The Czechoslovak Chemical Unit in the Persian Gulf

and Examination Results Concerning a Potential Use of

Combat Toxic Agents

The unit of Czechoslovak military specialists comprising 169 persons was sent to the Gulf as a result of an agreement between the government of the Czech and Slovak Republic and the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) regarding the function and conditions of Czechoslovak military specialists in the area of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. That agreement was signed in Prague on November 19, 1990, and amended in Riyadh on November 22, 1990. The federal parliament of the CSFR expressed its agreement with it. That resolution was amended with an addendum, in which the federal parliament authorized the government of the CSFR to make a decision on crossing the national border between the KSA and Kuwait in accordance with Article 5 of the Agreement. The government expressed its agreement in the form of resolution number 71, issued on January 31, 1991.

As a result of an operational order of the Northern area commander of the DOD of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the unit was incorporated into the order of that region on December 22 in accordance with Article 5 of the Agreement. On January 1, 1991, the two chemical battalions were incorporated into the order of the 4th and 20th brigade of the KSA Military. The rest of the unit was deployed at the basic camp and with the staff.

Deployment and strategic control of the unit was fully within the competency of Saudi Arabia. The concrete means of completing tasks was decided by the unit commander (Colonel Jan Valo), whose duty was to make sure that the valid Czechoslovak legal order and basic standards of international law were not violated while completing the tasks.

The two chemical battalions incorporated into KSA brigades crossed the border of Kuwait on January 27, 1991. They actively participated in providing chemical support to allied units in carrying out the operational plan. On February 5, 1991, the unit was expanded and the number of its members increased to 198.

The Czechoslovak chemical unit was mainly carrying out these tasks:

1. Chemical support of the HQ of the Northern area and troops deployed in the area of the King Khalid Military City

2. Chemical support of the 4th and 20th brigade of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

3. In case of toxic agents used against personnel to deploy a personnel decontamination site for them

A permanent chemical reconnaissance whose goal was to immediately detect used toxic agents and provide, therefore, information for warning forces and for commanders' decision-making.

During the period after the beginning of combat activity of allied forces (from 04,00 hrs. on January 17, 1991) our chemical reconnaissance detected threshold concentrations of toxic agents in the air. The chemical battalion commander writes in his report precisely: "During the referenced period, a few times we detected life-threatening threshold concentrations of chemical agents yperite and sarin, both in the area of the brigades and in the King Khalid Military City (i.e., at the military camp in which the unit was stationed), probably as a result of allied forces' airstrike on stores of chemical ammunition located in the area of Iraq." That information was published at the time in the Czechoslovak media.

The referenced fact is confirmed by the members of the battalion, chemical specialists who evaluated that fact and took measures in order to protect personnel. Immediately, they sounded an alarm (see appendix number 1, a page from the records of the Operational Group of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Military in Prague, entry 56) and used all means of personal protection. Within approximately two hours the alarm was canceled, when results were negative after repeated tests.

The detected concentrations (reported 0,002 g yperite/m2 and 0,003 mg/l without toxic agent specification) represent the limit of maximal admissible (threshold) concentrations attacking the human body. Those were very isolated positive results of chemical reconnaissance which were confirmed by none of the other participating states (it is proved by the report of the January 30, 1991, "Since January 19, the Czechoslovak unit did not detect any chemical agents" (see appendix number 2 - a page from the records of the Operational Group of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Military in Prague, entry 91).

The Czechoslovak chemical unit had all the available modern chemical reconnaissance and means of testing at its disposal. Those chemical means are able to detect threshold sensitivities (limits that do not violate the normal activities of human organism) of probable toxic agents and they permit distinguishing sarin nerve agents from V-type agents.

The statement that those were really low concentrations that do not cause any, not even temporary, changes in the human organism can be backed by these arguments:

1. Results of the chemical reconnaissance itself.

2. The persons located on the site did not demonstrate any symptoms of being hit by toxic agents (nerve toxic agents, among which the referenced sarin belongs, cause immediate reactions, for example ,myosis; in the case of yperite, the first clinical symptoms of intoxication usually appear within 4 - 6 hours of strike)

3. None of the participating persons had any subsequent effects.

Besides that the important fact is that all the chemical specialists were regular officers (their total number was 56 during the conflict). All of them are military college and military high school graduates with chemical expertise and in accordance with curriculum, they worked with highly toxic agents both in labs and in chemical training areas. In fact, the training of chemical military specialists focused on selected types of toxic agents (OL - 4 set) had been conducted, since the origination of chemical forces in 1950 until January 1990, when it was stopped due to the complaints of ecology movements and village mayors about alleged environmental damages. The chemical forces specialists who underwent that training are professionals and are able to detect the presence of known toxic agents in the terrain, on equipment and in the air within sensitivity limits of the equipment employed. That is why there is a high probability that the detected presence of toxic agents is objective. The fact is that concentrations that used to be used for training in chemical training areas and labs are a few times higher than the concentrations detected in the Persian Gulf.

