.

3. The current paper includes the material balances of those major weapons-related elements of Iraq's CW programme, which could be quantified and accounted for. These include stocks of chemical weapons (filled and unfilled special munitions and bulk CW agents), key precursors for the production of CW agents and main CW production equipment. Issues relating to the procurement, extent of R&D activities, know-how documentation on the production of CW, and military aspects of the programme could not be quantified due to their nature. Therefore, only the status of the verification of these issues is provided in this paper.

4. Iraq's CW programme was initiated in the 1970s through R&D activities. Large-scale CW-related activities, including the construction of industrial CW production facilities, procurement and production of raw materials, CW components and production equipment, production and stockpiling of CW in quantities, were carried out, according to Iraq, in the period 1982-1990.

5. Iraq' s declarations cover the organizational structure of its CW-programme, procurement and R&D activities, holdings of CW, their components and production facilities during the entire period of the implementation of the CW programme, as well as their consumption. When UNSCOM began its verification activities in 1991, only part of Iraq' s previous CW stocks, their components and production facilities remained in Iraq. According to Iraq, more than 50% of its CW stocks were consumed in the 1980s. About 70% of the CW key precursors obtained by Iraq were used, according to Iraq, for the manufacture of CW agents, both consumed and those remaining in 1991.

6. Iraq also declared that the majority of its CW production facilities were destroyed during the 1991 Gulf war by the aerial bombardment, as well as certain quantities of CW and their precursors. The Commission's verification of the proscribed materials remaining after the Gulf war was further complicated due to the unilateral destruction of significant quantities of special munitions and precursor chemicals carried out by Iraq. Iraq conducted this unilateral destruction in the summer of 1991, in direct contravention of the Security Council' s resolutions.

7. The Commission's accounting of the material balances of special munitions, bulk CW agents, key CW precursor and major CW production equipment are given below. The accounting is based on Iraq's declarations on its overall holdings of the above mentioned items in the period from 1982 to 1991.

8. Iraq declared overall holdings of more than 200,000 unfilled and filled special munitions (those produced and procured for CW and BW purposes) during the entire period of the implementation of its CW programme. For the purpose of the verification of the material balance of special munitions, the Commission simultaneously attempts to account for both chemical and biological munitions, given the fact that some types of weapons originally designed for CW purposes were later filled or planned to be filled with BW agents. Special munitions include aerial bombs, artillery shells, rockets for multiple launching systems and missile warheads. According to Iraq, of the declared total holdings of more than 200,000 special munitions, about 100,000 munitions filled with CW agents were consumed or disposed of by Iraq in the period 1982 -1988.

9. The Special Commission reported to the Security Council (S/1997/774 of 6

October 1997) that Iraq's declarations on its total acquisition and expenditure of CW munitions during the period 1982-1988 could not be verified fully due to the absence of sufficient evidence of: the procurement, indigenous production, the filling with CW agents and the consumption of special munitions prior to 1988, as declared by Iraq.

10. With respect to the munitions which existed as of January 1991, Iraq declared 127,941 filled and unfilled special munitions. These munitions have been declared by Iraq and accounted for by the Commission as follows:

a) 56,281 munitions [22,263 filled munitions and 34,018 unfilled munitions] declared by Iraq as having remained after the 1991 Gulf war:

• 40,048 munitions were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision [these comprised 21,825 filled munitions and 18,223 unfilled munitions],

• 16,263 munitions were not destroyed, but nevertheless accounted for by UNSCOM. These include 15,616 unfilled munitions which were converted by Iraq for conventional weapons purposes in 1993-1994. These also include 438 filled munitions destroyed, according to Iraq, during a fire accident.

The numerical discrepancy of several hundred munitions in the overall accounting can be attributed to minor deviations in the physical counting of large piles of weapons.

b) 41,998 munitions [5,498 filled munitions and 36,500 unfilled munitions] declared by Iraq as having been destroyed during the 1991 Gulf war:

• The Commission has accepted the destruction of about 34,000 munitions on the basis of multiple sources, including physical evidence, documents provided by Iraq etc. However, it has not been possible to achieve a numerical accounting of destroyed munitions due to heavy bomb damage of the CW storage facilities, where these munitions had been stored during the Gulf war,

• the destruction of about 2,000 unfilled munitions remain uncertain,

• 550 filled munitions remain unaccounted for.

c) 29,662 munitions [854 filled munitions and 28,808 unfilled munitions] declared by Iraq as having been destroyed unilaterally:

• the destruction of about 13,660 munitions, both filled and unfilled, has been accepted by the Commission on the basis of multiple sources, including physical evidence, documents provided by Iraq etc. However, it has not been possible to make a numerical accounting of these munitions due to destruction method used by Iraq (demolition),

• the accounting for 15,900 unfilled munitions which, according to Iraq, had been melted, has not been possible,

• about 100 munitions filled, according to Iraq, with BW agents remain unaccounted for.

11. The material balance of 127,941 unfilled and filled special munitions declared by Iraq remaining as of January 1991 is provided in table l.

Table 1

¹ - 20,000 motor bombs filled with the riot control agent CS, which were destroyed during the Gulf war at one of the storage facilities, are not included in the table.

² - Components of special munitions, including boosters and fuzes, are not included in the table.

The majority of these components were not presented by Iraq for verification. According to

Iraq, single-use components were destroyed unilaterally and dual-use components were used

for conventional purposes. UNSCOM was able to verify their disposition partially.

* - The following unfilled munitions were produced indigenously by Iraq:

250 and 500 gauge aerial bombs, R-400 aerial bombs, DB-2 aerial bombs, warheads for 122-mm rockets, missile warheads.

The following empty munitions were procured by Iraq:

250 and 500 gauge aerial bombs, 155-mm shells and 122-mm rockets.

'

12. Iraq declared the overall production of 3,859 tonnes of CW agents during the entire period of the implementation of its CW programme. According to Iraq's declarations, mustard, tabun and sarin were produced in large quantities. Not withstanding the admitted production of 3.9 tonnes of VX, Iraq states that attempts to produce VX had failed.

13. According to Iraq, of the declared total quantity of 3,859 tonnes of CW

agents produced, 3,315 tonnes of agents were weaponized. Iraq declared that about 80% of the weaponized CW agents were consumed in the period from 1982 to 1988. In addition, some 130 tonnes of non-weaponized CW agents were claimed to have been discarded by Iraq in the 1980s.

14. The Special Commission reported to the Security Council (S/1997/774 of 6 October 1997) that Iraq's declarations on its total production and holdings of CW agents could not be verified fully due to the absence of sufficient evidence provided by Iraq and its former foreign suppliers of the procurement of CW precursor chemicals, production and weaponization of CW agents prior to 1988.

15. Iraq declared that 412.5 tonnes of bulk CW agents available in Iraq as of January 1991. These have been accounted for as follows:

• 411 tonnes of bulk CW agents were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision,

• 1.5 tonnes of CW agent VX were discarded unilaterally by Iraq and remain unaccounted for.

16. The material balance of 412.5 tonnes of bulk CW agents remaining in Iraq as of January 1991 is provided in table 2.

Table 2

¹ - Only bulk CW agents are included in this table. The accounting of weaponized CW agents is covered in table 1.

17. Iraq declared that some 20,150 tonnes of key precursor chemicals had been produced by Iraq and procured from abroad for the production of CW agents during the entire period of the implementation of its CW programme.

18. According to Iraq, of the declared total quantity of over 20,000 tonnes of key precursors, 14,500 tonnes were used either for the production of CW agents or for the production of other key precursors for these CW agents. The rest, 5,650 tonnes, was not used in the production of CW agents, and therefore needs to be accounted for separately.

19. Iraq's declarations on its total holdings of key precursors over the period of 8 years could not be fully verified due to the absence of sufficient evidence provided by Iraq and its foreign suppliers for Iraq's procurement and the consumption of key precursors in the production of CW agents prior to 1988, as declared by Iraq.

20. Iraq declared that 3,915 tonnes of key precursors remained in Iraq as of January 1991. According to Iraq, the discrepancy between calculated quantities of precursors left over from the production of CW agents (5,650 tonnes) and quantities of precursors declared by Iraq as remaining in January 1991 (3,915 tonnes) could have occurred due to the lack of sufficient information and full records on the actual delivery by former suppliers, on the consumption of precursors in the production of CW agents, and on the losses of key precursors, including through unsuitable storage, spillage, leakage etc.