It is, in fact, proven all around that there was no combat use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and any activity of that type would have become a subject of large investigation conducted by the authorities of world peace organizations. It is possible to conclude that the results measured could be produced by a hit of an industrial facility or a chemical ammunition store during allied forces' bombing. Both the commander’s report and the statements of direct participants confirm that. All the unit members were equipped with the most modern protective means fully comparable to the current world standard, which were to protect them against effects of toxic agents. Any strike by that kind of toxic agents would precipitate a reaction immediately or within a very short time, which was not reported. Latent damage, if it could be considered in case of this group, would be detected, for sure, during the final examinations.

Based on the referenced facts, it is possible to conclude that the event can in no way be linked to the use of chemical weapons, that is, to their dispersion during combat activities, and that the personnel of the Czechoslovak chemical unit could not be affected by combat toxic agents.

The specialists of the health service also confirm those conclusions. None of the unit members applied for medical help motivated by that event, either at the time when toxic agents were detected or later. All the unit members underwent a complex examination at military hospitals after their return from the Persian Gulf, mostly at the Central military hospital Prague. Even there no serious changes caused by demanding climatic conditions or toxic agents were detected.

Many participants in the operations in the Persian Gulf participated later or still do participate in operations of the ACR's unit in Yugoslavia. Even during their other examinations nobody mentioned any problems.

Despite that, until August 31, 1993, the military doctors examined the 18 Persian Gulf veterans who experienced particular health problems; three of them are still under medical supervision. For the time being, nothing that would go beyond "common" problems linked to similar long-term stays abroad was detected.

 

	Time		From	To	Took		Forwarded
Number	Day	hrs.	whom	whom	over	Message content		to whom arranged what (signature)
47	19/1	08,10	Col. Poruzil	OSK	General Henera?	Situation in the area of deployment has not changed
48	19/1	11,15	ZS	OSK	Col Tu	CGS asked for clarification of clarification of movement of the chem. batal. Behind the 20th brig		NSZV Colonel Ti
49	19/1	12,10	CGS	OSK	Col Tu	Two first line chemical battalions are concentrat. in the rear part of the 20th brigade of the KSA's armed forces. Iraq carries out chemic. Attack on its forward line at 08,00 hrs. In the area of our units detected 0.002 g/m2 of yperite. The unit is OK, ready to carry out its tasks. During its movement the KSA's armed forces brigades' had been accompanied only by chem. Rec. squads, they did not cross KSA border.		report at 15,00 Gen Lencka Gen Herera (CGS informed by NSZV) Col Ti
50	19/1	12,30	Col Valo (phone)	NSZV	Col Proma (from NSZV 14,30)	Number 111 - order of the Northern area comm. - our battalions to follow the 4th and 20th brigade during pushing Iraqi armed forces out of Kuwait		Gen Herera Col Hryzak T.
51	19/1	14,20 15,15	K-800	OSK	Col Tu			Gen Herera Col Hryzak T.
52	19/1	14,20 15,15	K-800	OSK	Col Tu	Number 112 - written requirement of Col Valo on the area commander to follow the Article 5 of the Agreement		Gen Herera Col Hryzak T.
53	19/1	14,25 15,15	K-800	OSK	Col Tu	Number 113 - a requirement to		Gen Herera Col Hryzak T.
54	19/1	15,15 16,10	K-800	OSK	Col Tu			Gen Herera Col Hryzak T.
55	19/1	18,37	NSZV	Col Valo				Message stored at Col Hryzak T.
56	19/1	18,40 1850	K-800	CSK	Col Tu			Gen Lenska (NSZV and Col Hryzak)

 

Time

From

To

Took

Forwarded

Number

Day

hrs.

whom

whom

over

Message content

to whom arranged what (signature)

86

Jan 28

17,05

RS

Colonel Valo

Colonel Baca

signature

87

Jan 28

23,10

VALO

K 800

Colonel Baca

: ZS, SCHV

88

Jan 29

05,00

RS

Colonel Krato-chvil

Colonel Baca

: signature

89

Jan 29

20,00

Krato-chvil

Colonel Micha-lek

Colonel Tuma

90

Jan 30

06,00

Valo

Colonel Micha-lek

No change of situation

Colonel Tuma

91

Jan 30

19,00

Colonel Krato-chvil

Colonel Divis

Colonel Divis

1) The CZ unit detected no chemical agents since January 19 2) material requirements -7 chemical instructors to be ready for field activities -supply 5 km of LK-2 cable -supply 5 packs of CRISOVIN drug -supply fuel tank for T815 -supply a left forward indicator for PAJERO 3) to make sure, that

Took over by Spicak on January 31 at 07,00 hrs.

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