21. 3,915 tonnes of key precursors remaining in January 1991 have been accounted for as follows:

• 2,850 tonnes were accounted for by UNSCOM. Of these, 2,610 tonnes of key precursors were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision,

• 823 tonnes were declared by Iraq as having been destroyed during the Gulf war. The Commission was able to confirm qualitatively the destruction of these precursors. It was not possible to make a quantitative verification,

• 242 tonnes were declared by Iraq as having been destroyed unilaterally in the summer of 1991. These include all precursors for the production of VX. The declared destruction of these 242 tonnes of key precursors was only partly accounted for.

22. The material balance of 3,915 tonnes of key precursors declared by Iraq remaining as of January 1991 is provided in table 3.

Table 3

¹ - Quantities of key precursors declared by Iraq in 1995 as having been destroyed unilaterally in 1991.

² - Only key precursors that Iraq declared as remaining as of January 1991 are included in the column. The following key precursors, according to Iraq, were fully consumed prior to 1991: DMMP, MPC, TMP, MPS, and they are not included in the table.

* - Key precursors, which Iraq was able to produce indigenously in varying quantities (including DMMP, MPC, MPS and TMP).

** - According to Iraq, discrepancies in rows # 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10 between calculated quantities of precursors left over from the production of CW agents (column 3) and quantities of precursors presented by Iraq (column 6) could have occurred due to the lack of sufficient information and/or proper record keeping:

a) on the actual delivery of precursors by foreign suppliers,

b) on the actual consumption of precursors in the production of CW agents, and

c) on the losses of key precursors, including through unsuitable storage, spillage, leakage etc.

23. CW production and support facilities were constructed in Iraq from 1983 to 1990. According to Iraq, all CW agent production plants were located at the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE). Iraq declared that all CW agents were produced only at MSE.

24. The special mechanical workshop for the production of two types of special munitions (250 and 500 gauge aerial bombs) was also located at MSE. Other types of indigenously produced special munitions were manufactured by general purpose establishments, Nasser State Establishment (R-400 aerial bombs), State Establishment for Mechanical Industries (DB-2 aerial bombs) and Project 144/2 (special missile warheads and warheads for 122-mm rockets). Iraq declared that all special munitions had been filled with CW agents only at MSE.

25. Prior to 1986, the majority of precursors for the production of CW agents were procured by Iraq from abroad. In the period 1985-1990, Iraq constructed three facilities (Fallujah 1, 2 and 3) and new production plants at MSE to produce indigenously CW precursor chemicals (PCl ₃, POCl ₃, SOCl ₂ and TMP).

26. The majority of the equipment for the above mentioned production plants was procured by Iraq from abroad. Some of these production plants were constructed, assembled or completely furnished with equipment by foreign companies.

27. Iraq declared that 553 pieces of production equipment were installed at 15 production plants which had been involved in or procured for the production of CW agents, their precursors and special munitions. These include chemical process equipment (reactor vessels, condensers, heat exchangers, columns and tanks). They also include mechanical equipment (presses, moulds, welding and rolling machines) used or planned to be used solely for the production of special munitions. These 553 pieces of equipment have been accounted for as follows:

• 480 pieces of chemical production equipment were accounted for by UNSCOM. 405 of these were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision,

• 75 broken pieces of equipment damaged during the 1991 Gulf war were accounted for by UNSCOM,

• Several tens of pieces were buried under the debris of CW production buildings destroyed during the Gulf war.

28. In addition in 1997, 197 pieces of glass production equipment were admitted by Iraq and destroyed under UNSCOM supervision.

29. The material balance of the main production equipment from Iraq's CW production and support facilities is provided in Table 4.

Table 4

30. Iraq declared the procurement of significant quantities of precursor chemicals, production equipment, empty munitions and machinery for the production of empty munitions from abroad in the period from 1982 to 1990. Iraq also declared having had foreign assistance in the construction of several CW-production and support plants in the 1980s.

31. Iraq's declarations on the procurement of chemical precursors were partly verified by the Commission on the basis of information provided by the foreign suppliers. Iraq supported its declarations with some original documents, including copies of several contracts and shipping documents. However, it has not been possible to verify the acquisition of several thousand tonnes of precursor chemicals due to the absence of information requested from the foreign suppliers. This includes several hundred tonnes of essential precursors for the production of the chemical warfare agent VX.

32. Iraq's declarations on the procurement of the production equipment used or planned to be used for the production of chemical warfare agents and their key precursors were verified by the Commission with respect to the majority of the declared items. This was achieved through field inspections, evaluation of documents provided by Iraq, and through contracts and letters of credits made available to the Commission by Iraq and the foreign suppliers. However, the verification of equipment from the latest contracts, delivered to Iraq in 1988 and 1989, was not possible due to the lack of information from the foreign suppliers.

33. The Commission was only partly able to verify Iraq's declarations on the acquisition of empty munitions from the foreign companies. Despite many requests sent by the Commission to the foreign suppliers and their governments, the information required had not been made available to the Commission. Nevertheless, the Commission through inspection activities was able to independently establish the types and origin of munitions procured.

34. Iraq cooperated to a certain extent with the Special Commission on the verification of the procurement of the above mentioned CW-related materials and items. The Commission believes that in the area of the procurement of CW related items and materials, with the means available to the Commission, it has achieved a stage of verification where further progress could only be made with the full cooperation of the former suppliers.

35. Iraq provided declarations on its chemical warfare agents and chemical munitions related R&D activities and their results. Some of these declarations were supported by the documentation provided by Iraq. In addition, in the files admitted by Iraq at the Haidar farm ("Chicken Farm") in August 1995 the Commission found many R&D reports which supported Iraq's declarations. As a result, the Commission has a good understanding of the extent of Iraqi research on the types of CW produced by Iraq in quantities. These include the following chemical warfare agents and munitions: mustard, tabun, sarin, CS, 122-mm rocket, 155-mm shell, BR-250, BR-500, LD-250, AALD-500, R-400, DB-2 aerial bombs and special warheads for the Al-Hussein missiles.

36. However, it was not possible to verify the full extent of several R& D projects carried out by Iraq from 1989 to 1990, due to the absence of sufficient data from documents and other verifiable evidence. Those include the research on new chemical warfare agents, BZ and Soman. These also include Iraq's efforts to develop new delivery means for CW-agents, such as special warheads other than for Al-Hussein missiles, i.e. FROG missile, and real binary artillery munitions and aerial bombs. Evidence of such studies was found in the documents from the Haider farm. On the other hand, the Commission did not find evidence that Iraq had reached the stage of industrial production of these materials and items.

37. The military aspects of CW programme cover the deployment of chemical munitions, the firing and bombing tables for the specific types of chemical munitions, military requirements in chemical weapons, the field manuals on the use of chemical weapons, and the chain of command and the responsibilities for the use of chemical weapons.

38. The Commission's verification activities of the military aspects were the most sensitive elements of its investigation of Iraq's CW-programme. The Commission's attempts to clarify these issues created controversy on the Iraqi side. The document found by the Commission in July 1998 at the Head Quarters of the Iraqi Air force was an example of the documentation related to the military aspects. It detailed the expenditure of special munitions by the Air Force during the Iran-Iraq war. It was taken away by the Iraqi authorities from the Commission's inspection team in the course of the inspection and was not returned to the Commission.

39. The issue most evaluated from the military aspects of the programme is the deployment of chemical munitions from the production and storage facilities to the Army and Air Force in 1991. Undertaking the issue of deployment is an effective tool to verify quantities of CW remained in Iraq prior to the beginning of the Commission's verification. The majority of Iraq's declarations on the deployment were verified up to the level of regional depots and airbases through documents provided by Iraq and physical evidence found by the Commission. Questions remain concerning Iraq's declarations on the deployment of R-400 chemical and biological aerial bombs, special warheads for the Al-Hussein missiles and 122-mm rockets.

40. With the exception of a firing table for one type of 122-mm rocket found in the files from the Haider farm, no other firing and bombing tables for other types of special munitions have been seen by the Commission. According to Iraq, all these documents were destroyed by Iraq in 1991.

41. Military requirements are important to assess credibly Iraq's declarations on types and quantities of CW produced. The only document of this nature provided by Iraq to the Special Commission was the request of the Ministry of Defense for CW for 1988. According to Iraq, this request detailing types and quantities of CW needed was used as a basis for the production of different CW agents and munitions in 1990.

42. According to Iraq, there were no military field manuals specifically related to the use of chemical munitions. Iraq claimed that no specific units were trained to use chemical weapons. Iraq insists that planning for the combat use of CW was the responsibility of a special Tactical group established at the Muthanna State Establishment, Iraq's prime CW R&D and production site. According to the Iraqi authorities, the chain of command and responsibilities with respect to the combat use of CW are related to the national security of Iraq and could not be discussed with the Special Commission.

43. In general, due to the political sensitivity, military aspects are among the less evaluated issues of Iraq's entire CW programme and all its related activities.

44. Technical manuals ("cook books") on the production of chemical warfare agents and their critical precursors were essential elements of Iraq's CW capabilities. These manuals were developed through the scaling up of the processes of the production of CW related compounds and represent the collected empiric experience, including parameters of the chemical reaction in combination with the specific plant configuration and specifications for the equipment used.

45. The Commission found two examples of such manuals related to the production of precursors in the files from the Haider farm. The Commission also found references to manuals on the production of different types of chemical warfare agents, including VX. According to Iraq, the major part of CW related technological documentation was destroyed unilaterally in 1991.

46. It should be recalled, that a significant number of chemical weapons, their components, related equipment and materials were identified and destroyed under the Commission's supervision in the period from 1991 to 1997. This included over 38,000 filled and unfilled chemical munitions, 690 tonnes of chemical warfare agents (including 411 tonnes of bulk agents), more than 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals and about 600 pieces of production equipment.

47. In its accounting for various weapons-related elements of Iraq's CW programme, the Commission has achieved various levels of confidence, depending on the availability of evidence found in the course of the Commission's inspection activities, provided by Iraq or by its former suppliers.

48. The Commission has a high degree of confidence in its accounting for proscribed items which were physically presented by Iraq for verification and disposal. This includes the accounting for: 56,000 special munitions, 411 tonnes of bulk agents, 2,810 tonnes of key precursor and 553 pieces of production equipment.

49. The Commission has a certain degree of confidence in the accounting for proscribed items declared by Iraq as having been destroyed during the 1991 Gulf war. The Commission has accepted through its verification the destruction of 34,000 special munitions and 823 tonnes of key precursors. Outstanding issues remain. These include the accounting for 2,000 unfilled and 550 filled special munitions.

50. The Commission has a lesser degree of confidence in accounting for proscribed items declared by Iraq as having been destroyed unilaterally. These include 15,900 unfilled and 100 filled special munitions, the CW agent VX and 50 tonnes of a precursor for the production of VX. Nevertheless, the Commission has accepted through its verification the destruction of 13,660 special munitions and about 200 tonnes of key precursors. However, residual questions remain with respect to proscribed items destroyed unilaterally. The presentation by foreign suppliers of information on the delivery of munitions and precursors requested by UNSCOM could be helpful in the verification of this area.

51. The priority should be given to the resolution of the most important outstanding issues. These include: material balance of chemical munitions (including verification of the expenditure of special munitions in the 1980s, which is required to increase a degree of confidence with respect to Iraq's declarations of chemical weapons remained in Iraq in 1991; the accounting for 550 artillery shells filled with mustard; verification of the unilateral destruction of R-400 chemical and biological aerial bombs); accounting for the production of the chemical warfare agent VX, and; verification of the completeness of declarations provided by Iraq on the material balance of CW production equipment removed from the Muthanna State Establishment (MSE) prior to the UNSCOM inspections.

52. The Commission identified these issues as priorities on two grounds. Firstly, the resolution of these particular issues would allow the Commission to verify the disposition of Iraq's most advanced proscribed weapons and capabilities and secondly, their resolution would increase considerably the degree of confidence in the accounting for other areas where gaps and inconsistencies still remain. Firstly, the majority of these issues were identified as priorities by the Emergency Session of the Special Commission and endorsed by the Security Council in November 1997. In June 1998, they were included in the "Road map" of disarmament issues provided by the Commission to the Security Council. Finally, the chemical issues of the "Road map" were accepted by Iraq within the scope of the Schedule for work.

53. Several other outstanding issues still remain. These issues are related to the procurement, extent of R&D activities on new types of chemical warfare agents and munitions, disposition of know-how documentation on the production of CW, and military aspects of the programme. As mentioned in Paragraph 3 of this paper, these issues are not covered in the material balances , because they could not be quantified. Given the fact, that these issues do not affect directly the accounting for final weapons and means of their manufacture, the Commission did not include them in the list of priority issues.

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